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0FOREWORD
Associate Professor G. .l. Hawkins
This seminar was unquestionably timely. It was held on the eve of the
introduction in the New South Wales Parliament of the new Community
Welfare Bill which is addressed to the problems dealt with in the seminar.
Furthermore. it coincided with the conclusion of the Australian Law Reform
Commission‘s two year inquiry into child welfare law and practice in the
Australian Capital Territory.
The Institute was fortunate to be able to secure as speakers Dr John
Seymour who was Commissioner in Charge of the Australian Law Reform
Commission's inquiry; and also Mr Richard Chisholm who was a member
of the New South Wales Legislative Advisory Panel on whose report the
Community Welfare Bill was largely based. Both are recognized authorities
on child welfare law and child welfare systems. No two speakers better
informed on these subjects could have been found in Australia or, for that
matter. overseas.
In addition. the Convenor Mr R. D. Blackmore, Senior Children‘s
Court Magistrate. Sydney who contributed a commentary and Ms Rosemary
Smith and Mr Chris Cunliffe-Jones, both from the New South Wales
Department of Youth and Community Services, were able to provide insight
into the wide range of problems in this area. from the perspective of those
actually working in the ﬁeld. Together with the contributions from the floor,
described by the Chairman. New South Wales Chief Justice, Sir Laurence
Street. as of a quality “not excelled in the seven years that I have been
chairing these seminars". the papers collected in this volume represent a
valuable addition to the Australian literature on the problems which arise in
connection with child welfare.
The Institute has never held a seminar on a more important topic. The
way in which the children‘s court systems should deal with both offenders
and non—offenders is the subject of continuing controversy. The debate
involves many complex questions; and difﬁcult theoretical and practical
problems are at issue. Moreover although there exists an enormous volume
of research findings relevant to these questions we remain ignorant about
many fundamental matters of fact For example. as Dr Seymour says in his
paper. “there is an urgent need for information as to the comparative
effectiveness of different methods for dealing with young offenders".
In fact. although it seems clear that young offenders are responsible for
a disproportionate share of serious crime, we do not even know how large
that share is. We know enough however to recognize that what we do in
this area is of profound importance for the future. Twenty years ago the
late l‘lans Mattick. Professor and Director of the Center for Research in
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Criminal Justice at the University of Illinois, wrote, in this connection:
.[T]he young, after all, are our only real national treasure for they
.represent the future. Even those who have offended against us are a pan of
that future."
It is appropriate therefore that we should be concerned about these
matters. It is particularly appropriate that we should be concerned here in
New South Wales which has the highest rate of use of custodial measures for
juveniles of any State in Australia. It is to be hoped that Mr Cunliffe-Jones‘
prediction that the detention rate is going to fall signiﬁcantly in the next few
years will be fulfilled.
In his cautionary concluding remarks Richard Chisholm observed that
“in this State in particular we have failed to learn lessons that we should
have learned long ago” It was clear that many of those present at the
seminar had already learnt those lessons. This volume of the Proceedings
may help a wider audience to do so The Institute is very grateful to Mr R. D.
Blackmore for his work as Convenor of one of the most successful seminars
the InStitute has even held.
 
  
ASPECTS OF CHILD WELFARE LAW IN AUSTRALIA
Dr J. A. Seymour, PhD.
Australian Institute of Criminology
(Formerly Commissioner in Charge of the Australian Law Reform
Commission's inquiry into child welfare in the ACT.)
The Australian Law Reform Commission’s Report
The Australian Law Reform Commission is bringing to a close its
work on the child welfare reference.l Although its final report has been
completed. it has not yet been published. It is therefore not appropriate to
discuss the Commission‘s recommendations. However it is appropriate to
give an indication of the scope of the report and to discuss some of the more
important matters which it addresses. The report deals with the child welfare
system in the ACT. It contains a detailed examination of ACT. procedures
for dealing with young offenders and with the so-called neglected and
uncontrollable children. It also covers child abuse, legal representation for
children. the regulation of child care facilities and the employment of
children. In each of these areas the theoretical issues are examined and a
series of recommendations is made. In preparing the report it was, of course,
necessary to examine child welfare systems in all Australian jurisdictions
and overseas. This paper will consider selected aspects of child welfare law
in Australia. An effort has been made to identify those areas in which there
are shared problems and to bring out similarities and differences in
approaches to these problems.
Age Limits
In three Australian jurisdictions the ageof criminal responsibility is
seven,2 in two it is eight3 and in'three it is 10‘. There is less variation with
 
I. Under the terms of reference received from the Commonwealth
Attorney-General on 18 February 1979. the Commission was directed to
inquire into child welfare law and practice in the ACT.
2. Western Australia (Criminal Code Act 1913 (W.A), 5.29); Tasmania
(Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas.), s.l8(1)); and the Northern Territory. In
the Northern Territory there is no legislative age of criminal respon-
sibility and hence the common law, which sets the age at seven, is in
force.
3. Victoria (Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), 8.335) and the ACT. (Child Welfare
Ordinance I957 (A.C.T.). s.108).
4. New South Wales (Child Welfare Act 1939 (N.S.W.), 5.126); South
Australia (Children '5 Protection and Young Oﬂenders Act 1979 (SA), s.66);_
and Queensland (The Criminal Code, 3.29).
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regard to the upper limit of the children’s court jurisdiction. In four
jurisdictions this limit is 17’ and in four it is 18‘. Differences in age limits.
particularly those relating to the age of criminal responsibility, raise
questions as to the basis on which these ages are selected. It cannot be said
that the age of criminal responsibility is based on any universally observable
facts of child development The attainment of a particular birthday does not
confer on a child the instantaneous ability to understand the nature and
consequences of his actions. The ﬁxing of the age of criminal responsibility
is no more than the reﬂection of a vague feeling that the very young should
be shielded from the rigours of the criminal law.
The age of responsibility is, in effect, not the age at which the
child can tell right from wrong - most ﬁve year olds can do that —
but the point at which society feels it can unashamedly punish.
Most of the efforts that have gone into raising the age of criminal
responsibility have really been efforts to mitigate the full severity
of the law that might otherwise fall on children whom we
recognise as being imperfectly socialised rather than morally
ignorant".
The practical question raised by the setting of a minimum age of
criminal responsibility is how society should react when a child under that
age commits an act which would be criminal were it committed by someone
over that age. The obvious solution, and one which is regularly employed in
Australia, is to make such a child the subject of non-criminal proceedings.
Instead of being charged, he is dealt with as "uncontrollable“ or “in need of
care.” The adoption of such a course casts doubt on the signiﬁcance of the
concept of the age of crimihal responsibility. The fact that a child is under
this age does not make him immune from court action in respect of
“criminal” behaviour. It can also be argued that the use of non-criminal
proceedings in this situation is fundamentally objectionable. Although
nominally different from a prosecution, the procedure can result in the
imposition of measures which are very similar to those imposed in respect of
children who are explicitly dealt with as offenders. Everyone involved in this
procedure — including the child - knows that the basis for the proceedings is
the act which would have been an offence if the child had been of sufficient
capacity.
 
. 5.- See deﬁnition of “child“ - Victoria (Children's Court Act 1973 (Vic.),
s.3(1)); Queensland (Children’s Services Act 1965 (Qld), 5.8); Tasmania
(Child Welfare Act 1960 (Tas.), 53(1)); Northern Territory (Child Welfare
Act (N.T.), 5.5). '
6. See definition of “child" — South Australia (Children's Protection and
Young Offenders Act 1979 (SA), 5.4); Western Australia (Child Welfare Act
1947 (W.A.), s.4(1)); and definition of “young person“ New South Wales
(Child Welfare Act 1939 (N.S.W.), s.4(1)); Australian Capital Territory
(Child Welfare Ordinance 1957 (ACT) 5.5).
7. Morris, ‘Struggle for the Juvenile Court,‘ (1966) New Society. 7(176), l7.
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An inescapable artiliciality surrounds the use of non-criminal pro-
cedures to deal with offences by the very young. Reliance on these
procedures is also open to fundamental legal objections. lf non-criminal
procedures are employed to deal with conduct which. in the case of an adult,
would amount to a criminal offence,should the civil standard of prooﬂrather
than proof beyond reasonable doubt, be adopted? Such a course would be
open to criticism, for a young child dealt with by way of care proceedings
wou|d_receive fewer protections than an adult charged with a crime. If an
attempt were made to solve the problem by importing the criminal standard
of proof into proceedings which are otherwise of a civil nature the resulting
procedure would be complex and confusing.“ Another problem posed by an
attempt to deal with criminal behaviour by way of non-criminal proceedings ,
is that a decision must be made about any mental element (the mens rea)
which. in the case of an adult, would be an ingredient in the crime charged.
By definition, a child under the age of criminal responsibility cannot possess
this menv rea. Yet any procedure which disregarded the mental element
which would have to be proved if an adult were charged would be
objectionable. These considerations provide major obstacles to the utili-
sation of non-criminal proceedings to deal with behaviour by a young child
which would be criminal if committed by an adult It can be argued that a
rule setting a minimum age of criminal responsiblity should mean what it
says. It should not be possible to circumvent it by employing non-criminal
procedures. Having set an age of criminal responsibility, society must accept
that those below this age are immune from court proceedings in respect of
behaviour which, but for their age. would amount to a criminal offence. If
the child’s situation justiﬁes the initiation of non-criminal proceedings,
these should be employed. Such a conclusion reﬂects the view that if a
child‘s situation does not warrant the initiation of proceedings of this kind,
and his behaviour is such as would amount to a criminal offence were he
over the age of criminal responsibility, the control of his behaviour is the
responsibility of the parent or guardian, rather than the state.
Whatever view is adopted with regard to the various arguments
outlined, it is clear that the maintenance of a minimum age of criminal
responsibility raises difﬁcult theoretical and practical problems. There is a
need for a fundamental re-examination of the concept of the age of criminal
rcsponsibility.° This re-cxamination must be undertaken against a back- _
ground of criminal law principles. If society’s concern is with protecting
8. For an example of legislation which attempts to combine criminal and
civil procedures in the manner described, see Children and Young Persons
Act I969 (UK), 3.3.
9. For a discussion of the concept of the age of criminal responsibility see
Kean, ‘The History of the Criminal Liability of Children,‘ (1937) 53 Law
Quarterly Review, 364; Williams, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Chil-
drcn.~ |l954| Cn‘m, LR 493; Williams, Criminal Law — The General Part,
(2nd ed.. I961), 814-820: and Westbrook, ‘Mens Rea in the Juvenile
CourL‘ 5 J. Family Law. 121 (I965).
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from the criminal process those whose incapacity deprives them of the mens
rea' which normally must be established as an ingredient of any offence, it
can be argued that there is no need to set a minimum age of criminal
responsibility. It might be possible to rely on the basic principles of criminal
law which require the prosecution affirmatively to establish the mens rea of
a defendant in) every case...Thus a satisfactory examination of the age of
criminal responsibility would raise complex questions, the answers to which
would have ramifications throughout the criminal justice system in
Australia.
Although arbitrary choices must be made, the setting of upper limits
for the children’s court raises fewer problems. However, if Australia follows
developments which have occurred in the United States, difﬁculties could
emerge regarding the treatment of older juveniles who have committed
serious offences. If serious juvenile crime were to become, or, equally
important, were to be seen by the media and the politicians to be, a severe
problem, the result could be agitation to lower the age at which a juvenile
passes out of the jurisdiction of the children’s court An examination of
Australian procedures for dealing with serious offences by the young
suggests that these_procedures are sufficiently ﬂexible to allow serious
juvenile offenders to be dealt with by courts for adults if this is considered
appropriate. In all Australian jurisdictions certain indictable offences are
legislatively excluded from the jurisdiction of the children’s court, regardless
of the age of the child charged.lo It is also common for the relevant
legislation to permit the presiding magistrate, at his discretion, to decline to
 
10. In N.S.W. the children's court may not exercise jurisdiction in respect of
homicide, rape or an offence punishable by death or penal servitude for
life (Child Welfare Act 1939 (N.S.W.), s.86(1)). In Victoria the only offence
excluded is homicide (Children's Court Act 1973 (Vic.), s.15(l)), and the
same is true in South Australia (Children's Protection and Young Oﬂ'enders
Act 1979 (SA). 5.45). In Queensland the excluded offences are those
punishable by imprisonment with hard labour for life (Children's
Services Act 1965 (Qld.), 529(1)), and in Western Australia they are wilful
murder, murder, manslaughter and treason and attempting any of those
crimes (Child Welfare Act 1947 (W.A.), 520(8)). In Tasmania a children’s
court must deal with all offences committed by children under 14 except
murder, attempt to murder, manslaughter, or wounding with intent to do
grievous bodily harm. With regard to children who have attained the age
of 14, the same offences are excluded, together with rape and robbery
with violence (Child Welfare Act 1960 (Tas.), s.27(1) and (2)). Under
A.C.T. law the children’s court may not deal with a number of speciﬁed
offences, all of which are punishable by imprisonment for life (Child
Welfare Ordinance 1957 (ACT), 5.56).
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exercisejurisdiction in respect of other indictable offences.” South Australia
provides an interesting exception to the pattern described. Under s.47(l) of
the Children's Protection and Young Oﬂenders Act 1979 (SA), where the State
Attorney-General is of the opinion that a child charged with an indictable
offence (other than a minor indictable offence") should be tried in the
appropriate adult court, the Attorney-General may apply to a Judge of the
Supreme Court for an order that the child be so tried.13
The existence of procedures by which some young offenders can be
removed from the jurisdiction of a court specially created to deal with them
is somewhat paradoxical. It is an admission that the system cannot or does
not want to deal with one member of the class for whom the court was
established. Yet, as Feld has pointed out, attention must be paid to the
political reality that “highly visible, serious offenses evoke community
outrage or fear that only the punitive sanction of an adult conviction can
mollify."
The availability of a mechanism for prosecuting the hard-Core
youthful offender as an adult is thus an important safety valve,
permitting the expiatory sacriﬁce of some youths to quiet
political and community clamor and to preserve a more benign
system for those remaining. In the absence of transfer pro-
cedures. the pressures to lower the maximum age of juvenile
court jurisdiction could be almost irresistible. While lowering the
maximum age would reach most of these older, sophisticated
juvenile offenders, it would also sweep many youths who might
be rehabilitated (or who perhaps are simply less culpable) into
the adult criminal process.”
Diversion from the Court
In this paper the term “diversion" is used to describe procedures
employed as alternatives to a prosecution. The differing approaches adopted
l I. See, for example, Child Welfare Act 1939 (N.S.W.), s.86(2); Children's Court
Act I973 (Vic), s.15(3); Children’s Services Act 1965 (Qld.), s.29(2); Child
Welfare Act 1947 (W.A.), 520(4); Child Welfare Ordinance 1957 (ACT),
s.65(2). But cp. Child Welfare Act 1960 (Tas.), 527(1) and (2). The Western
Australian and Tasmanian provisions are distinctive by virtue of the
fact that they indicate that, where a-children’s court has jurisdiction, it
cannot decline to exercise that jurisdiction in respect of an indictable
offence committed by a child under the age of 14.
12. As defined in the Justices Act 1921 (SA).
l3. For a discussion of s.47(l), see In Re Szekely (1980) 25 SASR 112.
I4. Feld. ‘Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The
Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions’; 62 Minnesota
LR, 515, 518-519 (1978).
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to the diversion of young offenders from the court provide what are
undoubtedly the most interesting variations in the ﬁeld ofjuvenilejustice in
Australia. They also provide opportunities for extremely important. com-
parative research. 0n the one hand are those systems in which the
prosecution decision is left to the police and in which the major alternative
to a prosecution is a police warning or caution. Victoria is an example of a
State with a particularly well developed system of cautioning for juveniles.
On the other hand are those jurisdictions which have created more elaborate
alternatives to the court. The jurisdictions referred to are South Australia
and Western Australia, which have introduced informal panels to deal with
a range of young offenders. Panels of the kind operated in these two States
represent perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Australian juvenile
justice system. A consideration of all the issues and questions raised when a
panel system is compared with a system which relies on police warnings is
beyond the scope of this paper. All that can be attempted here is to highlight
some of the important matters raised by an examination of the two
approaches. Before doing so, however, it is~ desirable to give a brief
description of the panel system in South and Western Australia.
The South Australian Children’s Aid Panels, established under the
Children's Protection and Young Oﬂenders Act 1979 (SA), may deal with all
offences by children except homicide and certian road traffic offences. The
panels deal with those matters referred to them by a Screening Panel. A
Children's Aid Panel consists of a policeman and a member of the
Department for Community Welfare. The child and at least one parent or
guardian must be present for the panel to proceed, and the panel must refer
the matter to the children's court if the child so requests or if he does not
admit the offence. After discussing the offence and the surrounding
circumstances with the child and his parent or guardian, the panel may
warn or counsel the child and his parent or guardian, request the child or
his guardian to sign an undertaking, or refer the matter to the children‘s
court Provision for Western Australia’s Children’s Panels is made in the
Child Welfare Act 1947 (WA). Panels in that State deal with ﬁrst offenders,
under the age of 16. There are restrictions as to the type of offence with
which a panel may deal. A schedule to the Act lists offences over which a
panel has no jurisdiction. Each panel is made up of a police officer or a
retired police officer and a field worker from the State Department for
Community Welfare. As in South Australia the child must have admitted the
offence before the panel is able to deal with him. The child may elect, or his
parent or guardian may request, to have the matter heard by a children's
court A panel’s powers are: to dismiss the complaint, to ask the parent and
child to enter into a voluntary supervision agreement, or to refer the matter
to a children’s court.
In order to assess the contribution which a panel can make to
procedures for dealing with young offenders it is helpful to identify the
functions which panels of the kind operated in South and Western Australia ‘
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can pcrform." These are:
0 It can administer admonitions.
0 It can perform a symbolic role. Referring a child to a panel can be
seen as a response to the community’s demand to “do something”
about an offence. without necessarily bringing it to court
0 It can provide a venue for involving parents and child in a
discussion of their problems and family relationships.
0 It can serve as a forum for on-the-spot counselling.
0 It can refer children and parents to the help they need or, by
consent, arrange informal intervention and oversight of a kind
beyond the scope of a police Juvenile Aid Bureau.
There is merit in the argument that a panel provides a particularly
appropriate forum for the performance of these functions. It has an air of
authority. The admonitions it administers may have more impact than a
police warning. and perhaps just as much as one delivered by a magistrate.
Because of this authority, child and parents may take the matter seriously,
whereas informal handling by the police might be interpreted as a “let-oft".
Yet a good panel can also combine an air of authority with informality and
so provide a setting in which real discussion can take place. By contrast a
court tends to frighten many of those who appear before it, whatever the
intentions and efforts of those involved to create an informal atmosphere.
‘ With regard to the other functions listed, it could be argued that most of
them can be performed equally well by other means. If the panel is seen as a
venue for discussion and counselling, and a referral agency, the advice
which it provides might be just as satisfactorily made available by welfare
workers. Indeed, it might be thought that a panel would inevitably introduce
elements of formality where informality is required. Further, there is a
danger that a panel might become a court under another name, but one
which fails to provide legal safeguards. Certainly those who appear before it
would frequently see it as a kind of court As a United States report has
pointed out, although informal procedures appear informal to those who
administcr them, to those caught up in the net they are impressively
authoritative and formal.I6 Other reservations about a panel must also be
considered. In time an appearance before a panel would probably be
regarded as stigmatising and thus one of the beneﬁts of avoiding court
proceedings would be lost Also, there are dangers in a system which makes
the avoidance of a prosecution dependent on an admission of guilt The
South Australian and Western Australian panels require such an admission
before they will deal with a case. Further, there is the danger that
IS. For a further analysis of the functions of panels, see Seymour
‘Children‘s Boards in New Zealand: Some Unanswered Questions’,
(I977), It) ANZJ of Criminology, 233.
I6. President‘s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, (1967),
It).
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panels will deal with a substantial number of children who would simply be
warned and released in a system which does not employ a panel. Reliance
on a panel, far from facilitating the diversion of offenders, could have a net-
widening effect.‘7 Finally, a panel is open to criticism as an uneasy and
ambiguous compromise between a welfare agency and a criminal court, with
‘ neither the informality and expertise of the former nor the concern for due
process traditionally displayed by the latter.
Yet these are primarily theoretical arguments. More research is needed.
In particular there is an urgent need for information as to the comparative
effectiveness of different methods for dealing with young offenders. At ﬁrst
sight it would seem that it should be possible to obtain clear answers to the
question whether court proceedings are more “effective” than diversion from
the court and whether one form of diversion is more “effective" than
another. Two points can be made about questions of this kind. First, few
studies have been undertaken of Australian procedures for dealing with
young law-breakers. Little information is available. Secondly, claims about
the effectiveness of intervention in inhibiting further illegal behaviour
should generally be viewed sceptically. Surveys based on official statistics
can show whether a child has again come to notice after his initial brush
with the criminal law. They cannot indicate whether he has committed
further offences and not been apprehended. Even if it is certain that a
particular child. has not re-offended it is impossible to be sure that his
subsequent avoidance of crime is the result of the intervention. A change in '
behaviour which is claimed as a “success" of the system might be the result
of maturation rather than of any action taken by society.
Among the Australian studies there are some which seem to point to
the high “success rates" of certain methods. In Victoria'it has been shown
that only a small proportion of children re-offend after a police warning." In
 
17. Evidence which seems to conﬁrm that certain diversionary schemes can
have a “net-widening” effect is beginning to emerge in Australia. See
Sarri and Bradley, ‘Juvenile Aid Panels: An Alternative to Juvenile
Court Processing in South Australia’, 26 Crime and Delinquency, 42, 55
(1980). For United States studies, see Blomberg, ‘Diversion and Accele-
rated Social Control', 68 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 274,
(1977); Lincoln, ‘Juvenile Referral and Recidivism', in Carter and Klein,
,(eds.), Back on the Street, (1976), 321; and Empey, American Delinquency.
Its Meaning and Construction, (1978), 541-2.
18. This is indicated by research conducted by Morman who studied the
records of 1551 children warned by Victorian police in 1969 and 2281
warned in 1972. The follow-up period for members of the former group
was five years, and for those. in the latter group was two years. The
overall success rate was 74.8%. Horman ‘Juvenile Delinquents and the
Role of the Police in Victoria‘, unpublished LLB (Hons) Thesis,
Monash University, (1975).
 
l‘)
South Australia and Western Australia the number ofchildren who are dealt
with by the special panels and who again come to notice is not large.”
Similarly. in N.S.W. a study showed that 62.3% of a sample of males who
had appeared before the children’s court did not re-appear before the
court.20 All of these ﬁndings can be advanced as indicating the efﬁcacy of
the particular method employed. Proponents of a police warning or panel
system could claim that these diversionary strategies were a “success", while
supporters of the court could also claim a relatively high “success rate". The
difﬁculty with such studies is that they did not employ control groups. There
is no way of knowing whether other methods would have achieved similar or
better “success rates" with comparable groups of children. Reference can,
however, be made to a United States study which compared the results
achieved by diversion programs with those achieved by the use of the court .
process. Young offenders were randomly assigned to: release (i.e., the
equivalent of a police warning was administered), referral (i.e., informal
l9. A study of re-offending rates of children who appeared before Chil-
dren‘s Aid Panels in South Australia found that 21.6% were known to
have re-offended. This re-offending rate was very similar to that
demonstrated by children who had appeared before the children’s court.
See Richmond, ‘Juvenile Offenders in South Australia 1972-1977:
Appearance Patterns of Individuals’\unpublished, (1978). See also
Report of the Director General of Community Welfarefor the Year ended 30
June 1980. 25, Tables 17 and 20. In Western Australia, although
legislative provision for Children's Panels was not made until 1976 (see
Child Welfare Amendment Act (No. 2) 1976 (W.A)), an informal panel
system was in operation from 1964. The Western Australian Depart-
ment for Community Welfare undertook a study of the records of
children who appeared before a panel. Each child was followed up
until he attained the age of 18 (the upper limit of the children's court
jurisdiction in Western Australia). The study covered only subsequent
children's court appearances. It revealed that, of those children who
had appeared before a panel and who had, between 1972 and 1980,
attained the age of 18. more than 80% did not subsequently appear in
the children's court. The ﬁgures ranged from 83% to 89%, with a mean
of 85%. (Figures supplied by the Western Australian Department for
Community Welfare).
20. This ﬁgure is derived from a study of a random sample of 1250 male
juvenile offenders in N.S.W. Of these, 37.7% had more than one
conviction by the time they reached their eighteenth birthday, i.e., 62.3%
appeared only once in the children's court These ﬁgures do not include
subsequent appearances as adults. nor do they include any appearances
relating to trafﬁc offences. See Kraus, ‘On the Adult Criminality of
Male Juvenile Delinquents', undated.
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diversion to community and welfare agencies), and prosecution. Signiﬁ-
cantly lower re-offending rates were found among those who had been
informally referred than among those who had been taken to court Those
who had simply been released fared signiﬁcantly better than both other
groups.“ Although this is only one study, it does directly compare the results
achieved by different methods. This research, together with the Australian
evidence relating to re-offending rates following a police warning or an
appearance before a panel, suggest that diversion might, for a wide range of
young offenders, be just as effective as a prosecution. What is needed is
further Australian research to conﬁrm or deny this hypothesis. There is also
a need for research which will directly compare the efﬁcacy of different
diversionary strategies and which, in particular, will compare the impact of
police warnings with the impact of panel appearances.
Special Police Units
Almost as interesting and signiﬁcant as the comparison between those
Australian jurisdictions which operate panels and those which do not is the
comparison between those jurisdictions in which specialist police units exist
to deal with juveniles and those in which no such units exist In two
Australian jurisdictions there exist units known as Juvenile Aid Bureaux.
These are Queensland22 and the ACT. Special police units for dealing with
children are well established overseas. Juvenile liaison schemes and juvenile
bureaux have existed for some time in England," and the New Zealand
Police operate a Youth Aid Section.“ In the United States many police
departments have juvenile bureaux or have appointed juvenile ofﬁcers."
Such arrangements indicate an acceptance of the view that the police should
adopt a specialised approach to the problem of dealing with children in
trouble. Recent studies in the United States have stressed the value of police
 
21. Klein, ‘Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A
Litany of Impediments,’ in Morris and Tonry (eds), Crime and Justice:
An Annual Review of Research, Vol.1, (1979), 145, 192.
22. For a description of the stafﬁng and functions of the Queensland
Juvenile Aid Bureau, see Queensland Police Department, Annual Report
1979, 25-26.
23. See Oliver, The Metropolitan Police Approach to the Prosecution ofJuvenile
Oﬂenders, (1978); Mack, ‘Police Juvenile Liaison Schemes', (1963). 3 Brit.
.1 Criminal, 361; and Taylor, Study of the Juvenile Liaison Scheme in West
. Ham 1961-1965, (1971).
24. Some details of the work of the Youth Aid Section are provided in the
Report of the New Zealand Police Departmentfor the Year Ended 31 March
1980, 12-13.
25. Kobetz, The Police Role and Juvenile Delinquency, (1971), Chapter 2.
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specialisation with regard to the young.26 As has been observed in a report of
lhe Juvenile Justice Standards Project:
|J|uvenile criminality would seem to be deserving of more
determined and more methodical attention than it has received
in the past. [Pvlolice departments may no longer hope to
somehow muddle through in their dealings with young people.
They must assign resources to the task on a planned basis and
they must develop and engage special skills for dealing with it.27
In the course of its work on the child welfare reference the Law Reform
Commission undertook a study of the work of the ACT. Juvenile Aid
~ ‘ Bureau. The functions which it performs are as follows:
0 dealing, either by way of a warning and counselling or a prosecution,
with children who come to notice for the alleged commission of an
offence:
O dealing, either informally or by way of court action, with neglected
and uncontrollable children, runaways, and other children in
trouble: ’ ‘
0 providing advice and assistance to children, parents and other
members of the community;
0 providing information to other members of the police force regarding
children who come to notice;
0 patrolling such places as amusement centres and shopping centres;
and
o maintaining records of cases which come to the Bureau’s notice.
Several comments should be made on the functions performed by the ‘
Juvenile Aid Bureau. First. the Bureau does not exercise exclusive respon-
sibility in respect of any category of children in trouble. It deals only with
those children who happen to come to its notice. Other members of the force
are ,not required to refer cases to it and only a small proportion of the
Bureau‘s work comes from other police ofﬁcers. Secondly, the fact that so
few of the cases which come to the notice of the Bureau staff are referred by
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, (1976), 245; Institute of
~Judicial Administration, American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice
Standards Project. Police Handling of Juvenile Problems, (1977), 83f.
(hereafter ‘Juvenile Justice Standards Project’).
. Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Police Handling ofJuvenile Problems,
(I977), 83-84.
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other members of the police indicates that one of its major purposes is to
provide a direct and distinctive service to the community rather than to act
as a specialist resource to the police. The Bureau is able to deal with cases in
an informal, low-key manner and to offer advice and assistance to members
of the public. Thirdly the Bureau may be described as a “welfare arm" of the
police, and this can create role conflicts.” Its members must endeavour to
combine welfare and law enforcement functions.
The most difﬁcult questions raised by an examination of the operation
of a Juvenile Aid' Bureau relate to the handling of young offenders. It would
be neither appropriate nor realistic for members of a Bureau to attempt to
assume exclusive responsibility for juvenile crime. Inevitably they must
share this responsibility with other members of the force. In some cases
offences by the young will come to the notice of Bureau staff and be handled
by them. In other cases general duties ofﬁcers or detectives will deal with
juvenile matters without reference to Bureau staff. This creates the pos-
sibility that two quite spearate sets of procedures for dealing with young
offenders will co-exist Children whose cases happen to come to the notice of
the Bureau might be dealt with in one way, and those who come to the
notice of other members of the force might be dealt with quite differently.
This problem can to some extent be overcome if clear criteria are laid down
for the handling of juvenile cases. The aim of such criteria would be to
produce consistency in the making of the decision to warn or prosecute a
young offender. However, the difﬁculty here is that members of a Bureau
might see themselves as providing a particularly sympathetic and under-
standing approach to children in trouble. Such a perception of their role
might make them more willing than their colleagues to deal with juvenile
matters by way of a warning.
Clearly the role of a Juvenile Aid Bureau with regard tojuvenile crime
is difﬁcult to deﬁne. However, if it is desired to identify the distinctive
functions which a Bureau can perform with regard to young offenders, there
are two which suggest themselves. First, emphasis can be placed on the
community relations aspect of its work. Development of this aspect would
require the activities of the Bureau to be publicised in such a way as to
encourage members of the public to regard a direct notification to the
Bureau as the appropriate method of bringing an alleged offence by a child
to police notice. Secondly, a Bureau can be seen as a resource on which
other members of the force may call. Police could be encouraged to refer
cases to the Bureau. With regard to this possibility, however, it should be
noted that the ﬁgures compiled by the Law Reform Commission suggest
that, in the ACT, other members of the police force refer cases to the
Bureau infrequently. Information as to the reason for this is not available.
Members of the police may be insufﬁciently aware of the role of the Bureau,
 
28. Cain, ‘Role conflict among Police Juvenile Liaison Ofﬁcers‘, (1968), 8
Brit. J. Criminal, 366.
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they may lack conﬁdence in its ability to provide effective assistance (either
because they are unsympathetic to its aims and methods or because they
believe it to be understaffed). or they may prefer to handle their own cases
themselves. Probably all these.factors play a part.
One speciﬁc function which a Bureau might perform with regard to
criminal cases handled by other members of the force is the provision of
advice and assistance to a child and his family following the administration
of a warning. If the commission of an offence brings to notice difficulties
which a family is experiencing, appropriate assistance might be offered by
the Juvenile Aid Bureau. When a decision has been made to warn a child
following the commission of an offence, the police officer responsible for
handling the case could be encouraged to consider the possibility of
arranging a home visit by a member of the Bureau. The purpose of the visit
would be solely to offer advice and to provide information as to appropriate
welfare services. It would not be desirable for supervision, such as that
(provided under some English Juvenile Liaison Schemes, to be undertaken.
The member of the Juvenile Aid Bureau should not maintain continuing
involvement with the child and his family. Members of such units should
not act the part of social workers or therapists.29 Performance of such a
function can exacerbate the role conﬂict to which reference has been made.
Although a Juvenile Aid Bureau is the “welfare arm” of the police, wherever
possible it is important to avoid the expenditure of police time on duties
which can more appropriately be performed by trained welfare personnel.
Further. a study of the effects of an English Juvenile Liaison Scheme
suggests that the supervision provided under the scheme did not sub-
stantially affect the rate of recidivism.”
Less troublesome is the role of a Juvenile Aid Bureau with regard to
neglected and abused children and other children in need of care. It is
appropriate for members of a specialist juvenile unit to assume primary
responsibility for police work with young non-offenders. Performance of this
function is a logical corollary of a Bureau’s acceptance of a welfare role.
Members of a Bureau can be expected to have a closer knowledge of health
and welfare services than the average member of the police and to be
accustomed to working with health and welfare personnel. A Bureau cannot
function effectively without establishing a close liaison with a range of
community agencies. Hence it is well placed to assume responsibility for the
handling of non-criminal matters which come to police notice.
2‘). Juvenile Justice Standards Project. Police Handling of Juvenile Problems,
(I977). 103.
30. Rose and Hamilton. ‘Effects of 3 Juvenile Liaison Scheme,’ (1970) 10
Brit. .1. Criminal, 2.
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Finally, consideration should be given to other possible roles for 3
Juvenile Aid Bureau.
0 A Point of Contact. Reference has already been made to the possibility
of publicising the work of a Bureau and of encouraging members of
the public to regard a notiﬁcation to a Bureau as the appropriate
method of bringing an alleged offence by a child to police notice. A
bureau's public role need not, however, be confined to receipt of
information as to alleged offences. Together with health and welfare
agencies, a Juvenile Aid Bureau can be seen as an agency from which
parents and other members of the community may seek advice about
children in trouble.
0 Education. Members of the Bureau are well placed to perform an
educational role, both in the community and among other members
of the police. As an example of community education, mention can
be made of the educational activities undertaken by the Youth Aid
Section of the New Zealand Police. Members of the section regularly
visit schools to give talks on the work of the police and also give talks
to groups and organisations interested in the problems of youth. In
London, Juvenile Bureau ofﬁcers also undertake duties of this kind.
Members of a Bureau can also fulfil an important role in police
training. They can explain the functions of the bureau and encourage
other members of the force to take advantage of the assistance which
it offers. Among police there is a widespread view that dealing with
children is low status work. Police patrolmen “assign a low priority to
working with troublesome juveniles".
Their experience teaches them that the majority of cases in which
they are called upon to act are trivial, that most of these cases
allow no good solutions; and that even a successful treatment ofa
case is not considered an accomplishment of note in the hierarchy
of police values. The risk of frustration and the absence of credit
lead patrolmen to shun assignments involving young people, to get
involved as little as possible when they cannot be avoided.
Consequently, skill in the handling of juvenile problems is less
'well developed than skill in other areas of police work No
points are gained by careful and considerate handling of a
juvenile problem, and there is some risk that attention given to it
will be judged excessive in relation to problems deemed more
important."
Members of a Juvenile Aid Bureau can play a part in questioning
attitudes such as these and in emphasising the importance of careful
handling of cases involving children.
 
3|. Bittner, ‘Policing Juveniles: The Social Context of Common Practice,‘ in
Roseheim (ed.), Pursuing Justice for the Child, (1976), 69. 80.
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0 Monitoring. Members of a Juvenile Aid Bureau can monitor police
practices with regard to children and. where they consider it
necessary. make suggestions as to changes in procedure. Although
it is not appropriate that a Bureau should be responsible for “delin-
quency prevention" or for the formulation of broad policies for
dealing with children in trouble, it is in a position to analyse trends
emerging from cases which come to notice and so to identify
particular problems with which the child welfare system should
endeavour to deal.
Conclusion
The ﬁeld embraced by child welfare law is a broad and complex one. It
is obviously not possible to cover it adequately in a paper of this kind. What
has been attempted is the identiﬁcatidn of certain aspects of the system
which are. or are likely to become, particularly signiﬁcant in Australia.
Interest in the reform of child welfare laws is apparent throughout the
country. In all of Australia‘s States and Territories child welfare laws are. or
recently have been. under review. The field is a lively and controversial one.
It seems that there is something about it which makes it the subject of
special concern. This concern is not confined to' Australia. In many parts of
the world policies are continuously under review. “The whole history of
child welfare is a history of reform. We are never quite satisﬁed."32
32. Professor A. J. Kahn, address to a national conference, ‘Towards an
Australian Family Policy,’ Sydney, 8-12 May 1980.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr J. A. Seymour
When I prepared the paper which has been distributed I was in some
difficulty, as the Australian Law Reform Commission had not completed its
report and I was therefore unable to discuss the recommendations made.
I am still facing the same difﬁculty. The report is virtually complete.
but the ﬁnishing touches are still being put to a draft Child Welfare
Ordinance. The Commission will then report to the Commonwealth
Attomey-General, and naturally the Commission's recommendations can-
not be discussed until he has tabled the report in the Federal Parliament.
What. I propose to do, therefore, is to bring together some of the issues
dealt with in my paper. Because the child welfare ﬁeld is so broad I shall
concentrate on policies for dealing with young offenders. In particular, I
shall concentrate on policies which can be subsumed under that fashionable
slogan word _“diversion". I use this term to describe procedures employed as
alternatives to the prosecution of young law breakers. A discussion of
diversion raises what are probably the most important and difficult
questions facing those of us who are concerned with the planning of systems
for dealing ,with young offenders. Further, these questions are, as I shall
show, particularly topical in N.S.W.
As my time is limited I shall begin by assuming that it is widely
,accepted that positive efforts should be made to divert young offenders from
the court. This assumption is reflected in many of the systems for dealing
with young offenders in Australia. Obviously there will be disagreements as
to how vigorously a policy of diversion should be pursued and as to what is
an acceptable prosecution or diversion rate. Nevertheless I believe that today
there would be few in Australia who would argue that every young offender
who comes to notice should be brought before a court In his commentary
Mr Blackmore goes so far as to say that he believes that in N.S.W. 65% of
young offenders could be diverted from the court I propose therefore to look
at the mechanisms by which a policy of diversion can be pursued and the
aims and assumptions which these mechanisms embody. At the outset one
general comment can be made on the aims and assumptions reflected in all
procedures for dealing with young offenders. As with so many aspects of
these procedures, a broad distinction can be drawn between responses
directed towards a child's offence and responses directed to the child‘s
underlying problems, of which the offence may be merely a symptom. As all
of you will recognise, this is the needs/deeds debate about which so much
has been written. I need say no more about this. It is a debate with which
you will all be familiar. '
Let me turn now to mechanisms. Given the assumption that it is
desirable to establish methods by which young offenders should be diverted
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from the court. let us consider the various methods by which this might be
donc. These are as follows:
0 Reliance on police warnings or cautions. Police warning procedures
may be very informal or highly formalised and carefully controlled.
0 A screening agency. It is this model which is particularly topical in
N.S.W. in view of the provisions in the Community Welfare Bill
regarding Children's Panels. South Australia has introduced
Screening Panels. However, screening need not necessarily be per-
formed by a panel of this kind. In Scotland it is done by an
independent official. known as a reporter. to whom the police are
obliged to refer the majority of cases involving offences by the
young. He makes the decision whether formal proceedings should
ensue.
0 Hearing Panels of the kind operated in South and Western
Australia and in New Zealand. Talk of panels raises the possibility
of terminological confusion. It is necessary to make a distinction
between screening panels and hearing panels. The former-does not
hold a hearing attended by the child: it makes a decision on the
basis of reports submitted to it. The latter do hold informal
hearings: the child and parents appear before it and often quite
lengthy discussions ensue.
In considering the operation of the various types of diversionary
mechanisms listed. it is helpful to make a distinction between those which
seek to do no more than divert a childfrom the court and those which seek
to divert the child to a preferred alternative. A decision to divert a child can
be seen as a negative decision, a decision not to prosecute, or it can be seen
as a positive decision. a decision that a child can be more appropriately
dealt with and helped by employing an alternative to a prosecution. The
needs/deeds debate is relevant‘to this distinction. What I have called a
negative decision, a decision not to prosecute, is one which is made in the
context of a criminal justice system. It is a decision to display lenience, a
decision to impose the least severe penalty. In contrast is the positive
decision to direct a child to a preferred alternative because it is believed that
this alternative is better for the child. It reflects a desire to do something to or
for the child. Such a decision can be characterised as a child welfare or
“needs“ decision. Ofcourse in real life the contrast is never as clear as I have
suggested but making this distinction is helpful if we wish to determine
what a policy of diversion really means.
Let us apply the concepts which I have outlined to the various types of
diversionary mechanisms. A simple police warning system reflects a
criminal justice approach. A decision to warn is a decision that nothing
further is required. that the child has learned his lesson by being
apprehended and that the most lenient of all penalties is appropriate. Yet
even here the ambiguity which characterises procedures for dealing with
young offenders appears. Some police warning schemes, notably the English
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juvenile liaison schemes, endeavour to go beyond what I have characterised
as a negative decision not to prosecute. They seek to do something for the
child and thus move into the realm of the child welfare, needs approach.
They do this by offering counselling to children who have been diverted
from the court. So even the most simple and clear cut application of a
diversionary strategy can become blurred and the objectives can become
uncertain.
More sophisticated is the system which sets up a central screening
agency. In considering this model I shall concentrate on the N.S.W. Bill,
since this will obviously be of major interest to the members of this
audience. Panels to be established under this Bill will be screening panels:
they will not hold hearings. They will deal with cases on the basis of reports
which they receive. With the exception of certain categories of offences (see
cl.l3l) the prosecution decision will be made by a Children’s Panel. When
an offence allegedly committed by a child comes to notice the panel will
stand between the police and the court. Unless the child wishes a matter to
go to court it is the panel which will decide whether he will do so. Important
political decisions are reﬂected in this legislation. The power to prosecute a
child in respect of any of the offences to which the Bill applies is to be taken
away from the police. Also, incidentally, the power of private prosecution is
presumably abolished in respect of these offences. But I am more interested
in the aims and assumptions reﬂected in the provisions of the Bill. Each
panel will consist of a member of the police force, an ofﬁcer nominated by
the Minister for Youth and Community Services, and another suitably
qualiﬁed person. Thus the police are to maintain involvement in the
prosecution decision, but could presumably be outvoted.
The most interesting questions about the panel are what sort of
information will it receive and what will it do with this information? A panel
will be permitted to inspect any ﬁles or records held by the police or by the
Department of Youth and Community Services. It will not be empowered to
order reports. Let us suppose that an alleged offender who has previously
come to notice is referred to a panel. The police representative will have
details of the current offence and of previous offences. The Department of
Youth and Community Services‘ representative may have background
information if the child's previous contact with the system has led to the
preparation of a report or to any form of continuing contact The question
which must be asked is: what use will be made of the background
information? Will it be employed in the context of what I have called a
criminal justice decision? If it is found that, though the child‘s offence is
relatively serious, the child is disadvantaged and has personal and social
problems, how will the panel use this information? Why is it important that
it should understand the child? To determine whether he is less culpable
than he might appear because there are extenuating circumstances? Is the
decision to be seen in terms of whether or not lenience is warranted? Or is
the information relevant in order to make a child welfare “needs“ decision?
If. so, and the information available to the panel suggests that the child has  
2‘)
special problems. the answer to my question as to why it is important to
. understand the child is that this understanding will permit the making of a
decision as to the course which would be most helpful to the child. This
would be what I have termed a positive decision. not merely a decision not
to prosecute, but a decision to divert a child to a preferred alternative to the
court.
Another possibility is that the information available to the panel will
be used to reach a decision that a child can best be helped by initiating court
proceedings. Yet the only criterion which the legislation offers to guide the
panel is that of “the public interest". This suggests that the decision is
primarily a criminal justice one. Consideration must also be given to those
cases which will involve children who have not previously come to notice.
Unless the family is known to the Department of Youth and Community
Services all the information available to the panel will be provided by the
police. This suggests that for these children the decision will be solely a
criminal justice decision. If this is the case, there will be two systems
operating. one in respect of the first offenders and the other in respect of
those who have previously come to notice. For one group the panel will have
access to background information. for the other it will not. With regard to
this latter group, therefore, different kinds of decisions might be reached. It
..is also possible that if the child has not previously come to notice, and hence
the only information available is that furnished by the police, the panel
could become a rubber stamp for the police.
In the course of my work in the juvenile justice ﬁeld I studied the
operation of New Zealand‘s conference system. This system has now been
changed. but when it was in operation it functioned in a manner very similar
to that proposed under the new N.S.W. law. The conference system involved
a representative of the police and a representative of the Department of
Social Welfare together considering reports submitted to them and, on the
basis of these, making a recommendation as to prosecution. The point about
this system is that it is one in which the police were in a very powerful
position. The police representative at the conference had often visited the
child's home and had talked to his parents. As a result the police member
was able to present a vivid picture of the child, his offence and his
background. In contrast, the representative of the Department of Social
Welfare was often able to contribute little. This placed the representative of
the Department in the position of a passive recipient of police impressions
and information. This is not intended to express criticism of the way the
police operated. Often the police representative was able to convey a very
sensitive and thoughtful picture of the child’s situation. Nevertheless the
process did raise questions in my mind as to the role of the Social Welfare
representative and as to the contribution which he or she was able to make
to the decision-making process.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that one of the courses
open to a panel under the new Community Welfare Bill is to convene a
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“conference" (see cl.l33 (6)). A conference is to consist of nominated persons
interested in, and involved with, the child. It will be convened by an ofﬁcer
of the Department of Youth and Community Services. In one of Dickens‘
novels there is a reference to a character who “was knighted by His
Britannic Majesty King George [V in mistake for somebody else". On first
looking at the Community Welfare Bill I concluded that, in the conference,
this Bill had created a hearing panel in mistake for something else. However
this impression was not correct. The child is not to be involved in the
conference. As with other aspects of the diversionary process, questions must
be asked about the functions which the conference will perform and the
aims and assumptions which it embodies. Under the Bill the task of a
conference is to make recommendations or proposals to the panel. How will
this work in practice?
It is helpful to consider an imaginary illustration. Suppose a boy
comes to notice for a series of offences. Pursuant to the new Bill his case will
be referred to a panel. Let us imagine that the family is well known to the
Department of Youth and Community Services. Other members of the
family have been in trouble with the police. The father is unemployed. The
. parents take little interest in the boy and the panel concludes that one ofthe
boy’s major problems is the lack of suitable methods of occupying his
leisure time. The members of the panel agree that the boy is “a nice kid“ and
that they do not wish to see him prosecuted. As a result a conference is
convened. The message to this conference is very clear: “We are thinking of
prosecuting. Can you come up'with something better?" Let us suppose that
the conference does so. It produces positive suggestions to help the family
and to assist the boy in better methods of occupying his time. This activity is
wholly admirable as it involves the community in helping the disadvan-
taged. However such a description of the process causes us, I believe, to lose
sight of a crucial fact. This is that the system has been created to make a
decision as to whether that boy should be prosecuted. Are these potentially
complex and time consuming procedures necessary in order to make what I
have characterised as a negative decision? Does not this system make the
fatal error of attempting to combine a laudable desire to help with
procedures which are designed for a quite different purpose? Would we not
be better advised to disentangle our aims and make the decision not to
prosecuteﬁrst and then offer help? A further question which must be asked is
whether the child’s “co-operation" with the conference‘s recommendation is
the price which he must pay in order to secure a favourable decision from a
panel.
I will not take this illustration further. It is, I think, a clear example ofa
basic point which I have been seeking to make. It is necessary to ask
searching questions about diversion. and to identify precisely what we are
doing and why we are doing it Our procedures must be adapted to our
objectives. Until we are articulate these objectives clearly. ambiguities and
unanswered questions will impede our efforts to deal rationally and fairly
with society’s young offenders.  
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AFTER THE COMMUNITY WELFARE BILL — WHAT NEXT?
Richard Chisholm, B.A., LL.B (Syd). B.C.L.(0x0n.)
Senior Lecturer In Law, University of N.S.W.
The paper will consider three areas: Offenders (Part A. PP. 31-38),
Non-Offenders (Part B, pp. 38-50) and Children's Rights and Autonomy
(Part C, pp. 50-52). In relation to each, it will consider how far the
Community Welfare Bill 1981 embodies principles suitable for the 1980’s.
PART A : CHILDREN WHO COMMIT OFFENCES
Topic 1. Help and Punishmentzotfenders
Principles
A central feature of children's court systems is the tension between
various objectives. There are different views on how this tension should be
characterised, but its existence is generally accepted. Here, it will be
described in terms of help and punishment. The issue is the extent to which
the children‘s court system should be engaged in the two tasks, and how far
it is feasible and desirable to combine them.
ln my View the 1980‘s will be dominated by two propositionsf
(i) That any punishment administered by the system should be con-
strained. by (at least) the principles associated with the general
criminal law. These include procedural justice, and the principle that
the penalty should be proportionate to the offence.
(ii) That it is proper for the law to have regard to the offender's
interests in the case of children, as it is in the case of adults. What is
special about children in this context is that it cannot be assumed
that children are the best judge of their own interests, while it can be
assumed (in general) that adults are the best judge of their own
interests. Another characteristic of children is that unlike adults they
(usually) have guardians, who have a general responsibility to look
after their welfare. These two characteristics (and perhaps others)
mean that the penalties applied to children might be different from
.the penalties applied to ‘adults. However the principles of criminal
justice should set the outer limits to state intervention: the child’s
interests cannot be used to justify greater punishment than is
appropriate to the offence. They can only go to lessening the
punishment. or determining its form.
The Present Law
The Child Welfare Act 1939 provides a rather simple framework for the
children‘s court in dealing with young offenders. There is a battery of orders,
ranging from discharge, through probatio‘n, to‘committal to an institution
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and wardship. In addition, the child could be dealt with “according to law",
(a curious phrase, since the other orders are equally covered by law) which is
taken to mean that ordinary penalties applicable to adults could be given to
children. -
The New Bill
‘ Under the Community Welfare Bill, the children‘s court may make the
following orders in relation to young offenders (the age of criminal
responsibility remains ten years):-
(i) Dismiss the charge with or without a caution (cl.l95)
(ii) Probation for up to two years (cl.l92)
(iii) Recognisance to be of good behaviour, and/or fine of up to $500
(cl.l92)
(iv) Committal to control of the Minister either “generally" or for a
prescribed period of up to two years (c1193)
(v) Community service order (c1193; 139-163)
(vi) In the case of indictable offences, send the case to a higher court,
which may deal with the child “according to Law" and direct that any
period of imprisonment be served in a training centre (cl.l36-8).
There are some constraints, designed to ensure that children are not
subjected to more severe penalties than adults. Thus, orders (iii-vi) can only
be made where the offence would, if committed by an adult, attract a
possible sentence of imprisonment; the line under (i) cannot exceed the time
prescribed for the offence; the period of institutionalisation under (iv)
cannot exceed the maximum period of imprisonment for which an adult
could be sentenced for the same offence. As under the old law. murder and
other very serious offences fall outside the scheme, and the child must be
sentenced “according to law" (cl.l37).
Of these powers, community service orders are new for children.
“Control orders" replace the earlier “committal to an institution", the main
change being the restriction of “general" committals to 12 months. Taken
together, these changes bring the system closer to the adult sentencing
system, and remove some of the more glaring injustices of the present law.
Apart from the welcome introduction of the Community Service Orders,
they will not necessarily have much impact on the sentences actually
administered in the usual run of cases. For instance, it was customary for
children given a “general committal“ to serve something like ﬁve months in
practice, so the restriction to 12 months may make little difference.
However, the Act also includes provisions of an innovative nature,
namely a set of guidelines for sentencing. Such guidelines are unusual, in
my experience, in the criminal area. and it will be interesting to see how they
are applied by the courts. (Or rather, it will be interesting if the editors oflaw  
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reports show a greater interest in reporting decisions relating to children.
and sentencing; at present, many important decisions remain unreported).
Here are the new guidelines:
c|.l23 (I) A court, in exercising criminal jurisdiction with respect to
children, shall have regard to the following principles:-
(a) that children have rights and freedoms before the law governing
criminal behaviour equal to those enjoyed by adults and, in
particular, a right to be heard in and to participate in the
processes that lead to decisions that affect them;
(b) that children who commit offences should bear responsibility for
their actions but, because of their state of dependence and
immaturity. require guidance and assistance;
(c) that it is desirable, wherever possible, to allow the education or
employment of a child to proceed without interruption;
(d) that it is desirable. wherever possible, to allow a child'to reside in
his own home;
(e) that the penalty suffered by a child for an offence should be no
greater than that suffered by an adult who commits an offence of
the same kind.
(2) Subsection (I) has effect subject to any other provision of this
Act.
Clause I94 might be thought inconsistent with these principles. It
provides that in determining penalties for offenders, the court “shall not
have regard to the question of whether the child is in need of care within the
meaning of Part VII". I think the idea behind this is that there should be a
clear separation between criminal and care proceedings. It is wrong for a
court. in dealing with an offender, to use the commission of the offence as
an excuse to try to impose elaborate strategies of salvation, strategies going
beyond the level of intrusion justiﬁed by the offence. If this is the rationale
for cl.l94. the proper construction may be as follows: (i) the court should not
think in terms of having available to it the powers or policies applicable to
children in need of care, and therefore should not enquire whether the child
falls within that deﬁnition. However, (ii), aspects of the child‘s needs,
character or situation relevant under the sentencing guidelines, should be
taken into account even though they would also have been relevant to care
proceedings.
These provisions certainly travel some distance in the direction of the
principles stated above. They show a concern for fairness as between
children and adults. and a recognition of the special needs of children. They .
also go some way towards relating the penalty to the offence. In all these
respects, 1 think that they bring the law closer to the principles identiﬁed in
the paper. and to that extent are likely to prove acceptable in the 1980’s.
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I cannot leave this topic without drawing attention to Part X. dealing
with children “subject to control". There are provisions for inspection and
reports every three months by departmental ofﬁcers and that judges and
magistrates may visit training centres and remand centres at any time.
Clause 206 provides that the objects of the Part include ensuring that
persons subject to control “take their places in the community as soon as
possible as persons who will observe the law" and that sufﬁcient resourCes
should be provided to achieve that result (i); also that satisfactory
relationships are preserved with the children‘s families, and that “it shall be
recognised that the punishment for an offence imposed by a court is the only
punishment for that offence". There are also elaborate provisions for the
treatment of children subject to control. covering such sensitive matters as
solitary conﬁnement (now called “segregation for psychological reasons")
and punishment for misconduct Included are provisions making it “mis-
conduct" for a child to make a wound or sore on his or her body, and
“serious misconduct" to make a knowingly false complaint (Schedule 7).
. Surely in 1981 it is time to stop thinking of self-mutilation as deserving of
punishment. And the latter provision may have the effect of inhibiting
legitimate complaints. There is a need for a thorough re-consideration of
this area, on which the various review committees made an insigniﬁcant
contribution.
Topic 2. “Diversion" — Panels and All That
Principles
There has been a great deal of discussion in Australia about the
wisdom or otherwise ofpanels, whose functions are to deal with less serious
offenders. Children so dealt with need not go to the children's court; they are
“diverted“ from it In the United States, “diversion" is, or was, a trendy
notion, and the word has come into general usage in Australia.
Diversion is a two-edged sword: the children are both diverted away
from and also towards. What they avoid is the court. What do they get? In the
United States, they might ﬁnd themselves subjected to quite elaborate
programs. Hence in the United States one can speak of diversion as a system
ofprograms for those children who do not go to court. “Diversion", therefore,
may refer to the fact that the children are taken out of the court-bound
trafﬁc, or it may mean that they are put into a different system of
treatment/punishment.
Why is diversion thought to be a good thing? There are two very
different sets of reasons. One set of reasons is based on the court‘s
perspective. The court is an expensive social institution, having certain skills
and uses. Its effective functioning will be impaired if it is clogged up with
little cases, leaving it insufﬁcient time to deal properly with the big cases.
Another set of reasons is based on the child's perspective. The court
experience is assumed to be darriaging. or at least unhelpful. Therefore if the  
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problem can be tackled without court proceedings. it should be. This
perspective ﬂourished in the heyday of labelling theory. since by avoiding
the court process the child might escape the harmful consequences of being
labelled as a delinquent.
More recent thinking is cooler about diversion. If diversion is so
wonderful. why shouldn‘t all cases be diverted, and the children’s court
abolished? Answer: because it is the court’s job to stand between the child
and those who wish to intervene, either to punish him or her (the criminal
jurisdiction) or to help (the non-criminal jurisdiction). The court is not there
to regulate the availability of services. It is there to control coercion: to licence
public power. This leads to an important cautionary note: diversion should
not be used in a way that subjects children to coercive power, denying them
the protection of the court
The most obvious way in which a diversion system could be coercive is
where the panel (or other diversion mechanism) was given power to make
orders binding on the child. But to give it this power pre-supposes that the
child has offended. If we ask the panel to decide this question, then it
becomes a mini-court, since the rules of evidence and procedure would have
to be re—introduced. However. there is an apparent solution: Give the powers
to panels only when the child has admitted the offence. Defended matters go
to court. and the panels only handle undefended matters, where the only
issue is the penalty. Because panels deal mainly with little cases, they need
only the power to order minor penalties; also, we may not want to trust them
with the power to hand out heavy penalties. \
This solution is ﬁne in theory but dangerous in practice. The danger is
that a child who is innocent will prefer to plead guilty and suffer the (small)
penalty of the panel rather than risk being found guilty and given a heavy
sentence in the children‘s court. In other words, the panels system will
encourage plea-bargaining. And if you try to‘~set up mechanisms to prevent
this. the panel starts to look more and more like a court It should be
remembered that the plea of guilty might turn on such matters as the law of
complicity or the admissibility of a statement given to the police, and the
prospect of children without protection pleading guilty when they have a
good legal defence is a real one.
There is a second apparent solution, entirely unconvincing. This is that
the panel can make orders only with the consent of the child. This is
unconvincing because again such consent may amount to no more than a
preference for avoiding court The notion of voluntariness is clearly spurious
where the panel has power to refer the matter to the court, which would have
power to make coercive orders.
Where does this leave us? With these two propositions, I think:
(i) It is a good thing to build into the system plenty of escape hatches.
so that it' it becomes apparent that (for one reason or another) the child
should not be taken to court, the child can be diverted. Without such
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escape hatches,'the danger is that once legal proceedings have been started.
they will grind inexorably to their conclusion, even when it becomes obvious
that they should be stopped.
(ii) Any system of diversion. or escape hatches, must be carefully
designed so that it will not have the practical effect of subjecting children to
coercive measures without the protection of a judicial determination.
However, it seems obviously desirable to be able to refer the children and
their families to any available sources of help, so long as that can be done in
a way that really is voluntary.
The Present Law
Police may choose whether to take a child to court, or to administer a
caution, or to take no action. If the child is to be taken to court, the police
may choose between arrest or summons, and between criminal and civil
proceedings. There is no system of diversion other than the police caution.
The New Bill
The Bill introduces a new system of diversion, constituted by the
Children’s Panels. The basic scheme is that the court cannot hear criminal
proceedings against children unless the Children’s Panel has recommended
it.
The new scheme applies to all offences except very serious offences
like murder, and a miscellaneous group of offences: offences committed by
persons subject to control; contempt (sic); breach of communty service
orders; traffic offences (which have been removed from the children's court
cl.188); and such offences as may be prescribed by the regulations (cl.13l).
Clause 131(2) provides that a court shall not deal with a charge against
a child unless a Children’s Panel has determined that the court may do so
or, after legal advice, the child has so requested in writing (cl.l3l). The
procedure is that when a child is charged with an offence, the police ofﬁcer
concerned shall forthwith ﬁle a report for the Children’s Panel (cl.l32). It
then becomes the duty of the Panel to consider “whether or not, having
regard to the public interest, the child should be dealt with for the offence“
and such determination is final. It may request the police to administer a
caution, or simply determine that no further action be taken. The Panel's
determination releases the child from custody or discharges any bail. If the
Panel fails to make a determination it is deemed to have determined that the
child should not be proceeded against.
It can be seen that the way Panels actually perform will be of great
importance. It could, at one extreme, become a rubber-stamp for policy
decisions. At the other, it could stop the vast majority of children beingtaken to court for suspected offences. It is therefore surprising that the onlyguideline given to it is the “public interest”; one would have expected,
especially in this Act, greater guidance as to the factors which should be
taken into account. Presumably the Panels will have to develop their own  
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guidelines. In this connection. it is again surprising that the Panels, unlike
many of the other bodies established by the Bill, are under no obligation to
make periodic reports of their work, nor is there any obvious way in which
they can be said to be accountable.
Who constitutes the Panel? It is to be selected from (i) police ofﬁcers
of or above the rank of Inspector; (ii) ofﬁcers of the Department; and (iii)
“other persons who the Governor considers have suitable qualiﬁcations or
experience“. Each panel consists of three people, one from each category
(Schedule 5).
How does the Panel operate? The Bill says that it may look at bits of
paper: ﬁles and papers of the Department or the police, or proposals made
at a “conference" (cl.l33(5)). What conference? The Panel may convene a
conference consisting of a Departmental ofﬁcer and such people as parents,
relatives and teachers; The ofﬁcer is to report to the Panel.
It is provided that neither a reference ofa matter to a Children’s Panel,
nor any statement made at a confemce, is admissible in evidence in any
court (cl.l34). It is also provided that any admission of guilt by a child shall
not affect the Panel's determination whether or not to allow the matter to got
court (cl.l33(8)).
These provisions are the result of an intensive debate about the merits
and demerits of panels. The solution adopted is very different from the
panels of South Australia and Scotland, discussed in an earlier seminar of
this lnstitute.‘ On the face of it, the Bill’s Panels constitute diversion in the
narrow sense: they simply decide whether a child should or should not be
dealt with by the children's court. Under the Bill, children will in practice go
to court only if the police and the Panel so wish. The Panels do not
themselves deal with children; they do not, unlike the Scottish system and to
a lesser extent the South Australian Panels, constitute an alternative method
of dealing with children. They have no power to make orders or even accept
undertakings.
However, the power of the Panel to arrange a conference must be taken
into account. It seems likely that the report of the conference will inﬂuence
the Panel’s decision whether or not to let the matter go to court If at the
conference the child and parents agree, for example, to make compensation
to a person, the Panel might be more inclined to divert the case from court.
Indeed. it is possible that the Panel will become a rubber stamp for the
conference, in which case the system would come closer in practice to the
South Australian and Western Australian panels.
This sets the scene, perhaps, for an element of bargaining. There could
be something approaching a deal made at the conference: if parents and
child are willing to do certain things, the conference will recommend that
‘ .
l. Syd. Im'l. Crim. Proc. No. 27 Treatment of Children Associated with
. Crime, (1976) pp. 33-34.  
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the child not be taken to court. If this happens, then we are not dealing with
“pure” diversion, but with a system which has considerable actual power. Is
this a problem?
To evaluate this, we must back-track a little. It will be recalled that
some panel systems provide that the panel can deal only with children who
admit their offence. But critics have pointed out that this is dangerous.
because the guilt of a child may depend on difﬁcult questions of law, and
the panel may be unqualiﬁed to make the (judicial) decision whether or not
to accept an admission of guilt No doubt in order to solve this problem. the
Bill says that the child‘s admission of the offence is irrelevant to the Panel‘s
work Unfortunately, this may solve one problem only by creating another.
For if it is accepted that in practice the Panel-plus-conference is able to exert
real power over children, then it may exert that power over children who are
innocent A child who is innocent may be willing, for fear of going to court,
to submit to some form of supervision or pay compensation. This result
seems unjust '
The provisions of the Bill on Panels, therefore seems to me to raise two
important issues. First, is it desirable to give to such a body a veto over the
decision by police to take a child to court? Second, is there a danger that the
system will subject some innocent children to what are in effect coercive
measures?
My own reaction is a cautiously favourable one. I would be inclined
either to abolish the conference, or make its proceedings absolutely
conﬁdential, so that it could not make any report or recommendation to the
Panel (or the Court). I think that the existing scheme does embody to a large
extent the two propositions on page 35. Of course, much depends on how the
Panels perform, but I am inclined to think that the danger of subjecting
innocent children to coercive intervention is not so serious as to outweigh
the beneﬁts of the new diversionary system. By all accounts, thre really are
lots of kids who now go to court, who might have been better dealt with in
other ways: if so, the new panel system could be a very valuable screening
device. -
mm B : NON-OFFENDERSV
Topic 3. Substitution for Parents
Principles
Here, the focus shifts to younger children. The question is in what
circumstances and through what procedures may the State take over the
powers ordinarily in the hands of parents or guardians. This matter is the
subject of Goldstein Freud and Solnit’s latest book, Before the Best Interests of
the Child.
I will not repeat what I have written elsewhere on this, but brieﬂy, I
think that the history of this area of law is a story of excesses. In the
nineteenth century and before, there was excessive concern with the rights of  
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pa rents (in practice, fathers), at the expense of the children’s welfare. But this
was only under the general law. Under the Poor Law system and its modern
equivalents, the excess was the other way: the poor law authorities had far
too much power to intervene and break up the families of the poor and
destitute. These origins explain much of the 1939 Act. The grounds for State
intervention on the basis that children were “neglected” were mainly aimed
at parents who were once called the “undeserving poor”. Once it was
established that children were in the evil clutches of such people (see the
references in 5.72 to drunkards,prostitutes, vagrants and the like) then it was
up to the welfare authorities, on white chargers and bearing colourful
banners proclaiming the child's rights, to intervene, remove the children,
and the less that was heard of the parents thereafter, the better. So, under the
I939 Act it is by no means clear what status the parents have in the court
proceedings: they are required to attend, but they may not even be parties
entitled to participate in their own right, or to appeal, and there is no
indication of a legislative concern to protect their rights or involve them
constructively in the process. Nor are there any sensible provisions for good
parents, temporarily unable to care for the children, to obtain assistance
from the department with their dignity intact. The legislation cannot see
children in need other than because of wickedness or incompetence on the
part of their parents, and it does not envisage a role for the department other
than a total take-over of the child.
Within this legal strait-jacket, the department and courts have
struggled (not always successfully) to behave in ways that are more in accord
with contemporary views. In this area, I think there is considerable
agreement in principle, and the themes that will dominate the eighties are
these:—
(i) That the State should assist parents and guardians to care for their
children. So far as consistent with available resources and the child’s
welfare, it should do so in a way that does not stigmatise the parents, and
does not deprive them of parental rights. The model for support is the good
neighbour. or the extended family. It follows that neither surrender of
parental responsibilities nor a determination of parental fault or failure
should be necessary conditions for State assistance, whether or not it
involves residential care of the children. '
(ii) The State welfare authorities should have sufficient power to
intervene to protect children at risk in the care of their parents or guardians,
but not have power to intervene beyond the requirements of the child's
welfare.
(iii) That it is the role of the court to authorise the appropriate level
of intervention. lnterveners, parents and (arguably) the children should be
parties to such proceedings. This role of the court (or other tribunal) extends
not only to the initial authorisation of intervention but to its continuation in
the face of objections. Thus the court should have continuing power to
review Ministerial decisions relating to wards of the State.
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The Present Law
The Child Welfare Act says nothing about objectives or prevention. It
provides that children (0-18) may be brought to court as being “neglected“ or
“uncontrollable". and gives the court power to make orders placing them on
probation, or with suitable people, or as state wards, or in (punitive)
institutions (5.82). Either the police or parents can bring the proceedings:
V and parents can, too, in the case of children alleged to be “uncontrollable".
When a child15 made a ward, there is no power in the Supreme Court to
make custody orders: Ministerfor the Interior v. Neyens (1964) 113 CL.R 411.
The New Bill
Objects-and Preventive Services
The new Bill wears its heart on its sleeve. It goes on and on about
objectives. Look at these:
cl.5 The objects of this Act are —
(a) to promote. the well being of the people of N.S.W.
(b) to promote the welfare of the family“
(c) to ensure the provision of services to people dis-
advantaged by — '
(i) lack of adequate family or social support;
(ii) personal or family problems which inhibit adequate social
functioning . . .
_ [Part VII Children’s Welfare]
c1.45 (l) The objects of this Part are —
(a) to identify the special needs of children, whether or not
under parental care, with respect to services necessary to
promote their optimum development;
(b) to ensure the provision of any' necessary services for
families so that, Where necessary, the care available to
children in the family environment can be enhanced to such
a degree as to enable them to remain in or return to family
care.
[Division 6 - Children in Need of Care]
cl.77 The objects of this Division are to ensure that children in need of
care are provided with assistance. . . being based on the premises
that -
(a) the welfare and interests of children are to be given paramount
consideration. . . .
(b) children are entitled to special protection and to opportunities
and facilities to enable them to develop...
(c) [parents are best]
(d) children should be protected against all forms of neglect...  
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(c) responsibility for the welfare of children belongs primarily to
their parents but if it is not fulﬁlled, it devolves upon the
community: '
and
(0 except in exceptional circumstances or (sic) pursuant to legal
proceedings. there should be no interruption of parental rights
contrary to the wishes of children and their parents.
There are also very explicit and elaborate provisions for the depart-
ment to provide ﬁnancial and other support to individuals, families and
community organisations (Parts III and IV).
These principles clearly embody the ﬁrst principle noted above.
Although they make heavy weather of it all, they point in the right direction,
I think. This area of the law is full of discretionary powers, and the “objects”
sections may tend to produce some consistency and direction. I wish they
had been better written, but on the whole I think these provisions cannot do
much harm, and may have some usefulness.
Inlervcmion
We now turn to the second two principles, which concern the extent
and manner of state intervention. Here, too, there has been much change.
The key provision is the deﬁnition of children “in need of care”:
cl.44 (4) For the purposes of this Part, a child is in need of care if-
(a) adequate provision is not being, or is likely not to be, made for
his proper care;
(b) he is being, or is likely to be, abused (deﬁned in cl..4 as
including psychological harm);
(c) he is being, or is likely to be, harmed as a consequence of -
(i) his behaviour; or
(ii) the conduct of any person with whom he is residing or the
conditions in which he is residing;
(d) he is not under competent and proper guardianship;
or
(e) there is a substantial breakdown in the relationship between the
child and the person having the care of the child.
Temporary Cuxlody Order
On the application of a “person who has the care of” a child under 16
years, or of a child over 16 years, the Minister may make a “temporary
custody order“ if he or she thinks the child is in need of care (cl.46(1)). The
Minister must. if possible, notify parents when an application is made, and
again when the order is made. Curiously, “parent" here means a person who
is a guardian or has custody (cl.4), so that there would probably be no
obligation to notify a step-parent, or the father of an ex-nuptial child. While
the order is in force. the Minister has custody, and “shall provide for the care
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of the child as if the child were a ward” (c1.46(5)(6)). But the Minister must
terminate the order at the request of a person who was, immediately before
the order, “responsible for the child", deﬁned as a parent or person who had
the care of the child (cl.4). In any case, the order must be terminated after
three months. It may also be terminated at the discretion of the Minister
(c1.46(7)).
Wardship
The Minister may declare a child to be a ward on the application of a
person responsible for the child “or any other person who, in the opinion of
the Minister, has a sufﬁcient interest in the welfare of the child“ (cl.108).
There are provisions for parents etc. to be given notice of the application
and of their rights and the Minister must wait for 21 days after such notice,
and consider any submissions made (01.109).
Review of Intervention
There is an appeal to a new body, the Community Welfare Appeals
Tribunal, in relation to wardship: appeals can be brought against admission
to wardship, or refusal to admit; discharge from wardship or failure to
discharge. They may be brought by “any person who, in the opinion of the
Tribunal, has a genuine concern in the matter" (cl.284-7). There is a further
appeal to the Supreme Court on points of law.
Second, it is provided that the custody jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is preserved (cl.113). This is the jurisdiction that made the order
relating to Stephen McGuire. Under the new Bill, the Supreme Court's
custody jurisdiction co-exists with the Minister's powers as guardian, a
position that has received much attention by the courts of England.
Unfortunately, where the child is a child of a marriage and the custody
application falls within the deﬁnition of a “matrimonial cause" under the
Family Law Act, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction (Family Law Act s.8).
Nor can the Family Court hear it, because the High Court has held that it is
unconstitutional for the Family Court to make orders which clash with State
Welfare authorities (Re Lambert ex p. Plummer 1980 32 A.L.R 505). This
seems a pity. I would suggest the addition of the words “or of the Family
Court of Australia" after “Supreme Court” in c1105 and 113. However, this is
a very difﬁcult and technical area. There will be an article on it in the next
number of the Federal Law Review.
Third, the Bill establishes Children's Boards of Review to report to the
Minister in respect of wards and'certain children living away from home.
This is an advisory exercise, in relation to particular children. It is activated
by a request by some interested person, or by the President of the Board of
Review. This provision reﬂects concern about children who are “lost in the
system". A much-canvassed View was that there should be mandatory
periodic review of such children, which would of course go further than the  
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present clause. Because of the decision' to keep secret the report of the
Legislative Advisory Panel, 1 am not able to tell you what was recommended
by that body.
Inlcrvmlion by Court Order
Children may be taken to the children’s court by departmental ofﬁcers,
not by parents or (except in emergencies) by police (cl.82). If the court is
satisﬁed that the child is “in need of care" (see cl.44(4) quoted above). it may
do nothing; require undertakings from the person caring for the child or
from the child; or if it is satisﬁed that it is not appropriate to deal with the
matter in these ways, it may place the child with a suitable person willing to
take care of the child, or place the child under supervision, or make the child
a ward.
The most interesting thing about these powers is the omission of the
power to make a “control order" (formerly committal to an institution). This
represents a considerable advance from the Green Paper of 1978, which
argued in favour of this punitive order for non-offfenders. Its removal is
welcome and marks a clearer division between the criminal and the care
jurisdictions.
These powers cannot be exercised in relation to children over 16 years
unless they are intellectually handicapped (cl.8l). And there are other
constraints: a departmental assessment must be obtained before an order is
made; orders cannot be made where the child is no longer in need of care
when the application is made; and the court must obtain repons on and
have regard to any special cultural or ethnic factors relating to the child
(cl.8l).
A further important change relates to truants. In the course of the
process of legislative review, there was much debate about truants. On one
side it was argued that truants should, in their own interests, be forced to
attend school, if necessary by court order. On the other it was argued that
truancy is frequently a multi-sided problem, concerning the roles of the
school and parents as much as the behaviour of the child, and the
appropriate response was not to direct orders solely against the child, but to
require the problem to be solved by the parents and the education system.
There was considerable common ground between the two sides: agreement
that children would be prejudiced by interrupted education, and that it was
wrong to use the court system to punish truants. As the discussion
progressed, a compromise position gained considerable acceptance, and it
now appears in the Bill. Truancy is not of itself a ground for court action.
But if a child is otherwise within the deﬁnition of a child “in need of care",
and also has not been attending school regularly, one of the orders the court
can make is an order requiring the child to reside at and attend a prescribed
school for up to 12 months (cl.80). This is a considerable advance, but could
be improved by expanding the court’s power to make less drastic orders.
 
44
Unfortunately, the power to accept undertakings is restricted to those given
by the child and persons responsible for the child (which as defined does
not include school-teachers). The ﬂexible spirit of the Bill, and a recognition
of the complex nature of truancy, would suggest that the court should have
power to accept undertakings from anyone.
The Bill deals most elaborately with the court's powers on adjoum-
ment under the peculiar heading “Rights of Children While Proceedings are
Pending“. In deciding what order to make on an adjournment, the court
“shall have regard to and only to” the child’s wishes and intentions and the
need to protect the child or avoid bodily injury to any other person (cl.9l,92).
Curiously, there are no criteria prescribed for the exercise of the court‘s
powers to make ﬁnal orders. Here, presumably, it must turn to the general
“objects” clauses elsewhere in the Bill. Unfortunately, the multiplicity and
generality of those objects will have lawyers and magistrates scratching their
heads. It might have been preferable to provide more directly relevant
criteria speciﬁcally for the exercise of these powers. But hopefully. sympa-
thetic and sensible interpretation will surmount any awkwardness in the
Bill.
There is an important extension of the court’s jurisdiction in another
area. Where a child has been in a non-govemment home for a period of 12
months, and there has been no substantial contact with the child‘s family
during that period, the court “may, if it considers it to be in the best interests
of the child to do so", make any of the orders available for children in need
of care. In these cases, the application is to be made only by an officer of the
children’s home concerned (cl.84). I must say this bothers me. It seems a
dangerous power to give to people running non-govemment homes,
especially as there is no provision for parents to be informed of the power
when they place their children in the homes. On the other hand, I entirely
see the force of the argument that children should not be left to linger in
these places and denied the chance of family life. On the whole, I think I
would support the provision if there was a guarantee that persons placing
children in non-govemment homes had notice of the law on this point
Procedures
Nextjo process; and here, there are provisions which will be of
particular interest to lawyers, for they depart in important ways from
familiar legal patterns.
First, there is provision for the court to sit with an “assessor”, who is
selected from a panel of persons having “qualifications in social work or
experience in community service". The assessor acts only in an advisory
capacity (cl.78,79). .
Secondly, in these proceedings the court is not completely closed
although disclosure of identifying material is forbidden. Any person “bona
ﬁde engaged in reporting or commenting upon the proceedings of the court”
,#__l
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for dissemination through a public news medium shall not be excluded
unless the court otherwise directs" (cl.184). This is a welcome change, but
should be extended to include students and other people with a legitimate
interest in the processes of the courts other than reporters: hopefully the
provision will be amended, or the magistrates will use their discretion
sensitively, as they have in the past This is the appropriate time to record
my gratitude to magistrates, who have been universally generous and
courteous to me and all my students -who have sought to learn about the
children‘s courts.
Third. and most important, there are a series of provisions relating to
the conduct of the hearing. They need to be set out in detail:
94. (l) Proceedings under this Division shall be conducted with as
little formality and legal technicality and form as the circum- ‘
stances of the case permit.
(2) Proceedings under this Division are not criminal proceedings
but any fact which would, in any such proceedings, tend to
prove that a child is a child in need of care or that the
Children‘s Court has jurisdiction to make an order with respect
to him under section 80(1) must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt
(3) In any proceedings under this Division of the Children’s Court,
or a court hearing or determining an appeal from a decision of
the Children‘s Court made under this Division, is not bound by
the rules of evidence and may act upon any statement,
document, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist
it in relation to the proceedings, whether or not the statement,
document, information "or matter would be admissible in
accordance with those rules.
(4) In any proceedings under this Division, a member of the
Children's Court or a stipendiary magistrate exercising the
jurisdiction of the Children's Court may examine and cross-
examine any witness to such extent as he thinks proper for the
purpose of eliciting information relevant to the exercise of his
powers under this Division.
(5) In any proceedings under this Division before the Children’s
Court, or a court hearing or determining an appeal from a
decision of the Children’s Court made under this Division, any
person who, in the opinion of the Children’s Court or the
appellate court, has a genuine concern for the welfare of the
child to whom the proceedings relate, may, by leave of the
Children‘s Court or the appellate court, as the case may be,
appear in person in the proceedings or be represented thereat
by barrister or solicitor, and may examine and cross-examine
witnesses on matters relevant to the proceedings.
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The general thrust of all this is welcome: the court is to proceed more
by way of an inquiry than in traditional adversary form, and the importance
of non-legal expertise is recognised. However, I ﬁnd some difﬁculties with
these provisions. First, clause 94(3) says that the court is not bound by the
rules of evidence and may act upon any material that may assist it. But cl.95
says that the Children’s Court, “when determining the admissibility of
evidence”, shall not admit certain statements made to the police by children
in the absence of parents etc.
This seems a ﬂat contradiction. No doubt the court would read cl.94(3)
subject to cl.95. It is easy to understand the motive behind c195: police
“verbals” are as obnoxious in care proceedings as in criminal proceedings. I
suppose clauses like this will continue to be necessary until tape-recording
of confessions becomes mandatory. However, 01.95 seems rather arbitrary,
when combined with cl.94(3). All sorts of evidence which would be highly
prejudicial or unfair, such as prior criminal records, or confessions given
under duress, are admissible, for what they are worth, yet statements falling
into the particular circumstances of cl.95 are excluded. Again, any state-
.ments made to departmental officers will be admissible: is there no risk that
they, who will be bringing these proceedings, will invent statements? A
further complication lies in the fact that what is good policy for older
children may be inappropriate for little children. For example, there is
something to be said for protecting older children against having admissions
used in court, even in care proceedings. but suppose a six year old girl went
to a police station and made a statement that her father has been sexually
interfering with her. Under cl.95, that statement, even if tape-recorded, would
not be admissible, unless her father was with her at the station! There seems
a need for further thought in this area.
A related problem is the provision that proof should be on the criminal
standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”, as distinct from the less
onerous civil standard of proof “on the balance of probabilities”. My view is
perhaps oversimple, but this seems a mistake. The point of the criminal
standard of proof is that we make it very hard for people to be convicted, for
fear of convicting innocent people. It is better, the theory goes, that ten guilty
people go free than that one innocent person gets convicted. I think this is a
good policy for the criminal law but a bad policy for care proceedings. Take
a baby thought to have been abused. The child is as much at risk from a
mistaken failure to intervene (where there is a danger) as from unnecessary
intervention (where there is not). The important thing is surely to get i! right.
The civil standard is therefore appropriate: the court should be satisﬁed that
it is more likely than not that the child is in need of care.
In addition, the criminal standard sits awkwardly with the other
provisions. Look at the wide definition of “in need of care", and the
emphasis on ﬂexibility in the other provisions. They rest on the argument
that the state should be able to intervene when children’s welfare demands
it The criminal standard of proof rests on the other argument, equally valid,
that the state should not be allowed to intervene beyond what the child’s
welfare requires.   
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I would like to hazard a guess at the thinking behind the criminal
standard of proof. My guess is that the person responsible was not thinking
of abused babies, but of adolescents. And that person may have held the
view that much injustice has been done to older kids through the punitive
and repressive application of the (technically non-criminal) categories of
“uncontrollable“ or “exposed to moral danger". The criminal standard was
perhaps put in as a way of protecting older children against such measures.
There is indeed a need to contain state powers in this area, and it is certainly
arguable that the Bill gives the authorities too much power. But the criminal
standard is not the way to do it It is much too crude. Ifit is intended to limit
the state‘s power, there are better ways, for example by narrowing the
deﬁnition of “in need of care". There.are sophisticated discussions of' this
area in the American literature. especially in Goldstein Freud and Solnit’s
latest book, Before the Best Interest of the Child. I think that the criminal
standard is quite inappropriate in this context, and does not reﬂect the
modern view that welfare authorities should be given the power of coercive
intervention necessary to protect children from serious harm.
Finally cl.94(2) makes it necessary not only to prove beyond reason-
able doubt that the child is in need of care but to prove any relevant/act
beyond reasonable doubt. [t is hard to believe this was intended for it is
stricter than the criminal requirement, and would threaten to make these
proceedings quite impossible.
Conclusions
The provisions relating to Topic 3 do embody the ﬁrst principle
mentioned above Broadly, they also embody the other two, but in this
respect there are a number of difﬁculties the most important being the
criminal standard of proof. However, the Bill makes a tremendous advance
in establishing various mechanisms for review of administrative action, and
working out a balance of power between parents and the state that is, on the
whole. about right. I say “on the whole" because I think that there are other
legislative provisions which would have reached a similar conclusion more
elegantly and a little more satisfactorily. I won’t spell them out here.
Let me conclude this section by noting that, while it constrains state
power much more than does the present law, the Bill gives the state more
power than many modern Commentators think it should have. In particular,
the key deﬁnition of “child in need of care" is very wide. For example, there
is a well-known debate about how far “emotional abuse" should be a ground
for state intervention. On one hand it is pointed out that children can suffer
greatly from non-physical abuse; on the other, that it is very hard to deﬁne
such abuse in precise terms. On this point, the Bill’s deﬁnition of “abuse"
includes exposing a child to behaviour that is “likely to psychologically
harm him" (cl.4, 46(4)). Those who are alarmed at the scope of intervention
thus authorised may or may not wish to enter this debate here, but in my
view the Bill in this area gives the welfare authorities and the courts a power
which, while it is controversial, seemed to have widespread support from
public submissions.
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Topic 4. Help and Punishment (Non-Offenders)
Principles
This topic raises the controversial question of “status offenders“. The
debate is about how far the children’s court system should be used to control
the non-criminal misbehaviour of (older) children.
In the United States in particular, probably because of the great .
involvement of lawyers in this area, there has been a massive argument that
“status offences" should be abolished. Intervention, it is argued, does more
harm than good, and in practice subjects children to a covert system of
punishment without the protections of the criminal law. If this coercive
power were not available, society would have to develop services and
facilities that could be effectively “sold" to children, who would voluntarily
accept them. The debate is highly relevant to New South Wales. as can be
seen by the recent preoccupation of the media, police and politicians with
child prostitution in Kings Cross. Under the abolitionists‘ argument, police
and welfare officers would have only two options: to charge the children
with offences, or to offer them services and help which the children would
be entitled to reject. This argument has of course met opposition, especially
from those administering the system, such as juvenile court judges. They
argue that the abolitionists would in practice abandon children to exploi-
tation and danger, and that their position is academic. uncaring and
legalistic.
The debate involves contention about both facts and values. There is a
difference about whether coercive intervention is in practice capable of
helping these children and young people, or whether it does more harm than
good; again there are different views on whether voluntary services would in
fact appear on the abolition of status offences, and whether they would be
effective. As to values, the debate mainly involves a political judgment about
the limits of government intervention of a protective nature in the lives of
older children who are approaching the age when they can make their own
decisions. Of course, the issues are more complicated than this; they involve
difficult questions about disentangling punitive from helping objectives, and
the protection of the children’s interests from the protection of society, or at
least some sectors of society.
In a small (and less expensive) way, the debate has been echoed in
Australia. In my view, it has not been resolved, and it would be misleading
(though tempting) to pretend that a particular view is likely to dominate the
eighties.
However, I do think that the debate has been constructive to some
extent, in that fair-minded people who have been involved in it can now
reach agreement on a number of points, which have implications for the
diretion of law reform. As I see it, those points may be stated as follows:-  
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(i) That it is very difﬁcult to succeed in changing the patterns of
behaviour that are seen as troubled or troublesome. This is partly because
we don't know what we could do to the children to change them. And it is
partly because “the problem" is often to be understood not in terms of the
child‘s behaviour in itself, but in the child‘s relationship with others, and
functioning in the community. On this analysis, solving the problem
involves measures relating to the wider environment — family and com-
munity — which appear to be well beyond the reach of the court system.
(ii) That even if interventions into the lives of non-offending children
purport to be for the beneﬁt of the children, in practice they frequently
involve measures which are perceived by the children as punitive rather
than helpful. This is a major problem.
(iii) That whatever view is ultimately taken about the proper scope of
coercive intervention over non-offenders, it is important that the system
clearly separates intervention which is based on offences by the child and
intervention which is not
(iv) That non-coercive intervention, even when not punitive, involves
important issues about the rights of the children and their families. It follows
that the court‘s function is to ensure that intervention is used only in proper
cases. Questions of due process are therefore as important in this context as
they are in the context of the criminal law, although the procedures may be
different to those applicable to criminal law.
The Present Law
It will be recalled that under the present law, the categories are
“uncontrollable" and “neglected", the latter phrase including such phrases
as "exposed to moral danger”. The police and welfare ofﬁcers can take
children to court, and even parents can do so in relation to “uncontrollable"
children. in relation to all children who come within these categories, the
court may make any of a range of orders ranging from “admonish and
discharge", through probation. to committal to an institution or to state
wardship. These powers apply to all children under 18, and there are no
guidelines for their use.
The New Bill
Many of the relevant provisions have been set out in the previous
section. But certain provisions of the Bill of special relevance to older
children should be noted here. First, the court’s jurisdiction does not exist
over children of 16 or more, unless they are intellectually handicapped
(cl.8l). This change, foreshadowed in the 1978 Green Paper, is a signiﬁcant
move in the direction of reduced coercive state intervention, and an
important legislative recognition of the rights of older children to determine
their own affairs. It means, in practical terms, that at the age of 16, children
are free to run away from home or behave in other ways that worry their
parents and others, but cannot be taken to court unless they commit an
offence.
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There is a second important change in the same direction. There is
now no power for the court to make a “control order" in relation to non-
offending children; that is, they cannot be committed to an institution as if
they were offenders. This change also reﬂects a re-assessment of the
propriety of certain kinds of state invervention, and in particular the
injustice of using labels such an “uncontrollable“ to punish children who
have not broken the criminal law. In this matter, the Bill goes beyond the
Green Paper, which recommended that control orders be retained for non-
offenders under 16.
Nevertheless, the Bill does not espouse “radical non-intervention". The
deﬁnition of children in need of care gives the welfare authorities great
power to intervene into the lives of children under 16. Because of its very
general language, it will remain the case that departmental ofﬁcers will have
wide ranging discretion about which children to take to court. And the
children themselves will have no real guidance about what behaviour will
attract court action. Take, for example, a 15 year old girl: is intervention
authorised if she sleeps with her boyfriend contrary to her parents’ wishes?
Or lives with him? Or smokes marihuana? Or hangs around Kings Cross?
Any of these could arguably bring her within the definition of child “in need
of care” (cl.44(4)).
While the Bill does recognise the rights of older children, it is
somewhat ambivalent in this area. Thus, on one hand, for example, the court
is to take account of the wishes of children in considering adjoumments
(cl.9l); children are required to be given notice of their rights in certain
circumstances (cl.93(3)), and a guardian ad [item may be appointed (cl.99).
On the other hand, the Bill does not require the court or the Director or the
Tribunal to consider the child's wishes, or inform them of their rights. as a
general principle Indeed, the “objects", especially in cl.77, seem entirely
concerned with younger children, and show no appreciation of the need for
older children to experiment, grow, and explore their developing powers. It
is all heavy protective stuff: the spirit of John Bowlby, not of, say, Eric
Ericson, let alone the spirit of John Holt, Paul Goodman and others who
have written of the rights of older children to have some control over their
own lives. While the Bill makes important advances in relation to Topic 4.
and can be said to be consistent in many ways with the thinking of the 80’s,
it does not adopt a consistent position which fully acknowledges the
differences between neglected little kids and difﬁcult adolescents. This leads
us into the ﬁnal section.
PART C: CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND AUTONOMY
Principles.
On this matter, I think that there is a rather vague but widely held View
that the law should somehow allow children to speak for themselves. have
their interests put before courts or other decision-makers. be consulted, and
have their views listened to and taken seriously. I think that this View has
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been reinforced by the International Year of the Child, the importance of
children‘s wishes in custody cases in the Family Court. the interest in the
system of legal representation forchildren in children‘s courts in New South
Wales. and other manifestations of some awareness of “children‘s rights".
While I don‘t pretend that the translation of this view into law has
been thought through or articulated. I would like to make some suggestions
about ways in which the law might be expected to move:
(i) In all court proceedings in which children are involved, the
procedural framework should ensure that their interests are independently
represented. This usually means that they should have the formal status of
parties in litigation. They should have power to initiate proceedings relevant‘
to their interests. However, their interests may legitimately be represented by
adults. unless there is reason to believe that the adults interests are different
from those of the child.
(ii) There should be clear mechanisms through which children‘s
understanding. perceptions and wishes should be made known to the court
or other decision-maker.
(iii) If the proceedings are in a court, children should have the benefit
of legal representation. whether or not they or their parents are able to afford
it. '
(iv) There should be provisions to ensure that so far as possible
children are provided with information necessary for them to make relevant
choices. In particular, they should be told whatever rights they might have in
the proceedings.
(v) There should be adequate channels through which children can
lodge complaints of ill-treatment. ,
The Present Law
The present legislation recognises, in the main. that children are
parties to the proceedings. Otherwise, it fails entirely to embody the above
principles.
The New Bill
Rc/H'r'st'nlurion of chi/drank interests in court
Children are. of course, parties to criminal proceedings. The Bill
provides that notice of care applications should be served on the child if he
or she is over It) years (cl.96; cf. cl.84(3)), and such children are parties to the
proceedings (cl.96). There is provision for guardians ad [item in care
proceedings, at the discretion of the court (cl.99). They could be appointed of
course in the ease ot‘ehildren under 10. The Bill, therefore, appears to satisfy
this principle.
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Recognition of children's wishes and understanding
'The party status of children goes far in this direction. There is,
however, no general reference to children's wishes in the various “objects"
clau‘ses, which seems a pity (See, however, c192, mentioned above).
Rights to legal representation
There is no legal right to legal representation for children who cannot
afford it; it is a matter of the availability of legal aid, which is not affected by
the Bill.
Information
It is provided that in connection with care proceedings, children and
parents should be given a document setting out legal avenues of challenge;
as far as reasonably practicable, these are to be available in different
languages (c193). ’
This is important and welcome. But a full implementation of this
principle would perhaps have involved a general statement, perhaps among
the “objects” clauses, to the effect that people affected by the Act should be
given, so far as practicable, sufﬁcient information to enable them to exercise
their rights. '
Channels for complaints
The various new avenues for legal challenge of decisions taken under
the Act will no doubt provide some opportunities for airing grievances. Also,
the provision for “visitors” should in theory provide avenues for complaints:
visitors may enter and inspect facilities at any reasonable time, confer
privately with any person in the facility, report to the Minister. and apply for
a review by the Children‘s Review Panel (cl.6, 119). In addition, complaints
may be directed to the Ombudsman. There are, therefore, several channels
for complaints: their adequacy will of course depend on the diligence and
skill of those who occupy the relevant positions, and also on the willingness
of the Minister to appoint appropriate people and give them the necessary
support This is an important area, and it is to be hoped that the
administration of the Bill will be such as to give ‘ children a realistic
opportunity to air any grievances they might have.
Overall, it seems that the new Bill goes a long way in the direction of
the themes noted on page 51, and to the extent that it does so is to be
welcomed as suitable for the 80's. A tragic exception is the provision noted
on page 34 making it an offence to make a false complaint against an ofﬁcer.
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«'nNr'utsluNs
In the (”nurse of this paper, various provisions ()l' the Community
Wellaie Hill have l‘teen eritieised, and various amendments suggested. 'l'hese
criticisn'ts should. however. he kept in their place. The Bill is a complete
overhaul of a wide and complex ﬁeld, and replaces a thoroughly discredited
Aet. It is the result ofa long process of consultation and public involvement.
That process is perhaps reﬂected in the patchy quality of some parts of the
Bill. But the process has led. more importantly, to a Bill which, in its
essentials. embodies the needs and values of New South Wales in the 1980's.
It will pose all kinds of new challenges and difﬁculties. and will be
expensive to administer. I think it‘is fair to say that it embodies a real
concern by the present government for a just and humane system of
community welfare, and its introduction is a considerable achievement I
hope it is swiftly brought into operation, subject to the amendments
indicated in this paper. I ‘
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Richard Chisholm
I would like to conﬁne myself to the process of the legislative review, a
general overview of whether the Bill is any good, and some brief comments
on the provisions dealing with non-offenders, children who are now going to
be called “children in need of care".
The first point to make is that this Bill is the result of a very extended
and complex process of discussion, debate, and consultation. “Community
consultation" is a slippery phrase. It never means the community, but always
selected sections of the community, usually the prominent and articulate
sections of the community. However, it does seem to me that insofar as one
can realistically expect legislation to emerge from community consultation,
this Bill has. There have been endless committees, and endless submissions
from the public, with a little bit of encouragement from various organi-
zations. These have resulted in a long line of reports. The most recent, that
of the Legislative Advisory Panel, was a large elaborate document published
at the beginning of this year. This represented a discussion of the Green
Paper, published in 1978, which outlined the government's then proposals
for the Bill, in the light of the public submissions received on that Green
Paper. It came up with some signiﬁcantly different recommendations. It is
deplorable that the Government has decided to keep this document secret
The public is entitled to know how public submissions were received. And
those of us on the Committee worked on the clear understanding that the
report would be published.
Nevertheless, I do think that in a very important sense the public
discussion worked. On most of the really big issues, this Bill does embody a
set of values, a certain degree of concensus, which did seem to emerge
during that long and complex process of debate. The Bill has been a long
time coming, and a lot of us have felt very impatient with it, but I think that
the long slow process of producing it was for many people, inside the
Department and certainly outside the Department, a very educative one. My
view of the Bill overall is that it does get a lot of important things right in its
big decisions, and in the “objectives" which are now made explicit in quite
an unusual way for Australian legislation. I think the Bill can therefore be
said to reflect community needs and aspirations of the 1980’s.
Another characteristic of the Bill, also reﬂected by the way it came into
being, is that it is very messy. It bears all the signs of committees and
compromises. Some bits of the Act are drafted in ways that are signiﬁcantly
different from other bits. The values and philosophies in relation to some
issues are pretty different from those in relation to other issues. The most
interesting and worrying example of that difference is that in relation to the
proceedings for children in need of care. The Bill says lots of things about
getting rid of the rules of evidence, having a flexible inquiry-like process
rather than the adversary process which the previous legislation largely  
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embodied. Yet at the same time the 'ill suddenly says: “Let‘s have the
criminal standard of proof‘. I know other people wish to speak on that and I
have referred to it in my paper (pages X ), but it seems to me that is a
classic example of how different ideologies are clashing within this
legislation. In that sense. too, the Bill embodies values of the 1980’s: on the
whole those clashes and uncertainties which you can ﬁnd within the Bill
reﬂect a lot of the uncertainties and debates which surfaced during the
process of consultation.
In relation to non-offenders let me comment very brieﬂy on three
aspects: (i) child abuse, (ii) children in long term care outside their home,
and (iii) troublesome older children.
In relation to child abuse I will not go through the detailed provisions
but the big question in relation to child abuse for the law is I think, what
kind of coercive intervention by State ofﬁcials or other people is going to be
legally permitted. The law is not primarily concerned with the provision of
services. There are generally speaking no important legal problems in the
provision of all kinds of helping services and counselling services relating to
abused children. Where the law becomes important is where people want to
intervene against the wishes of parents. The most dramatic example is where
the child is taken away from home. On this matter, I think the Bill reaches a
very ﬁrm and rather controversial position. What it does essentially is to say
“Let‘s have a very wide general deﬁnition of children in need of care”.
Notice that the deﬁnition which I have quoted in my paper (page 41)
includes not only physical abuse but psychological abuse, and it also
includes anticipated psychological abuse. Now this is very wide and it '
potentially gives the intervenors. the welfare authorities, very great powers. It
would be regarded as horrendous and would probably lead to the immediate
suicide of the authors of the new book Before the Best Interests of the Child,
Goldstein. Freud and Solnit (which also promises to be a best seller). They
argue very strenuously for severe limits to be placed on protective,
benevolent State intervention. However, to balance the wide ﬂexible powers,
the Bill says, on the other hand, “Let us also set up lots of opportunities and
avenues whereby people affected by this intervention can challenge the
authorities“. In relation to State wards it is now possible to take custody and
other proceedings in the Supreme Court, and there is a new Tribunal which
will hear appeals from all sorts of decisions by the Department So that the
Bill's answer to the question “How do we limit State power in relation to
abused children?" is essentially this: “We give the State lots of power, but
give individuals lots of opportunity to challenge exercise of that power in
various kinds of courts and tribunals". Personally, this position worries me.
However. there was no evident appreciation of the issues in most of the
public submissions. I expect this to be a major issue when the Bill is itself
reviewed in years to come.
The second matter is children in long term care. Let me direct your
attention to the special provision which enables proceedings to be taken by
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controversial issue about the extent to which intervention can be based on
the fact that a child has been essentially living in alternative care for l2
months. The argument in favour of this intervention is that these children
are. in the famous phrase, “children who wait": children in limbo, who have
no settled home. The argument is that the law should move after a
reasonable time to some final resolution of their situation and place them in
a family where they can have some permanency. The worry is that this
comes at the high cost of giving very great powers to welfare authorities.
The last matter is older troublesome children. Here what the Bill does
is essentially to accept. to a limited extent, the non-intervention argument
which has largely come from the United States. This argument essentially
says that older kids should be allowed, if they choose. “to go to hell in their
own way“. They should have the right, like adults. of knowing that they can
do what they like subject to the fairly precise restrictions of the criminal law.
It is improper for the State to push them around. lock them up and
otherwise deal with them on such grounds as being “uncontrollable“.
“exposed to moral danger", and so on. The Bill accepts this non-
interventionist argument to some extent lt lower the relevant age of non-
eriminal proceedings from 18 to l6. Secondly, and very importantly. it
deprives the court of power to make the punitive “control order". that is.
what used to be “committal to an institution". A related point is that truancy
now is not of itself a ground for court intervention. It is only a ground for
court intervention when a truant for other reasons falls within the definition
of “child in need of care“.
Overall my view of the Bill is that it has some important problems;
there are lots of amendments, some of them fairly serious. which I would
like to see. In particular. many of the provisions relating to children in
institutions are regrettably punitive and crude. On the other hand we have
spent a terriﬁc lot of energy and time in producing legislation. This Bill is
much better than the legislation that we have. The object of good legislation
is to be like a good chairman or chair-person; that is to be unobtrusive, ﬁrm.
clear. and let people get on with the job. What seems to me to be important
now is to get this Act passed (preferably after ﬁxing up its defects), to get the
various Tribunals and new bodies on_the road. to carefully monitor their
progress. and to keep pressure on government and other people given these
responsible jobs to do them well. I would expect this Bill. or something like
it. to serve reasonably satisfactorily for the next few years. I think it would be
a tragedy if anyone regarded this Bill as being the final word for any period
of more than. say. five years. but for the moment I think it is time to turn our
energies away from legislative reform. subject to the need to make some
amendments to this Bill. and concentrate on the proper funding. the
training. and decision making. To turn. in a sense. to where the real action
is. that is to what actually happens in the field to children who have the
misfortune of coming within such legislation. If this can be done. what
actually happens to children could be improved. And we could collect
information about the working of the system which would enable more
informed decisions to be made when the next legislative review is
undertaken.
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A CONSIDERATION OF SOME EVIDENTIARY AND
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN NEGLECT COMPLAINTS
Rare/”(1111' Smith. I'll l)i/).I.uw,
Legal Ofﬁcer,
[Department of Youth and Community Services
Introduction
The problems canvassed in this paper are those raised in the
preparation and presentation of neglect complaints made to the children‘s
court. As at the date of,preparation, the proposed Community Welfare Bill
has not been tabled in the House and it has, therfore, not been possible to
comment upon the changes that will be made by that legislation and the
effect of such changes upon the matters discussed.
Although weight of opinion indicates that the traditional adversary
approach is not appropriate in neglect proceedings, no clear guidelines have
been established to assist in the practical implementation of another form of
proceedings. The introduction of s.8lA into the Child Welfare Act was an
attempt to overcome some of the evidentiary problems raised by the rule
against hearsay, and in part it has proved successful, but it has also given
rise to certain associated problems relating to the weight to be given to such
evidence, and the scope of the matters that may be introduced under the
section. ‘
The central involvement of the parent or guardian in neglect com-
plaints has made it necessary to examine their standing in the proceedings
and the effect of such standing on the admissibility of evidence, and also the
standard of proof that is applicable where serious allegations have been
made against them.
The necessity for the legal guardian to have actual care and control of
the child has been the subject of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
N.S.W. and this has had far-reaching consequences in the areas of potential
and emotional abuse. The primary responsibility of the court to protect the
rights and welfare of the child means that the children’s court must become
increasingly involved in matters of emotional, sexual and cultural abuse,
and in so doing, will place considerable reliance on expert evidence to prove
the complaint It is, therefore, essential that strong interdisciplinary links be
established to enable the children‘s court to fulﬁl its role as part of a multi—
disciplinary system of intervention for the protection of children.
Matters of child abuse and neglect form only a small proportion of
cases that come before the children‘s court In 1977, however, amendments
were made to the Child Welfare Act (1939) in which it was made compulsory
for medical practitioners to report cases of actual or suspected abuse, and
the significant increase in the number of incidents reported has been
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reflected in the number of cases brought before the children's court. If this
trend continues, and if, in fact, compulsory reporting is extended to other
professions, a continuing increase in the number of cases brought before the
court can be anticipated.
“Abuse" and “neglect" are generally used in their generic sense to refer
to cases of non-accidental physical injury to children, psychological and
sexual abuse, and failure to provide an adequate and acceptable standard of
care, and it is in this sense that they are used here. The instances where a
child may be deemed to be neglected within the meaning of the Chi/(I
Welfare Act, (1939). are set out in the sub-sections of 5.72 of that Act, and all
cases of abuse and neglect fall within one of these statutory deﬁnitions.
Concurrent Child Welfare and Criminal Proceedings
The greater number of cases brought before the court and the
increasing participation of the legal profession since the introduction of
legal aid have meant that the evidentiary and procedural aspects of the
jurisdiction have come under closer scrutiny. As the evidence canvassedin
many of the cases brought before the childrens court could also give rise to
criminal proceedings, one of the ﬁrst matters to be taken on appeal to the
Supreme Court related to the competence of the children‘s court to hear
evidence of matters that may later be canvassed in another jurisdiction. His
Honour Mr. Justice Yeldham in McMahon-Winter v. Larcombe held that to
proceed with the matter before the children‘s court in no way amounted to a
denial of natural justice to the father who had been charged with criminal
offence given the protection afforded by 55.9 and 11 of the Evidence Act, and
further commented that matters concerning neglected children should be
dealt with expeditiously.‘ The important protective function exercised by the
children's court therefore stands apart from other considerations. and if.
criminal sanctions are considered appropriate because of the nature or
‘ degree of the injuries inﬂicted on the child, proceedings in both jurisdictions
may proceed concurrently.
The Children’s Court as part of a Multi-Disciplinary System
The children's coun forms part of a multi-disciplinary system of
intervention in the family and the taking of court proceedings may be the
culmination of unsuccessful intervention, or be part of the therapeutic
process. It is important to view the proceedings in this perspective when
determining the appropriate procedural form and the evidentiary rules that
are applicable to the jurisdiction.
Form of Care Proceedings
The Child Welfare Act gives no speciﬁc direction regarding the form of
the proceedings and merely provides that “where any child or young person
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is brought before a court as a neglected or uncontrollable child or young
person the court may thereupon hear and determine the matter 2
In the absence of any statutory direction to the contrary the pro-
ceedings are therefore conducted in the normal adversary manner. Whether
this form is appropriate has been the subject of some debate, and it may well
be that by tlte time this paper is presented legislation will have been enacted
making provision for such proceedings to be in the nature of an enquiry.
This would then give statutory recognition to the view expressed by Lord
Widgery in Humberside County Council v DPR that care proceedings are in
the nature of an objective enquiry,3 and to the suggestion by Maguire J. in Ex
I’arte Dorman: Re Macreadie‘ that that was the position in New South Wales.
In t‘ormally establishing the proceedings as an enquiry, however, an
important aspect must be to give recognition to the power of the court to
inform itself on any matter relating to the proceedings, in such manner as it
may think lit. as has been done in South Australia and Victoria.‘ Such an
express enactment should also take into account the particular nature of the
care jurisdiction. and give recognition to the fact that the ordinary principles
of a judicial enquiry do not apply in toto. This was made clear by Lord
Devlin when he commented that:
in the jurisdiction parens patriae the-re are unquestionably some
principles oljudicial enquiry which are not observed. Contrary
to ordinary principles. all wardship proceedings, either ﬁnal or
interlocutory, are held in camera and the practice permits the
judge to see by himself not only the ward but also each parent
separately .. .6
An enquiry conducted upon those lines would certainly be a departure
from the present manner of eliciting evidence. and may have the effect of
creating an atmosphere in which the parties are prepared to accept the
intervention of the court and to co-operate in the implementation of its
orders.
Within the present system it is not unknown for solicitors representing
very young children to call their clients to give evidence. Because of the
emotional distress that can be caused to the child this is a practice that
should be discouraged and a policy adopted that is more in keeping with the
view expressed by Lord Devlin that the child be interviewed privately,
Child Welfare Act (I939) s.8l(l)2.
3‘ (I977) l WLR l25l at 1254
4. (l‘)59) S.R. (N.S.W.) 27| at 274
5. South Australia, Children 's Protection and Young Offenders Act. l979,
s.l7(l) and Victoria. Children's Court Act, 1973 520(2).
(w. Ofﬁcial Solicitor to the Supreme Court In re K (Infants) 1965 AC. 201 at 239.
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perhaps in the presence of an independent party. This would effect a
practical application of the test applied by Viscount Haldane in matters
relating to wards and quoted in In re K that:-
\
the jurisdiction regarding wards of court which is now exercised
by the Chancery Division is an ancient jurisdiction deriving
from the prerogative of the Crown as parens patriae. It is not
based on the rights of parents, and its primary concern is not to
ensure their rights but to ensure the welfare of the children.7
It would seem that the same principles should be applicable in the
children’s court jurisdiction, and that the adversary system presently used is
not the most appropriate way of dealing with a problem that has
ramifications far beyond the determination of a lis between parties.
Relaxation of the Rules of Evidence in Neglect Proceedings
Whether proceedings are adversary or in the nature of an enquiry is of
significance in determining the nature of the evidence and the manner in
which it is presented. The principle that the welfare of the child is the
paramount consideration does not lie easily with an approach that insists on
the application of the strict rules of evidence, and this fact was recognised
when 5.818 was introduced in the Child Welfare Act, (1939). This section
makes provision that:-
the court, in hearing and determining the matter, may act upon
any statement, document, information or matter that may, in its
opinion, assist it to deal with the complaint, whether or not the
statement, document, information or matter would be admissible
in evidence...
where the complaint alleges that the child has been ill-treated or exposed, or
‘ evidence has been presented to the court that the child has been assaulted,
and it isian attempt to make admissible all relevant evidence that may
otherwise have been excluded. Similar provisions have been enacted in
Western Australia,‘3 Victoria, and South Australia9 and the two latter States
have extended the concept to allow the court to actively participate in the
proceedings.
The present provision in the New SOuth Wales Child Welfare Act has
not proved wholly successful in its aim, and some of the difﬁculties are
attributable to the conditions that must be satisﬁed before the section
becomes operative. Take, for example, the following case from a New South
Wales children's court:-
 
N [bid page 240.
Western Australia, Child Welfare Act, s.30(3) (a)
9. Victoria, Children's Court Act 1973 5.120(2) and South Australia Children's
Protection and Young Offenders Act, 1979, s.l7(1) previously referred to.
9°  
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A father masturbates in front of his 6-year—old daughter. speciﬁ-
eallly drawing her attention to his behaviour. The mother takes
no action other than to speak to the father when the matter
comes to her attention. and he answers that the daughter “must
be learned". The matter is brought before the court on a
complaint that the child is under improper guardianship. Similar
complaints of improper guardianship have been established
some nine months earlier in respect of the father‘s physical
interference (in which anal intercourse occurred) with two older
daughters.
The evidence would not come within the criteria of “similar fact"
evidence and would be excluded if the normal evidentiary rules were to be
applied. As there was no evidence of assult. s.8lB could not apply. and the
relevant evidence relating to the other children could not be adduced.
A similar case was considered by the English Divisional Court in R. v.
Lincoln (Kcsrovan) County Justice. ex-parte M (a minor)lo when it overruled
the decision ofthe juvenile court in refusing to allow evidence to be given of
a father's incestuous relationship with two other daughters. and in doing so.
the court remarked that the evidence should not have been excluded as it
was highly relevant to the child's circumstances.
Recognition that an inﬂexible rule against hearsay and the other
exclusionary rules of evidence are not applicable in care proceedings has
been the subject of comment in both In re K” and Humbersidc County
Council v DPR.l2 it is. therefore. clear that whatever form the proceedings
take the sole test of admissibility should be relevence to the proceedings. and
in this regard it is the child‘s total situation that must be considered.
. A further problem encountered in the use ‘of 5.818 is the varying
amount of weight that the court places on the untested evidence admitted
under iL and this reflects the innate caution of the judiciary in accepting
evidence that is untested by cross-examination or that is not the best
evidence. Reliance on this section in a strongly contested matter can prove
of minimal value and the only manner in which this or any similar section
will be of value is as an integral part ofa completely new approach to care
proceedings.
Standard of Proof
It is generally accepted that the standard ofproofin neglect complaints
is the civil standard following the comments of Maguire J. in Ex puny
Dormml: n- Mucroadie.” although where there are allegations of serious
It). (I976). 2 WLR I43. CAM
II. Ofﬁcial Solicitor lo the Supreme Court In Re K (infants) l965 A.C. 20].
l2. (I977) l WLR l25l.
l3. (I959) SR. (N.S.W.) 271.
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misconduct towards the child a higher degree of probability is demanded. In
so increasing the degree necessary to establish the complaint the para-
mountcy principle upon which the care jurisdiction is based is being
ameliorated. The justiﬁcation for the greater degree of probability can only
be directed towards the protection of the rights of the parent, and where
these are at variance with the rights of the child, the child may be placed in a
situation of grave risk where a complaint is not established. Should the
standard of proof be made the criminal standard in the proposed legislation.
the same argument would be applicable, notwithstanding the form of
proceedings adopted.
The nature of the evidence in abuse and neglect cases demands some
degree of subjective evaluation, and in the majority of cases value judgments
must be made by the court The obvious difﬁculties presented in trying to
prove such matters beyond reasonable doubt could mean that children are
returned to a situation where an unacceptable degree of risk exists. A more
realistic approach may be achieved by merely requiring a preponderence of
evidence and placing a greater evidentiary burden of proof on parents and
guardians to provide satisfactory explanations to the court.
Standing of Parents in Neglect Proceedings
Before any such requirement could be made it is necessary to clarify
the standing of parents and guardians in care proceedings.
Since approximately 1977, the metropolitan children‘s courts have ar-
ranged solicitors from the Austrlaian Legal Aid Ofﬁce to represent parents
in these matters and it is most probable that such representation would be
available in country areas if requested. The manner in which the complaint
is framed cites the child as defendant, and although s.81(b) of the Child
Welfare Act (1939) requires the parent to be present, it does not confer any
status upon them in the proceedings. The solicitor must therefore seek leave
of the court to appear and in so doing places his client in a position similar
to that of an intervenor. If he can be considered an intervenor, he shall.
unless the court otherwise orders, be deemed to be a party to the proceedings
with all the rights, duties and liabilities of a party."
The status of parents in neglect proceedings has proved of some
signiﬁCance in questions relating to admissibility of evidence. The view is
adopted by some magistrates that statements may not be put into evidence
unles they are made in the presence of the defendant, notwithstanding the
age or intellectual capacity of the child. The rejection of statements in which
parents have admitted to injuring the child prevents the court from having
before it evidence that is most relevant both to its decision and ﬁnal
disposition. If the necessary conditions precedent are fulﬁlled, the statement
 
14. Australian Family Law and Practice Reports 1980 C.C.H. Australia
Limited (53-810).
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may he admitted under sﬁl l3, but it is undesirable that admissibility should
be dependent upon such a contingency, and it would seem that other
arguments can be advanced in support thereof.
The lirst of these is the standing of the parents. Although there is no
slatutoiy basis in the Child Welfare Act (1939) to allow a person to apply for
leave to intervene in the proceedings, if leave is granted by the court for a
person to do so. he effectively has all the rights, duties and obligations ofa
party. -
The interest of parents in the proceedings is of a nature analogous to
that of intervenors under the Family Law Act — it is a subjective interest that
demands that they place before the court all matters that may have bearing
on their degree of innocence or culpability, and these matters will have a
signiﬁcant effect on the ﬁnal order. In requesting the privileges of a party.
they must accept the consequences of such involvement
‘ As specific reference is made to the child's guardian in the wording of
certain neglect complaints” the allegation against that person is clearly
indicated. and this further substantiates the view that he/she has the
standing of a co-defendant and therefore a party to the proceedings.
In England. the parents are not parties to the proceedings and they are
not given the right of separate representation; their role is limited to that of
answering any allegations made against them, and making representations
to the court at the conclusion of the evidence for the applicant and the
respondent.“5 However‘ two English decisions support the view that state-
ments made by a parent or guardian against their own interest may be
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. Lord Widgery in Humberside
County Council v. DPR” said: ‘
..I am quite prepared to accept the general principle that the
hearsay rule applies in juvenile courts On the other hand I
cannot for a moment believe that it is right that where you have
proceedings which are essentially non-adversary, non-party pro-
ceedings. that the question of admissibility of a confession or
admission should depend upon whether the person making the
confession or admission was a party In other words. all that
is necessary to be shown is that the evidence tendered is direct
l5. ('hiltl Welfare Act (1939) 5.72 “Neglected Child“ means child or young
person 0) “who in the opinion of the Court is under incompetent or
improper guardianship."
lo. Magistrates‘Courts (Children and Young Persons) (Amendment) Rules
I976, Rule 5 adding Rule 14b to the Magistrates’ Courts (Children and
Young Persons) Rules I970.
I74 (l977) l WLR l25|.
 
evidence of an admission made by someone who has the control of
the child or is concemed with the control of the child, and who can
therefore make admissions which could conceivably be of any value
under section 1. . . .Here D was the guardian of the child. If the
evidence tendered was an admission by him of ill-treatment of the
child or anything of that kind it ought to have gone in, and it ought
_ not to have been kept out merely because of purely technical reasons.
p. 1255 .
In Shropshire County Council v. PJS (a child)“ the court refused to allow
a statement into evidence made by a mother to others regarding her
husband’s ill-treatment of their child. They commented, however, that if the
statement made by the mother had shown herself in a bad light it would
have been admissible.
Who is the Child’s Guardian?
Whether or not the guardian must also be the caregiver before a
complaint of improper or incompetent guardianship under 5.720) of the
Child Welfare Act, 1939, can be substantiated has been the subject of a recent
decision of Mr Justice Yeldham1n Lawson v. Youngman" on a case stated by
a special magistrate. The ﬁndings of fact by the special magistri included 74
the following. - ,
The defendant child had been since the date of birth in the care
and control of the hospital;
That the mother had never had the child with her nor had she
ever held the child; the mother was not looking after the child on
the date of the complaint, and had not at any time since the birth
of the child looked after the child.
The mother on the date of the complaint was a continued
treatment patient under the Mental Health Act.
She was suffering from a very defective memory for recent events,
judgment poor to a degree to preclude the proper looking after
the child, physically suffering from inbalance of her legs and
unsteadiness and some brain damage.
The mother was not competent to look after the child on the
basis that her orientation and memory and judgment were
defective.
There was no evidence before the magistrate as to the identity or
whereabouts of the child’s, father.
 
18. Unreported QB Div No. 270175 16th December 1975 quoted from Child
Abuse—procedure and evidence in Juvenile courts. Hall and Mitchell, Barry
Rose (Publishers) Ltd London 1978.
19. Supreme Courts of N.SHW (1980) 2 N.S.W. L.R. 457.
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After an analysis of the common law meaning of "guardianship" and
of the sections of the Chi/(I Welfare Act in which the word appears, His
Honour concluded:
In my view as s72 and the provisions of Part XlV (see in
particular s‘8l(5)) are designed to promote the actual physical
and moral welfare of the child, and as other paragraphs of $.72
deal with parents who are unﬁt to have or retain custody, the
expression “under incompetent or improper guardianship" in
par. (j) refers only to a guardian who has the care and control of
the child in fact and not to one whose only qualiﬁcation to be
described as a guardian is her status as a parent she having no
custody and bestowing no care.
The matter was referred to the Court of Appeal on the ground, inter
alia. that the provisions of 5.720) of the Child Welfare Act, 1939, should not
have been construed so as to conﬁne the statutory meaning of the words
“under incompetent or improper guardianship" to a guardian only who has
the actual care and control of a child, and not to one who was aparent only
having no care or control of the child. 2"
The interpretative question raised by this case has considerable
practical implications. If the expression “under competent or improper
guardianship" is to be limited to those guardians alone who have care and
control of the child, then there would be no protection under the Child
Welfare Act (I939) for a particular group of children who may be subject to
potential abuse or neglect. or who are presently suffering emotional abuse.
Within these categories two situations frequently arise. Firstly, the child who
is born to a mother suffering from drug addiction, mental incapacity etc. so
that a serious potential risk exists if the child is given to her, and secondly,
the situation of a child voluntarily placed with a private agency by its
parents and removed infrequently but sufﬁciently often to impair the child’s
emotional growth and security and make permanent placement in a more
suitable environment impossible
lf guardianship is interpreted as including care. no complaint may be
placed before the court and no permanent arrangements can be made for
such children. The law has an obligation to provide protection for children
exposed to these less obvious forms of abuse. and although recourse may be
had to the Supreme Court in its inherentjurisdiction it is more appropriate
that they be dealt with in the specialised forum of the children’s court.
The extent of the concepts of“care" and “guardianship" again arise for
consideration when interpreting an order made under s.82(l)(c) of the Child
Welfare Aclt committing a child to the care of a person willing to undertake
such care. The express use of the work “care", deﬁned in the Act as
20. As at time of preparing this paperjudgment has been reserved. See later
p. 73 for comment on decision.  
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including custody and control.“ must limit the scope of the relationship
created and have the effect of transferring only the physical control of the
child to the caregiver. The transfer of care does not have the effect of
transferring guardianship and the extent of the responsibility and authority
of the custodian must only be to provide the day to day care of the child.
'Any question of consent to marriage, acquisition of a passport, or any other
major matters that may arise should be decided in conjunction with the
child's parents or legal guardian. The temporary nature of an order under
s.82(1)(c) transferring the care of the child is underlined by the provisions of
s.9l(3) of the Act giving a right to approach the children’s court at any time
to vary the terms and conditions or to terminate such order.
Thus an order under the Child Welfare Act committing a child to care.
differs markedly in effect from an order making the child a ward of the
Supreme Court. The latter order has the effect of removing guardianship
from the parents, and the court's consent must be obtained to any major
decision concerning the child.
Orders transferring temporary care under the Child Welfare Act thus
stand in contrast to orders transferring guardianship of a child to the
Minister for Youth & Community Services. Two situations arise where such
transfer of guardianship is effected. The ﬁrst is the transfer of guardianship
to the Minister to deal with a child as a ward admitted to State control and
such admission may be by way of court order or administrative action.
Although at present no independent judicial tribunal has been established
to review such decisions, the Minister has indicated that he favours the
establishment of such a body.22 The second is the transfer of the guardian-
ship of an intellectually handicapped person and this again can be by way
of court order or administrative action. Such transfer is a transfer of
guardianship of the person only and presently requires that the application
be made in respect of a minor. Such order changes the status of a person .
over the age of 18 years from that of an adult to that of a person who may be
dealt with as if that person were under the age of 14 years,23 and places upon’
the Minister the obligation of providing adequate physical care of the
person.
When any child with an obvious intellectual incapacity appears before
the court the provisions of Part IX of the Child Welfare Act should be
considered, and the necessary reports obtained to ensure that such a change
in status is warranted.
 
21. Child Welfare Act (1939) 8.4.
22. A report issued by the Hon. R.F. Jackson, M.P., Minister for Youth and
Community Services on Proposed Child and Community Welfare
Registration. December, 1978. p.7.5.
23. Child Welfare Act (1939) 5.48 (2)
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Protection of the rights of the individual is provided through the Intel-
lectually Handicapped Person‘s Review Tribunal which reviews each case
every two years to determine whether the continuation of the order is in that
persons interests.
Legal Representation of the Child
The natural duty of a parent to protect an infant child referred to in
llalsbury. Laws ofEng/aml.“ includes the taking of legal action on its behalf
as next friend or guardian ad litem. Historically, it was not recognised that a
child could require legal representation separate from that of its parents. or
that the actions of the parents may be such as to render them unsuitable to
protect the child‘s interests. When the Legal Aid Scheme for Children was
established by the Law Society of NSW in 1975. it was recognised that
solicitors should represent their child client and take instructions from that
child rather than from the parents, but the extent of their duty in
representing an infant child has never been adequately canvassed. Some
time after the scheme commenced the Law Society sought to have clariﬁed
certain points that had been raised by practitioners and Counsel's Opinion
was requested. One of the questions raised referred to the ability of a child
under the age of eight years to give instructions. and in an Opinion
published in the Law Society Journal“ Counsel observed that whereas at
common law in civil proceedings infants could not sue or defend except by a
"guardian" (subsequently extended to a “next friend" or “guardian ad [item”)
it appeared that. at common law. no such incapacity attached to infants in
connection with criminal proceedings. The difﬁculty that arose here.
however. was whether care proceedings could be considered “quasi-
criminal". particularly in view of the indication in Ex pane Dorman, Re
Mucrvac/ii'“ that the standard of proof in complaints under 5.72 is the civil
standard. As it was considered that most requests for assistance proceeded
from the presiding magistrate it was suggested that the duty solicitor was in
fact performing the function of an amicus curiae. in which case the question
of instructions became irrelevant This view. however. gives rise to difﬁcul-
ties in determing the extent of the role of the legal reprsentative for the child.
It" the umirux curiae is to maintain the traditional role of“friend of the court“
his status cannot be that of an advocate or an adversary in the proceedings:
he is without interest in the proceedings. and does not legally appear for
anyone.“ As the justiﬁcation for separate legal representation of the child is
based upon the conﬂict of interests between the child and its guardian. it is
obviously essential — at least from a practical point of view — that his role not
be restricted in this way. From a legal viewpoint. however. it does not seem
’___/
24. Vol. 24. fourth edition. Infants. Children and Young persons. Para. 504
25. February. I977. Mr. P.E. Powell Q.C.. (now Mr Justice Powell).
26. “959) S.R. (N.S.W.) Ni
27. The Australian Law Journal. Vol 54 Practice Note. The Attorney-General
and the role of amicus curiae p.558 at 559.
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accurate that the representative is acting iii t’he'hcaﬁi—tyoiaihﬁs, a-t‘l-east-in
the initial proceedings before the children’s court, given that his client is a
party to the proceedings.
The difﬁculty still remains of the inability of an infant client to give
instructions. The English Children’s Act, 1975, has provided a partial answer
in a similar situation by making provision that, in certain circumstances, the
court must appoint a guardian ad [item for the child, unless satisﬁed that to
do so is not necessary for safeguarding the interests of the child." The most
appropriate response is that made by 5.65 of the Family Law Act, 1975, which
provides that the court may, on its own motion or on the application of
certain other people, order that the child be separately represented, and
Demetriou and Demetriou” expresses the view that the separate representative
of children is not in the position of an ordinary representative of a party. of
being bound by instructions. The extent of the separate representative’s role
was outlined by Treyvaud J. as a role to:
cross-examine the witnesses, to call evidence touching upon the
child's welfare, where necessary to ensure that the children‘s
wishes are known to the court, and to ﬁnally address and make
submissions to the court based upon the evidence adduced, and
the law which he feels may be of assistance to the court in
dealing with the questions raised for its determination.30
This is a similar role to that which must be undertaken by the child’s
representative in the children’s court ifit is to be relevant and meaningful to
the proceedings. In the absence of speciﬁc facilitating legislation not
requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem, or allowing the court to
appoint a separate representative on its own motion, the representative
appears as solicitor for the defendant by leave and at the request of the court
where the child is of very tender years, and on instructions where the age of
the child renders him capable of formulating the same. The power of the
court to grant such leave can be seen as an instance of an inherent power in
the court to protect the welfare of a child. Re Bell; ex parte Lees (1980fl is
authority for the proposition that an inherent power exists in the court to
order a solicitor to make disclosure of his client‘s address, notwithstanding
that such disclosure would normally have been protected by legal pro-
fessional privilege, on the basis that such privilege is subject to exceptions,
 
28. New s.32b of the 1969 Act inserted by 5.64 of‘the Children Act 1975.
29. (1976) FLC 90-102 in Australian Family Law and Practice Reported
CCH Australia Limited (23-904)
30. Waghome and Dempster (1979) FLC 90-700
31. (1980) FLC 90-850.
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and particularly .is subject to an exception in matters affecting the welfare of
the child. In children‘s courts, where the welfare of the child is the essence of
the complaint, at similar argument must apply, and similar reliance placed
on the court‘s inherent power.
The situation may differ where an appeal is lodged by a parent on
behalf of a young child under s.8l(2) of the Child Welfare Act, for in such a
case the parent is purporting to act for the child, and the child is only a party
through its parents action. Any application for separate representation
would have to be made to the court by the guardian as the person with the
prima l‘acic duty of protecting the child‘s interest, and would have to be
based on the existent conflict of interests.
‘ Where an application is made to the Supreme Court in its inherent
jurisdiction. it may not be considered necessary for the child to be separately ,
represented where it is felt that all relevant matters will be placed before the
court by the respective parties (McGuire v. Tull).32
The facts of that case received considerable publicity, as did the
decision of the court to leave the child with the foster parents. In reaching
his decision His Honour Mr Justice Helsham placed considerable em-
phasis on the need for stability in the child’s future, particularly in the light
of the child's early experiences, and after consideration of all the relevant
matters raised in the case found that there was a greater likelihood of such
stability if the child remained with the foster parents. This case was
signiﬁcant in that it underlined the dependence of law on the social and
behavioural sciences in matters relating to the custody and welfare of
children. Several expert witnesses were called by both parties and the
judgment reﬂects the considerable weightplaced on certain aspects of such
evidence.
Importance of Expert Evidence in All Matters relating to Children
The courts have been aware for some considerable time of the
importance of medical evidence in cases of abuse and neglect, but for too
long such evidence has been restricted to evidence of physical abuse and
illtreatment. and insufficiently to emotional neglect. It is, of course a matter
of learning to walk before you run, and it is a difﬁcult enough matter to
persuade the medical profession of their obligations under the compulsory
reporting provisions presently in the Child Welfare Act. Ifthe children’s court
is to adequately fulfil its function of protection of children, however, expert
evidence must be readily available on a wide range of relevant matters. A
measure of society‘s concern for its children is their protection not only from
physical harm but from emotional, sexual and cultural abuse and neglect.
McGuire v. Tull has shown the extent to which expert evidence can assist in
clarifying matters relating to a child's emotional wellbeing; the same
32. Supreme Court of N.S.W. 20th March, 1981 (Unreported)  
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attention must also be given to other matters that most appropriately come
within the protective jurisdiction of the/children‘s court. For some time the
children‘s court has not been considered a suitable forum for matters of‘
sexual abuse as these matters have elicited a punitive response towards the
offender. rather than a protective one towards the child and therefore have
been dealt with in adult courts. Where such abuse occurs within the family it
may well be that a protective approach towards the child, together with the
. provision of extensive support services to the family, is a more appropriate
: response. Whatever response is adopted, however, it must take into account
' the damage that can be inﬂicted upon a child by the necessity of giving
evidence, and” make provision for such evidence to be given in another
manner so as to avoid inﬂicting abuse upon abuse. In this regard the
method adopted in Israel of appointing a “youth interrogator", or the
Norwegian or Swedish systems of excusing all child victims from testifying
. . should be examined to determine in what respects they are relevant to the
! situation in this State.’3
The possibility of abuse from certain cultural practices has lately
,received some attention. The most noteworthy, perhaps because of the
publicity it received, is the practice of female circumcision, but there are
other practices,rless sensational, that are not accepted or understood by this
society. Some of these amount to abuse, others need only be understood in
their cultural context. As Australia becomes increasingly multicultural, and
' as recognition is given to the rightful place of Aboriginal people in society.
the necessity for all those involved in family intervention to have an
appreciation of cultural differences becomes greater.
Interdisciplinary Education
Many of these issues will be more competently dealt with when strong
lines of communication are established between the disciplines involved-It
is essential that lawyers have an appreciation of the behavioural and social
sciences to be able to adequately understand the implications of the
evidence placed before them, and it is necessary for the medical and para-
medical professions to understand the function of the court in matters of
abuse and neglect. When adequate lines of communication are opened,
multi-disciplinary protection of our children may become a reality.
 
'33. Rape Victimology Ed. by Leroy G. Schultz. Charles C. Thomas.
Publisher. USA 1975.  
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Rosemary Smith
Complaints of child abuse and neglect form only a small proportion of
cases that come before the children's court - (in 1978/79 approximately ﬁve
percent of the total number of cases) although there has been a signiﬁcant
increase in the number of incidents reported since compulsory reporting by
the medical profession was introduced in 1977. It can only be anticipated
that this trend wil continue, and when the terms of the new legislation are
considered will probably increase. Under 5.148 (B) of the present Act a
medical practitioner must report any case where he suspects a child has
been assaulted, ill-treated or exposed. The Community Welfare Bill substan-
tially reproduces that section, but substitutes the word “abuse” for the word
“assaulted, illtreated or exposed”. cl.4 deﬁnes abuse as “assault" and
“illtreatment” and clariﬁes “exposed” to mean “expose or subject the child to
behaviour that psychologically harms him or is likely to psychologically
harm him. . . In taking this step the legislature is recognising that abuse
and neglect refer not only to non-accidental physical injury to children, as it
has been interpreted in the past, but to psychological abuse (and one hopes
sexual and cultural abuse), and medical practitioners, and other people who
may be prescribed in the Regulations, will have an obligation to report all
matters that come within the deﬁnition to the Department
The Children’s Court forms part of _a multi-disclplinary system
Frequently when a matter is brought to court a number of support
services have intervened in the family (Baby Health Clinic sisters, com-
munity nurses, school counsellors, psychologists), and the court may be the
ﬁnal step if the child is removed from the home, or only represent a part of
the process if the child is returned to its parents with a recommendation for
continuing intervention from suppport agencies. In either case it is
important that the participants in the court process see their function in the
wider perspective of a multi-disciplinary process of intervention.
The present Child Welfare Act gives no speciﬁc direction regarding the
form of the proceedings and merely provides that “where any child or young
person is brought before the court as neglected or uncontrollable....the
court may thereupon hear and determine the matter. . . The proceedings
are therefore conducted in the normal adversary manner.
In contrast, cl.80(l) of the Community Welfare Bill makes provision
that the court shall inquire into the matter, and 01.94 procedurally interprets
this direction and provides for the proceedings to be conducted informally.
and for the magistrate to examine or cross-examine any witness - but the.
Bill does not speciﬁcally give the important right to the court to direct that
certain evidence be placed before it. From this, and other matters to which I
will refer later, it would seem that although the proceedings are termed an
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“inquiry” they still retain some of the aspects of the adversary system. The
new legislation does, however, allow the children's court to deal with matters
in a manner more akin to that adopted by the Supreme Court in hearing.
wardship cases. and clearly set out in the English case of Humberside County
Council v. D.l’.R. and In Re K that have been cited.
Whether the proceedings are adversary or in the nature of an inquiry is
therefore of signiﬁcance in determining the nature of the evidence and the
manner in which it ispresented. The principle that the welfare of the child is
the paramount consideration does not lie easily with an approach that
insists on an application of the strict rules of evidence, and this fact was
recognised when s.81B was introduced into the Child Welfare Act, 1939. The
section has not proved wholly successful in its aim, and some of the
difﬁculties are attributable to the conditions that must be satisﬁed before it
becomes operative. A further problem that is encountered in the use of 5.813
is the varying amount of weight the court places on the untested evidence
admitted under it, and this reflects the innate caution of the judiciary in
accepting evidence that is untested by cross-examination. or that is not the
best evidence. At present, reliance on this section in a strongly contested
matter can prove of minimal value, and as this section is reproduced in the
new Bill in a form extending to all care proceedings, a completely new
approach will be necessary from all involved in the jurisdiction to overcome
this particular problem.
Standard of Proof. It is generally accepted that the standard of proof in
neglect complaints is the civil standard following ex parte Dorman; re
Macreadie, although allowing for a higher degree of probability as the
allegations become more serious. In so increasing the degree of probability
necessary to establish the complaint the principle that the welfare of the
child is the paramount consideration is being eroded. The justiﬁcation for
the greater degree of probability in these cases can only come from a desire
to protect the rights of parents, and where these rights are at variance with
those of the child, the child may be placed in a situation of grave risk where
a complaint is not established. The parents have a right of appeal against a
decision with which they are dissatisfied — a child that is returned to a home
where it is at risk has no similar right . . .only a hope that better evidence
will be available if the abuse continues. This higher degree of probability
that until now has only been demanded in certain serious cases will be made
even higher under the provisions of the proposed legislation. 01.94 (2) makes
provision that any fact which would tend to prove that the child is in need of
care must be proved beyond reasonable doubt ~ and it is “any fact" rather
than the issue that must be proved at this standard.
The standing of parents and guardians has presented some particular
problems in this jurisdiction.
Under the present Child Welfare Act the child is cited as the defendant,
and the parent required to attend unless the court is satisfied that to require
such attendance would be unreasonable. In 1977, however. the magistrate at
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one of the metropolitan children‘s courts became concerned that the parents
were unable to adequately express their point of view and arranged for the
Australian Legal Aid Ofﬁce to respresent those parents whose ﬁnancial
means would not allow them to engage private representation. This
, representation is now available to all parents who qualify, and is, of course,
in addition to the free legal represenation provided for all children. Thus the
role of the parents has not been limited to that given to them, for example, in
the English legislation — namely to answer any allegations made against
them and to make representations to the court at the conclusion of the
evidence - but has become one of full participation in the proceedings. This
has led to a' rather strange situation where the parents accept the status of
parties but on occasion use the fact that they are not formally cited in the
complaint to object to the admission of statements made by them not taken
in the presence of the child.
The Community Welfare Bill attempts to overcome this problem by
making provision that all persons served with a copy of the application
become parties and that any person who has a genuine concern in the
welfare of the child may appear and be represented. These provisions,
together with the provision relaxing the rules of evidence in all situations,
clariﬁes the standing of the parents. but in retaining “party" proceedings
moves somewhat from the concept of an inquiry.
Legal Guardian. The question of whether the guardian must also be the
care-giver in order that a complaint of incompetent or improper guardian-
ship can be substantiated has been the subject ofa recent decision in Lawson
v. Youngman, and this will remain of signiﬁcance as the words “competent
and proper guardianship" are retained in the Community Welfare Bill. In
that case, the Supreme Court found that “guardianship” referred only to a
guardian who had the care and control of the child, but this was over-ruled
by the Court of Appeal which decided that “guardianship" meant legal
guardianship only. This decision is of considerable signiﬁcance, in that it
allows matters of potential abuse or neglect, whether emotional or physical,
to be brought before the children's court Two situations that give rise to
potential emotional abuse frequently arise - ﬁrstly, that of a child born to a
mother suffering from drug addiction, mental incapacity etc. so creating a
serious potential risk if the child is placed in her care; and secondly, the
situation of a child voluntarily placed with a private agency by its parent
and removed infrequently, but sufﬁciently often to impair the child's
emotional growth and security, and make permanent placement in a more
suitable environment impossible. (The, Community Welfare Bill has made
provision for the latter situation by providing that where the child has been
placed in a non-Govemment Children’s Home, and there has been no
substantial contact with its parents etc. for a period of 12 months or more,
the court may make an order in respect of that child.)
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Lawson v. Youngman has meant
that these matters can be taken to the Children's Court, thus removing the
necessity of relying upon the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
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That latter juris'diction will still be appropriate in matters of emergency.
however — for example when an order is sought for a blood transfusion to be
administered to the child of a Jehovah‘s Witness, as the delay encountered
by the right of appeal in the children’s court could thwart the carrying out of
any order made. The Community Welfare Bill, however. gives no speciﬁc
right of appeal to the parents beyond that contained in the Justices Act -
namely the right of any party to request the Magistrate to state a case to the
Supreme Court
The concepts of “care” and “guardianship" again arise for consi-
deration when interpreting an order “committing a child to the care of a
person willing to undertake such care", when guardianship is not trans-
ferred, and the two instances when guardianship is transferred to the
Minister, namely when a child is admitted to “State control", or an
intellectually handicapped person is made a ward under Part IX of the Child
Welfare Act.
Guardian ad litem. The natural duty of a parent to protect an infant
child included historically the taking of legal action on its behalf. It was not
recognised that the interests of a child could differ from those of its parents
and the question of separate legal representation therefore did not arise.
When the legal aid scheme for children was established by the Law Society
in 1975, it was recognised that the interests of parent and child often differed,
particularly in cases of abuse, and that solicitors under that scheme should
represent their child clients and not the parents. The extent of their duty in
representing an infant child and the manner in which they may receive
instructions has caused some difﬁculties. If the duty solicitor is in fact
‘ ' performing the function of an amicus curiae, as has been suggested by some
authorities, the question of instructions becomes somewhat irrelevant. This
view, however, presents a difﬁculty in determining the extent of the role to be
played by the legal representative, as if the amicus is to maintain the
traditional role of “friend of the court" his status cannot be that of an
advocate or an adversary in the proceedings — he is without interest in the
proceedings, and does not legally appear for anyone. As the justification for
separate legal representation of a child is based upon the possible conﬂict of
interest between the child and his guardian. it is obviously essential - at least
from a practical point of view - that his role not be restricted in this way.
From a legal view-point, it does not seem accurate to give to the
representative the capacity of amicus, at least in the initial proceedings
before the children’s court, as his client is a party to the proceedings.
The difficulty still remains of the inability of an infant client to give
instructions. In England, a partial answer has been given in that provision
has been made in certain circumstances for the court to appoint a guardian
ad [item for the child, unless satisfied that to do so is not necessary for
safeguarding the interests of the child. It would seem that the most
appropriate response has been made by 5.65 of the Family Law Act, 1975,
which provides that the court may, on its oWn motion, or on the application
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-of certain other people, order that the child be 3separately represented, and
the extent of the separate represenative’s role is quite considerable.
In the absence of a speciﬁc facilitating legislation requiring the
appointment of a guardian ad [item of a child appearing in the children’s
court, or allowing the court to appoint a separate represetnative on its own
motion, the representative appears as solicitor for the defendant by leave
and at request of the court where the child is of very tender years, and on
instructions where the age of the child renders him capable of formulating
the-same. The power of the court to grant such leave can be seen as an‘ 7
instance of an inherent power in the court to protect the welfare of a child. "
This difﬁculty may be overcome in the Community Welfare legislation,
which makes provision under cl99 for the children’s court to appointa
person (including the solicitor, if any, acting on behalf of the child) to act as
the guardian ad [item for the child
The situation under the present Child Welfare Act is further confused
when an Appeal is lodged by a parent in the name of the child, as the parent
then purports to be appealing on the child’s behalf and no statutory
provision exists to allow the child separate representation. It was‘suggested
in Lawson v Youngman that the only way in which a child could be
separately represented1n the Court ofApeal was on application made by the .
child’s guardian. The CommunityWelfare Bill (c1204) specifically makes
provision for the Appeal to be taken on behalf of the child,1n his name,by
the childs solicitor or his guardian ad litem.
It may be, of course, that the court will not consider it necessary for the
child to be separately represented if it feels that all relevant matters can be -
placed before it by the respective parties, and the child was not separately
represented in the well-publicised case ofmu Tull. . . - 1“ cM
As well as underlining the impOrtance of bonding and psychological
parenting, this case emphasised the necessity of expert evidence in matters
regarding a child’s emotional well-being and right to emotional as well as
physical protection.
The children’s court jurisdiction has not been widely used in matters of
sexual abuse of children, as this form of abuse has elicited 'a punitive
response towards the offender rather than a protective one towards the child.
Where abuse has occurred within the family unit, however, the orders
available to a children’s court are more appropriate to the long term welfare
of the child and there is no barrier to the commencement of concurrent
criminal proceedings if the serious nature of the matter demands it Whether
a protective or criminal response is adopted, an important aspect to be
considered is the damage that can be inﬂicted upon a child by the court
proceedings, and alternative methods should be examined of obtaining the
child’s evidence to prevent inﬂicting abuse upon abuse. In this regard
' perhaps the method adopted in Israel. of appointing a “Youth Interrogator”,
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or the Norwegian or Swedish systems of excusing all child victims from
testifying should be examined to determine in what respects they are
relevant here.
Abuse from cultural practices has lately received some attention. The
most noteworthy, perhaps because of the publicity it received, is the practice
of female circumcision, but other unacceptable practices such as excessive
corporal punishment may originate in cultural conﬂict Some of these
amount to abuse, others only need to_be understood in their appropriate
context -‘
, We are increasingly becoming aware of the multi-cultural nature of
our society, and this has been recognised in the Community Welfare
‘legislation. cl.8l(5) makes provision that where a child has been brought up
substantially in accordance with the culture ofa particular ethnic group, the
court shall not — unless the child has expressed a wish to the contrary —make
an Order unless it has taken into account the desirability and feasibility of
making an order placing the child in the'custody of a person belonging to
’ that ethnic group'.
The appointment of assessors to Children’s Courts, provided for in
cl.78 of the Community Welfare Bill, could be an important step in bridging
the cultural gap, particularly if members are appointed to the panel of
assessors who have a knowledge of cultural and ethnic mores Under cl.79 of
the Bill assessors must be qualified in social work or have experience in
community welfare and will assist the court in its evaluation of expert
evidence and by advising on the ﬁnal disposition of the matter. It may be
that they will also establish an important liaison between the court and the
various professions involved.
- 9
We are beginning to see the opening of lines of communication.
between the various disciplines involved in child abuse and in time this will
developfurther. When this occurs, a multi-disciplinary approach to the
protection of our children may becomewa reality.
I
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NEW INITIATIVES IN THE‘TREATMENT 0F D-ELINQUENTS
K I ' Chris Cunliffe-Jones'. B.A., Dip.Cn'm.
' ' Senior Youth Officer,
Department of Youth and Community Services
Introduction .
The start of a new ﬁnancial year is an appropﬁate time to examine
programmes and new initiatives for delinquents in this State. Appropriate,
yet challenging, as government services and the funding to the non-
govemment sector to provide alternate or complementary services, are all
under review.
It does appear the general “belt tightening” exercise has affected, even
if unconsciously. certain long established practices in young offénder
programming. Recently some new programmes have developed utilising
local resources including staff and community expertise, and attempting to
meet the perceived needs of the young offender in his or her local
community
1981 is an historical year for. the Department of Youth and Community
Services:
0 it marks the Department’s centenary
O the Department is regionalising its operations
O the new Community Welfare Bill is before Parliament.
In conjunction with these three major events certain other signiﬁcant
happenings have occurred in the area of young offender programming:
0 the Premier commissioned a Task Force to inquire into the general
- area of substitute care, including programmes for young offenders
and focusing on the co-ordination, rationalisation, expansion and
costing of both government and non-government programmes and
both government and non-govemment programmes and services.
The “Terms of Reference" are attached as Appendix I.
O a Departmental discussion paper was prepared examining current
programmes for yOUng offenders and recommending a set of
principles and a range of alternative programmes and practices for
young offenders in line with these principles (involving regionally
and locally based programme options as the major thrust).
O a co-o-rdinated approach by the Departments Planning Research
and Evaluation Division and the Australian Bureau of Statistics to
supply court and young offender statistics on a regional basis as a
signiﬁcant aid to planning and future resource allocation.
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Present Perspective
'Table l: Juveniles (13 to 16 year olds) under detention. May to August
 
 
1978
May June July August
New South Wales 552, 499 NA 548
Victoria 219 195 203 ‘ 206
Queensland ‘142 158 NA ' 548
South Australia ‘ 62 42. 46 70
western Australia 137 109 101 104
Tasmania 3| 27 29 29
Australian Capital
Territory 11 . 11 12 12
Australia ' 1,154 1.041' — 1.127
Australian Capital Territory ﬁgures have been subtracted from New South
Wales.
Table 2: Juveniles detention rate (13 to 16 year olds) per 100.000 of relevant
population. May to August 1978.
 
May June . July Augu.r!_
New Soutli Wales 158.8 . 143.5. ' NA 157.6
Victoria . ' ~ 79.8 71.1 - 74.0 75.1
,Queensland 89.3 99.3 101.9 993
South Australia , 65.3‘ 44.2 ' 48.4 73.7
Western Australia 152.0 120.9 ,- 112.1 115.4
' Tasmania 95.1 82.8 88.9 88.9
Australian Capital ‘
Territory . 71.3 71.3 77.8 77.8
 
Australia 113.8 102.6 - 111.1  
7TABLE 3: Numbers and Rates" of children and young people 10-17 under detention October 1980-February 1981
 
31/10 30/11 31/12. 31/1/81 . 28/2/81
' M F M F M F M F M F
New South Wales (No.) 500 ‘ 109 559 108 483 , 78 536 104 608 108
(Rate) 141.4 32.8 158.1 ’ 32.5 136.6 23.5 151.6 31.3 181.1 . 32.6
Victoria I (No.) 235 78 229 ‘ 79 204 78 237 86 262 i 92
(Rate) 83.6 ' . 29.2 81.4 29.6 ‘ 72.6 29.2 84.3 32.2 93.2 34.5 . ’
Queensland (No.) 98 18 104 18 91 17 108 17 103 - l7 1
' (Rate) 61.3 11.8 65.1 1 11.8 57.0 11.2 68.0 11.2 64.5 . 11.2
South Australia (No.) 86 13 92 8 ‘ 82 13 84 11 '74- 7'
(Rate) 90.6 14.6 97.0 9.0 86.5 14.6 88.6 12.4 78.1 7.9
Western Australia (No.) 127 12 130 25 119 20 139 19 141 . 19
(Rate) 136.1 13.7 139.3 28.5 127.5 22.8 149.0 21.7 151.1 21.7
Tasmania ‘ (No.) ‘ 21 4 32 5 20 ‘ ' 3 23 3 18 . 5
(Rate) 64.9 12.9 98.9 16.2 ‘ 61.8 9.7 71.1 9.7 55.6 / 16.2
Australian Capital
Territory (No.) ‘ 10 10 15. 7 . 16 6 14 6 16 10
(Rate) 59.8 63.8 89.6 41.7 95.6 38.3 83.7 38.3 95.6 63.8
* Rates per 100.000 'of relevant population
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Tables I — 3 examine the numbers of young people under detention by
State and the detention rates per 100,000 of the relevant populations
(supplied by the Australian Institute of Criminology.)
Table 3 gives the ﬁgures for October 1980 - February [981 on a revised
and uniform data base. New South Wales scores highest on both the number
and rate scales. The reasons for this are open to debate although the past
heavy emphasis on residential care services and “training schools" (insti-
tutions) and the lack of viable alternatives, coupled with social expectations
of locking away offenders have obviously all contributed.
An examination of the Department's Annual Report of 1969/70 reveals
a large pre-occupation with young offenders and residential care. A review
of the Annual Report of a decade hence reveals a much expanded
Department with a fairly major thrust towards community and family
support and development, a Department with an important child abuse
function, a Department with a greatly increased funding function and a
Department much less pre-occupied with young offenders.
Ra'pid departmental growth in other areas, together with ongoing legis-
lative consultations, has tended to restrict any major review, until the
present, of young offender programming. On 23 February 1981 the
Department had 952 available young offender “beds" and 790 young people
under detention. This gave an occupancy rate of 83%. The changes, both
legislative and departmental, together with agrowing awareness of the role
of the non-govemment sector and the community must see a reduction of
young offenders in residential care in this State.
The opening of the Stanmore Community Youth Centre in 1977 and
the St. Marys Community Youth Centre in 1981 are positive moves in this
direction. These programmes have been complemented with weekend atten-
dance programmes, day leave, work release, camping. community service,
work experience and personal development programmes operating from
both training schools and the new remand Centres at Wollongong, Newcastle
and St. Marys.
Present Initiatives
Community Youth Centres
Community Youth Centres provide the Department with an alter-
native to residential care for young offenders committed by magistrates to
training schools. Under section 53(l)(d) of the Child Welfare Act (1939) a
child or young person can be granted leave from a committal order to return
home or to an acceptable living situation and attend a Youth Project Centre
(Community Youth Centre) as directed.
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. The programme aims to provide appropriate support, guidance
.assistancc and supervision to the young people in their accepted community
in an attempt to develop their potential, their self esteem and an acceptable
lifestyle.
On the recommendation of a magistrate, district ofﬁcer, psychologist,
superintendent, parent or even the young persons themselves, the young
person is interviewed by a counsellor from the centre and a placement on
leave discussed. Stipulations for leave include conditions on accom-
modation, schooling and/or employment and programme participation.
Initial attendance requirements are two evenings a week and every Saturday.
The conditions are automatically reviewed after eight weeks. The evening
activities include a meal, recreation and education activities, individual
counselling and group work. "
Social, recreational, community service and camping activities occur at
weekends and allow staff to become involved with the young people in a
different atmosphere and setting. There is a strong emphasis on the legal
and satisfying use of leisure time with exposure to cheap and accessible
activities. Following the “eight week" review, individual attendance and
programme requirements are discussed and agreed to by the young person
involved, his/her “group” and his/her counsellor.
The Stanmore Centre has had over 400 admissions since its opening.
The average time spent on the programme has been 22 weeks. It is difficult
not to become enthused about the Stanmore, and lately, the St. Marys
Community Youth Centres. While Stanmore has had its share of frus-
trations and disappointments, with some young people re-offending while
on the programme, the ﬂexible and individual approach to young offenders
and such situations has resulted in many positive individual gains and
achievements. This has also indicated that there are many young people in
residential care, who could just as, or more, adequately be supported in a
less expensive and more realistic community programme.
The Minister for Youth and Community Services, the Hon. RF.
Jackson, when opening the St. Marys Community Youth Centre on 15 May
1981 commented.
“The success of the Stanmore Centre allows us to open the doors
at St. Marys with confidence and, hopefully in the not too distant
future, similar centres at Liverpool and in the Hunter area”.
A detailed study of the ﬁrst 300 male admissions to Stanmore plus a
six month follow up is being prepared and is presented on pp 93 to 100.
Weekend Attendance
Weekend attendance was developed at the Worimi (Newcastle) Re-
mand Centre in response to‘the need for some magisterial options in the  
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area. Attendance at the programme is for 16 weeks as an “agreed to"
condition of a probation order by the child or young person concerned. A
range of community service, personal development and recreational acti-
vities is organised in conjunction with local groups and individuals. The
response of the young people, parents and staff has been enthusiastic and
encouraging. Sixty-one (61) young people have participated in the pro-
gramme in the past 15 months. None has re—offended while on the course
while 12, after completion of the programme, have been committed to a
training school for subsequent offences.
Community Service Orders
A pilot scheme of community service orders operates in the Albury
'area. These orders are also given as an “agreed to" condition of a probation
order. Matching of young offenders to work tasks has been encouraged and
initial results have been encouraging.
Work Release/Work Experience Programmes
Training schools have become increasingly responsive to the needs of
young people in custody, especially those on long committal orders. The
Stanmore and St. Marys programmes have allowed an integrated residential/
community programme to be developed for young people returning to those
areas. 'For those and other young people work release and work experience
programmes while in residential care has assisted their development and
facilitated their reintegration to the community.
Accommodation and Employment ,
Accommodation .and employment continue to be major crises facing
young offenders. Studies have revealed less than 50% of all young offenders in
residential care have a “supportive" family, in the generally accepted sense. to
return to. In the inner city, the range of non-govemment and voluntary
hostels‘has assisted in providing initial accommodation but in other areas
suitable accommodation is critically short ’
I do not wish to dwell on the employment issue except to say that the
glut of relatively unskilled young people in the labour market makes ﬁnding
employment a continual headache. I pay tribute to the special groups officers
of the Commonwealth Employment Service for their great support to young
offenders.
Regionalisation
The Department of Youth and Community Services is presently
. regionalising into ten regions with the aim of providing a more effective and
efﬁcient service responding more readily, to regional and local needs within
an overall poliCy framework.
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A logical extension is the provision of regional and local services to
young offenders in terms of:
. 0 prohalion
community service orders (new legislation)
leave conditions from residential care (local supervision)
attendance centres
after care
and
additional alternatives to residential care (remand and committal)
e.g.
, foster care
home remand
fee for service remand
special programme development
0 and ultimately residential care itself
Regional remand centres presently exist at Wollongong, Newcastle,
Broken Hill (Shelter), Gosford (Shelter) and Tamworth (Shelter).
Land has been acquired and a design brief prepared for a multi
purpose centre at Wagga. This centre, with small “clustered" accom-
modation. is intended to provide a range of secure and non-secure
residential programmes and community programmes for young offenders
on remand or committal orders. When operational this would allow the full.
gamut of Departmental programmes to be offered to young offenders in the
area without them having to leave the region All programmes could be
developed and co-~ordinated with local programmes and resources to meet
the young offender individual needs ,
The develpment of such multi purpose centres in the remaining
country regions (Central West/Orana, North Coast and New England) and
the continued regional development of alternatives to residential care would
enable the present large training schools (ML Penant, Reiby and Daruk,
Ormond and Yawarra) to reduce capacity and respond simply to their ov‘vn
regional needs
Statistics _and Planning
One immediate result of the regionalisation approach has been co-
ordination between the Department's Planning Research and Evaluation
. : Division and the Australian Bureau of Statistics in preparing regional data.
Appendix II indicates distinct juveniles dealt with by region of usual
residence, sex, age and outcome (1978/79) Continued access to this sort of
data and its integration with other regional data will assist the Department
to monitor evaluate and plan.
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The Community Welfare Bill
POssibly the most signiﬁcant development effecting future pro-
grammes for young offenders is the Community Welfare Bill presently (15
May 1981) before State Parliament
Matters of particular relevance include:—
Children in need of Care:
There is provided a completely new procedure for dealing with
children who are in need of care. It is made clear that, in determining
whether a child is in need of care or not, the Court is embarking upon an
inquiry and not adjudicating a dispute. In care proceedings, an assessor will
sit with the Magistrate to help him understand any expert evidence and to
help him,adduce further expert evidence, should this be required. The rules
of evidence are not to apply but facts tending to prove that a child is in need
of care must be proved beyond reasonable doubt It will no longer be
possible for a’child who is found to be in need of care to be committed to a
Training Centre. Further, truancy can no longer form the basis of a “care"
application. The old definition of a neglected child is repealed and the term
“exposed to moral danger” is no longer used.
Criminal Proceedings involving (Children: ‘
Reforms introduced by the present Government setting the age of
criminal responsibility of 10 years and restricting the admissibility in
evidence of statements made by children to police are retained. Clause 123
sets out the principles to be observed when a Court is exercising criminal
jurisdiction with respect to children.
Children 's Panels:
Perhaps the most significant initiative in this Par’t‘is the creation of
Children‘s Panels. These panels, consisting of a police officer, an officer of
the Department and a third independent person, will determine whether a-
child should be proceeded against in a Court in respect of an alleged
criminal offence. The panels will deal with all but the most serious offences
but will not consider fresh offences allegedly committed by children already
subject to control.
If a panel determines that proceedings should not be instituted, the
charge against the child is dismissed, if the child is in custody, he is released
and if the child is on bail, any bail undertaking is discharged Before making
a final decision, a panel may convene a conference of persons who know the
child to assist it in making a decision.
Community Services Orders:
This is a new sentencing option which will be available to Courts
iwhich sentence children who are found guilty of criminal offences. The
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system which will apply to children differs hardly at all from the existing
system which applies to adults except that the maximum number of hours of
work to be performed shall not exceed 100 hours.
The Children's Court of New South Wales:
The Bill creates the entity of the Children’s Court of N.S.W., which will
have jurisdiction to deal with children who are charged with criminal
offences and to enquire into “care" applications. In those parts of the State
to which a member of the children's court does not travel, jurisdiction over
children will be exercised by stipendiary magistrates sitting at those places.
Trial by Jury:
Greater access is given by the Bill for children to be tried in a non-
summary manner than has existed in the past‘ln the past a decision to
commit for trial has been entirely for the discretion of the magistrate; the
Bill provides that a child must be committed for trial. if he requests it.
Penalties:
It will no longer be possible for a child who is found guilty of an
offence to be made a ward of the Minister. Moreover, a control order in
respect of the child may only be made if an adult who was found guilty of
the same offence, could be committed to prison - and the duration of such a
control order may be no longer than such a committal to prison. A general
control order will have a maximum life of twelve months and may be
imposed only in those circumstances where an adult, found guilty of the
same offence, might be committed to prison for a period of at least twelve
months. Alternatively, a court may commit a child to control for a speciﬁc
period not exceeding two years but not so that such a period is in excess of
the maximum period of imprisonment for that offence. A child cannot be
committed to control as “exposed to moral danger" or as “uncontrollable" or
as a “truant” but only where offences have been committed.
The children‘s court is given a new power to order the destruction of
photographs, fingerprints and palm prints. The children’s court may not
convict a child who is under the age of 16 years and has no power to commit
a child under the age of 16 to prison, and may only commit a child of or
above the age of 16 years to prison where the child is already subject to a
control order and is being dealt with by it for serious misconduct in a
training centre. It may, however, remand in prison, children of or above the
age of 16 years or commit them toprison once they have been committed for
trial. '
Children and other Persons subject to Control or on Remand:
The objects of this Part-are set out in c1206.
The Bill establishes two kinds of training centres:-  
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l) Called “Children's Training Centres" — will accommodate children
and those prisoners under the age of 21 years who are transferred
from a prison to the ‘control of the Minister;
2) The other kind callcd “Training Centres for lntellectually Handi-
capped Persons" will accommodate intellectually handicapped per-
sons of whatever age who are transferred from a prison to the
control of the Minister.
Before a prisoner may be transferred against his wishes to a training
centre for intellectually handicapped persons, he must be certiﬁed by an
Intellectually Handicapped Persons Review Tribunal to be, in fact, intel-
lectually handicapped.
The Bill prohibits segregation as a method of punishment of an
intellectually handicapped person. Segregation up to a maximum of twelve
hours in any period of seventy-two hours and, when it is considered in the
interests of the person that he be segregated for psychological reasons from
' other persons subject to control is however, permitted with the consent of
the person to be segregated, but subject to stringent conditions (see clause
239). A person detainedin a children5 training centre who[8 found guilty of
misconduct may be sentenced to room conﬁnement for a period not
exceeding six hours but, again, subject to stringent conditions (clause
253(2)). Other powers in relation to punishment are set out in clause 253 and
254. Physical punishment is prohibited. The regime in training centres for
intellectually handicapped persons wil be specially-adapted prison regime —
on the basis that it is more appropriate to deal with such persons as the
adults that they are rather than as if they were children. ..
It might be noted that the Minister's powers to deal with persons who
are subject to control are quite signiﬁcant The Minister may, for example,
grant such persons leave to be absent from a training centre and may,
subject to such terms and conditions as he orders, place certain of such
persons in the care of reputable persons approved by him (clause 222).
Conclusion
1981 is an exciting time to be around. Not only are legislative changes
imminent, not. only is the Department regionalising its management
structure and celebrating its centenary, not only is there a Premier’s Task
Force examining Government and non—Govemment co-operation and co-
ordination i-n substitute care programmesforlyoung people - but at the
grassroots practitioner level, where a certain squeeze is being felt. changes
are inexorably occurring as staff develop local initiatives, utilise local
resources and attempt to respond to the needs of young offenders in today‘s
society.
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X .. APPENDIX]
Terms of Reference: Premier's Task Force — Substitute Care
I. Examine the basis for,- and effectiveness of, decisions to place and retainchildren in out of home care; the present and developing needs forvarious forms of out of home care and related preventative andsupportive services in each region of the State and the existing resourcesfor meeting these needs (including costs). ‘
Review the potential for maintaining family unity and increasing therate of family restoration.
2. Report on the organisational mechanisms and the extent and form ofGovernment financial support as an alternative to per capita payments -under section 27A of the Child Welfare Act 1939, needed to facilitate theongoing co—ordination, rationalisation and. where necessary."expansionof services from Government departments and non-govemment agenciesso as to provide the best practicable range ofservices to meet the needs ofeach region.
3. To review the resources in the general out of home area particularlyconcerning issues related to staff training and professional stafﬁngneeds. To initiate the provision of comprehensive data on which to base'ongoing changes and to promote the most efﬁcient use of resources.
In its work the Task Force will pay particular attention to the specialneeds of aborigines, migrants, and handicapped, juvenile offenders, childrenin isolated areas and those who have been in care for a long period.
 APPENDIX II
DISTINCT JUVENILES DEALT WITH BY REGION OF USUAL
RESIDENCE, SEX, AGE AND OUTCOME. (1978/79)
TABLE I3: ABS. Bulletin Tables (availablefrom Planning Research and Evaluation Division,
Department of Youth and Community Services, NS. W.)
 
 
Commilml to Comibional Suspended
quan Age an Institution Pmbalian Dischmge Commiml Total
METROPOLITAN: M ‘ F M F M F M M F
' 10 1 5 1 19 4
l 1 6 12 2 3 l 30 8
12 8 1 29 3 4 2 58 8 '
13 24 4 45 10 17 6 9 122 33
CENTRAL & 14 39 11 67 27 '36 7 12 205 ‘ 64
SOUTH EAST 15 43 7 76 15 57 12 17 290 ‘ 63
16 45 3 68 12 90 12 19 452 72
17 28 7 42 I 9 87 26 12 77 l 149
18 3 2 254 31
Total 196 33 356 92 298 65 73 2279 494
Total M/F 229 448 363 ' 76 2773
10 1 4 2 14 .2 .
1 1 3 5 1 2 1 25 8
12 10 3 20 ' 3 ‘ 10 3 64 l 5
13 16 8 42 19 26 7 123 39
NORTH WEST 14 30 18 57 23 32 6 7 183 70
15 25 5 69 3 1 39 4 15 236 63
16 29 8 57 1 3 65 16 18 366 78
17 23 2 30 6 47 7 14 684 79
18 . 1 288 27
Total 138 45 294 101 223 34 65 2049 416
2465Total M/F 183 395 257 70
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Commirm/ m Conditional Suspended
 
Region Age an lnm‘mn‘an Probation Discharge Commiaal Total '
M F M F M F M F M F
10 3 1 2 10 1 ’ll 1 ~ 4 9 412 l , 7 1 6 2 ' 28 8= 13 6 1 21 4 10 2 ' 2 53 ~ 16NORTH EAST 14 12 1 35 10' 30 6 3 120 ~ 2915 10 4 42 12 44 15 9 1 4 164 4416 25 4 45 7 33 6 3 o 228 41.17 18 32 10 54 ll 9 527 6618 3 254 20
' Total 73 10 196 48 183 42 26 . l 1422‘ 241Total M/F . 83 244 225 27 1663
10 1 8 1 l9 3ﬂ 1] 4 7 2 27 112 7 2 15 2 5 1 1 ‘ 43 13, 13 9 ' 4 31 6 9 l 3 80 28SOUTH WEST 14 23 9 53 18 25 3 9 1 160 6015 17 5 61 17 36 5 11 l 206 ~5016 27 2 50 6 37 14 15 1 313 6417 17 l 27 4 .46 6 7 l 679 8318 1 1 l 197 21
. Total 107 23 261 60 160 30 47 5 1765 350Total WF 130 321 190 52 2115
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Commitmlw Conditional Suspenda!
Reign Age an lnm‘mion _ hobadan Dixhwge Communal Total
COUNTRY: M F M F M F M F M 'F
10 l 8 2
11 2 1 ‘ 5 1 19 l
12 3 1 9 l 5 1 2 2 39 6
13 15 l 23 9 5 - l 80 16
HUNTER 14 6 3 . 37 11 17 6 9 1 112 26
15 23 3 49 14 27 3 8 183 31
16 12 2 39 12 29 3 13 2 210 29
\ 17 ll 3 19 2 25 4 6 403 30
.18 1 ' 5 207 14
Total 72 11 187 51 1 115 17 39 5 1283 ' 174
Total M/F . 83 , 238 132 44 1457
10 1 l 8 - 1 1 12 2
. 11 7 2 2 17
. 12 3 l9 1 3 1 34 5
[LLAWARRA/ 13 ll 2 29 12 12 2 6 75 30
SOUTH EAST 14 15 6 39 14 9 3 6 100 36
l5 , l3 2 52 12 18 2 14 l 157 31
16 20 l 54 6 ' 29 4 15 209 22
17 10 . l 39 2 l7 - 2 17 1 407 27
18 3 132 11
Total 64 13 253 52 96 19 63 '2 1 176 194
Total M/F ' . 77 115 65 1370305
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 Commiml (0 Conditional Suspended
 
 
Region Age an Institution ‘ Pmban'on Diwharge Commina! Total
M I F M E M F M F M F
- 10 l 3 8 2 l . l3 5
ll 4 l9 _ 2 39 4
' 12 5 . l 13 2 2 1 3 30 8
ORANA, l3 2 2 28 8 2 3 4 l 48 22
CENTRAL 14 16 7 33 25 4 l 76 36
WEST, FAR 15 15 4 44 23 7 2 5 l 128 35
WEST 16 28 5 51 12 15 5 . 6 l 214 41
17 ‘ 22 l 31 3 15 3 5 355 42
18 . 97 14
Total 99 20 248 80 49 13 23 4 1058 229
Total WF 119 328 62 - 27 1287 ,
10 4 l ‘ l 12 1
_ll 1 7 3 12 8
12 1 l4 2 l9 2
13 4 2 26 7 l 9 49 10
NORTH ~ _ 14 ll 1 31 14 l 6 60 18
COAST 15 9 3 59 12 3 12 94 21
' 16 '10 40 6 7 7 121 13
17 '11 14 2 5 l 4 201 13
'18 l l 78 5
Total 48 6 203 47 18 - l 41 672 102
Total M/F ~ 250 1 19 41 774
l6
  
Commune Conditional Smpendedquaﬂ Age an Inﬂation Maa’on Diwharge Commiml Total
M M F M F M. M F
10 2 3 5 1
11 1 3 1 8 1
12 13 3 15 3
RIVERINA/ A 13 2 11 6 20 7MURRAY ' 14 5 22 6 5 6 47 14
15 8 27 10 7 1 3 66 19
16 8 42 2 7 1 10 128 11
17 19 20 6 -9 1 11 276 22
18 1 75 4
4 ‘ Total 45 152 ‘ 37 29 3 30 665 95
Total WF 1 53 189 32 32 760
1' 10 , 4 7 211 ‘2 10 . 1 18
V 12 3 14 26NEW ENGLAND 13 3 20 4- 6 2 .42 8- = 14 6‘ 20 13 3 4 49 19' 15 13 34 15 4 6 82 27
16 8 21 5 3 , 3 96 10
17 6 13 3 5 2 3 ' 194 17
18 1 1 55 7
Total 44 142 42 22 3 19 590 94
Total WF 47 184' V 25 23 684
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APPENDIX III
COMMUNITY YOUTH CENTRE. STANMORE
Report ofﬁrst 400 male admissions
June 1st. 1981
Since the commencement ofthe programme in late May I977. there have
bccn 404 boys and 10 girls admitted on leave from committal orders. although
an increasing number of both sexes have attended the centre as a condition of
probation orders, suspended committals, and even whilst on bail pending an
appeal.
The following is a survey of. the ﬁrst 400» male admissions. Some
corrections to earlier reports have been made due to the more thorough
analysis of the ﬁrst 300 male admissions.
The ﬁrst 400 boys admitted came from the following District Ofﬁce
areas. There had been a trend towards taking boys from a wider area ofSydney
—especially the west and south west suburbs. Since the opening of the new
Community Youth Centre at St Marys there will be a change in this pattern of
area of origin over time. Likewise Kingsford district ofﬁce has closed and 2
new ofﬁces have replaced it — Bondi Junction and Maroubra Junction.
District szce ' number NSW. Courmy* number
(90%) ' ' (8.8%)
Sydney 41 Wollongong 5
Hurstville 38 Armidale 4
Stanmore 29 Wellington 2
Bankstown 26 Orange 2
Burwood 25 Wallsend 2
Kingsford/Maroubra Warilla 2
Junction 25 / Newcastle 2
Fairﬁeld 24 Maitland 2
Parramatta 22 Lismore 2
Leichhardt 2| Narrabri l
Ryde . 16 Gosford I
Chatswood , 16 Bathurst _ l
Blacktown I6 . . Wagga ‘ l
Liverpool 16 Taree l '
Dee Why ll Deniliquin 1
Mt. Druitt ll U Moree l
Sutherland 9 Woy Woy l
Campbelltown .5. Tamworth l
Penrith 4 , Bowral ‘ l
Bondi Junction 4 Cardiff l
Specialist Section 1 Interstate (12%) ‘
ACT. , 3
Queensland l
* Accommodation found near Centre. Victoria
I
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The average age of the b0
16 years and 8 months.
ys has remained fairly constant over time and is
age number percent
13 2 ' 0.514 17 4.215 72 18.016 141 35.317 155 38.818 12 3.019 l 0.2
The range was 13 years 11 months to 19 years 5 months.
- The intelligence auotients of the boys range from 70-135 (mid point ofthe R.P.M. (38) non verbal test) and the average IQ. is 99.7.
I.Q. range number ' percent
70-79 ' 24 6.080-89 54 . 13.590-99 123 30.8100-109 114 28.5110-119 61 15.2120-129 + 24 6.0
The family status of the boys show 47% coming from intact. but notnecessarily functional or stable marriages. There were 12.7% from familieswhere the death of a parent had occurred, and 38.8% from families split byseparation or divorce. 1.5% of boys could not trace their families and therewere 30 state wards admitted and six ex-wards.
number percent
family intact: 188 47.0
family split by:
death: 51 |2.7single fathers 1.4 ‘
single mothers .27‘
mother remarried or defacto 8
father remarried or defacto ~ . 2
separation or divorce: . 155 ' 38.8;single father 17
single mother 68
mother remarried or defacto 45
father remarried or defacto 25
family could not be traced 6 1.5
living situation on admission
with parent(s) '279 69.8with friends. etc. 16 4.0boarding house 19 4.8, hostel . 53 s 13.2grandparents/relatives 28 . 7.0refuge , 5 , ‘ 1.2  
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Over time, it became clear that some boys wcrcliving in very destructive
family units. 'I‘hesc boys (about l()%) were shifted out where possible, and it
is anticipatcdthat this trend will continue. It is not Centre policy to attempt
intervention in family systems where the boy is over l6 years and the family '
fairly entrenchcdin its pathology..The Centre attempts to extract the boy
from such units and assist him towards independent living; although ﬁnding
suitable accommodation continues to . be a difficulty. Some left home
temporarily, returning when the situation “cooled down".
The offences/complaints for which the boys were committed were.as
follows. (Each offence for each boy was counted thus the total is greater than
400.)
Property
steal motor vehicle
steal motor cycle
carried in stolen motor vehicle
driving offences
Total motor vehicle offences
steal ‘
' break, enter and steal, and break.
enter with intent
receive
possess property stolen outside state
goods in custody ‘
possess housebreaking implements
Total
arson/malicious set ﬁre
malicious damage
Total
Total Property Offences:
Person:
armed hold up
armed assault and rob
assault
assault and rob
indecent assault
carnal knowledge
'rape
manslaughter
kidnapping
Total Person Offences;
Complaints:
uncontrollable _
breach of probation
neglect (E.M.D.. l.M.S.)
Total Complaints
number
403
percent
57(_)_ g .375
48.3
q
u
2.6
a
l
e
25 L7
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other: 'number percent
obscene exposure 4
forge and utter - 15
rcsisl arrest ' 9
abscond 32
supply prohibited substance 3
possess indian hemp l3
self administration 3
possess ﬁrearm 4
possess cutting implement 4
trespass 10
unseemly words ,‘ 2
false information __3_
Total Other Oﬂ'ences _ ' l_0_2_ 6.7
TOTAL ALL OFFENCES , 1,502
 
The average number of offences per boy on committal was 3.8
Most boys were not charged with drug offences, but many have a history
I of drug abuse (mainly heroin, amphetamines, sedatives/hypnotics. alcohol
and marijuana).
Of the first 400, 12.3% had severe alcohol abuse problems and 7.0% had
been involved in heavy hard drug abuse (mainly heroin) that had led to
physical addiction1n some cases resultingin withdrawals of varying degrees
“of severity. Another 14.8% had experienced difficulties with other drugs. This
does not include those who had experimentally used marijuana or were
frequent users with the drug having no readily apparent negative impact on
their lives.
There were 12% of boys who had been actively involved in male
prostitution. This does not include those who had experienced some form of
adolescent homosexual experience, but only those actually engaged1n pros-
titution This group tended to be made up of many of those also involved1n
regular hard drug abuse, alcohol and the “Kings Cross scene'.
The majority of boys (93.2%) had had previous court appearances
resultingin periods of probation, fines, suspended committals andin some ‘
cases, committals to Institutions.
+1
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previous court appearances number percent
0 27 ﬂ - 6.8
I 50 12.5
2 77 _ - 19:3
3 87 21.8
4 32 8.0
5 34 8.5 ,
6 26 6.5
‘ 7_ 24 6.0
8 15 3.8
9 9 2.2
10 9 2.2
1 1 6 1.5
12 2 0.5
13 1 0.2
17 1 0.2
The average per ‘boy for previous. court appearances was‘3.8.
Of the first 400, 44.7% had'been previously committed, in some cases
(104) more than once. This represents a progressive increase. over time, ofboys
with previous residential training experiences. The average per boy for
previous committals was 0.99.
O
‘
L
I
I
A
U
J
N
J
—
‘
O
previous committals number percent
‘ 221 55.3
75 18.8
50 . 12.5
23 5.8
17 4.2
8 2.0
1 0.2 .
7 3 _ - 0.8
8 l . ' ‘ 0.2
10 1 0.2
The education level of the boys was as follows:
number percent
Still at School on Adrriission 32 . 8.0 ,
year 8 3 .
year 9 . 14
year 10 14
tech. 1 ’
'2 _ Fiji
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Left School
left in year 11
left after gaining school certiﬁcate
left mid year 10
left end year 9
left mid year 9
left end year '8
left mid year 8
left mid year 7
percent
92.0
There were, consequently, 80% of the boys admitted without school
certiﬁcates, with another 8% hopefully gaining theirs whilst on the programme
or in the near future.
Of the boys who had left school (368) 324 (or 88%) of them were
unemployed prior to committal.
The majority of boys (73%) were Australian and the ethnic backgrounds
are as follows: (i.e., country where born or born soon after arrival in Australia
of parents).
number
Australia (19 part
‘ Aboriginal) 292
United Kingdom 44
Yugoslavia 15
Italy 12
Lebanon 6
Greece 6
, Turkey 3
New Zealand 3
Czechoslovakia 3
Hungary ’ 2
' 2
The boys were admitted from:
shelter/remand centres:
‘M.B.S.
‘Yasmar
Minda
‘*Taldree
Keelong
Cobham
training schools:
Mt. Penang . ,
Endeavour House
‘Yawarra
Daruk
*Tallimba
~ Gaol
Portugal
Brazil
France
U.S.A
Germany
Equador
Austria
Poland
Spain .
Malta
11
198
number
._
.
.
—
.
.
—
n
.
—
n
.
—
y
—
n
p
—
n
.
p
—
a
.
—
a
—
n
percent
21.8
10.2
14.3
3.0
1.0
.0_-2 .
50.5
49.5
, ‘ closed or function now changed, thus no more admissions from these units.
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The majority of referrals were from Magistrates, District Ofﬁcers,
Shelter Psychologists and Administration staff of Training Schools.
The average length of stay on the programme is about 24 weeks at the
moment with a range from 6 (re-entry cases from training schools) to 58
weeks (a boy who refused discharge until he felt he was ready).
The overall picture that emerges is of a 16V2-year-old boy of average
intelligence committing property offences, after being on probation or
suspended committal nearly four times before and having about a one in
two chance of being previously committed to an Institution. He is under-
educated, given his intelligence level and usually comes from a suburb fairly
near the Centre and a family that has less than one in two chance of being
intact, though not necessarily functional. He is usually unemployed, and an
increasing number of admissions are not living with their parent(s).
The average Jesness Inventory proﬁle on admission (N=399, l boy did
not complete inventory).
_ admission
scale N :7 399
T. score
social maladjustment 64.6.
value orientation . 54.3
immaturity . . 54.2
autism . . 56.0
alienation ' 55.7
manifest aggession . 53.2
withdrawal ' 55.0
social anxiety ‘ 51.3
repression . 51.9
denial ,' 45.7
' asocial index i 67.3
The average T scores are~ gradually approaching the average (50)
except that scores for social maladjustment have remained fairly stable over
time and the scores for the asocial index have been increasing slightly. Both
of these scores have been found to have a highly significant predictive value
in the analysis of the ﬁrst 300, and whereas the other scales (e.g., withdrawal
and social anxiety), which could be seen as “disturbance" rather than an
antisocial orientation, have shown slightly decreased scores that may reﬂect
an increase in youths who may be seen as more_delinquently oriented:
First test and re-test Comparisons show changes, supposedly for the
better, for social maladjustment, value orientation, manifest aggression,
withdrawal, social anxiety and asocial-index. The report on the first 300 will
include information on whether test scores and background variables'are
l0()
inter-related. and related. cithcr independently or in combination. to on
programme offending.
Further research will be commenced shortly to follow up the ﬁrst 300
admissions 6 months and 12 months after discharge to get an accurate
measure' of post-programme offending and whether any background
variables ,or test scores (initial or on discharge) predict such offending.
Another study will be completed on a random sample of admissions to
gain more information on post-programme adjustment (other than mere re-
offending), and a study will examine a series of consecutive admissions who
will be more thoroughly tested and a wider range of background data
collected. This latter sample will hopefully give more information of value in
predicting outcome. and on the “types“ of young offenders admitted to the
‘ programme.
Re-oﬁ’ending on programme ﬁgures have not been collected for admis-
sions 300-400 as yet. as many of these admissions are still on the programme.
These ﬁgures will be included in later reports. However, the rate of re-
offending appears to be around the 40% level. as previously reported. The
revocation rate has also remained stable — about 19%
There has been an increase in youthswho have previous committals-
and who are coming to the programme from training schools. These youths
represent the higher risk categories and as many are not returning home to
live, the risk is increased. The ﬁrst 300 analysis shows that the group re-
offending most on the programme is that containing those previously
Committed coming directly to the centre subsequent to a further committal.
rather than going to a training school again prior to admission. This raises
the question as to whether a period of training prior to admission would be
of beneﬁt However, it seems that a more intensive approach within the
community may be of more beneﬁt in the long run. The problem remains as
to what “more intensive" should include. This‘problem is being examinedat
the moment by the centre staff.
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‘ PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Chris Cunliﬂe-Jones
l mentioned in my paper that it was an exciting time to be around.
We have now all heard something about the new Community Welfare
Bill, but there a number of initiatives happening in the Department at the
grassroots level and this plus our regionalisation programme and a
number of other programmes show that we are moving slowly but
inexorably to change.
I mentioned in the paper the range of programmes, and a review of
our first 400 admissions to Stanmore Community Youth Centre is on pp. 93
to 100. There seems to be in the Department at the moment a growing
awareness of the individual needs of young offenders. It has happened in
our new'remand centres, our training centres and our Community Youth.
Centres that young offenders now seem to be looked at in terms of their
particular needs with individual programmes being worked out for them.
We have work-release, community programmes (both in the community
and residential care), work-experience programmes, educational pro-
- grammes, weekend attendance at Newcastle and other centres shortly, and
individual programmes both inside and outside the unit for young
offenders. The Community Youth Centre at Stanmore has, I believe, been
an outstanding success and the centre at St Marys1n the last week had 13
referrals to it and has justiﬁed its existence in a short time.
With the regionalisation of the Department and the growing
awareness of looking at young offenders as individuals, it seemsthat more
and more we need to develop programmes to look at these young people in
their local community or region. The Bill, in reference to children in need
of care, refers to the best place for them as within the family and in the
local community with local resources in order to cause the minimum
disruption. That seems to be what is happening now and certainly what is
plannedin the future. It was recently announced that a multi-purpose
centre for Wagga will be established. This will provide both remanded and
committed accommodation (both secure and non-secure). crisis accom-
modation and community programmes. All will operate from the one
centre so that young people from that region will not have to leave the
region to participate in a range of Departmental programmes.
The new Bill introduces some challenges to the Department, too, e.g.
the Children’s Panels (already alluded to), the units for the intellectually
handicapped, Community Service Orders, and prescribed centres for
children in care. Community Service Orders will be much the same as
those under the Community Service Orders Act (1979) for adults. They will
not be available as an option for probation but as an option when the
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alternative from the magistrate was to commit to control. What is exciting
about the Community Service Orders is that the young person involved has a
chance to say whether he wants to be involved in that scheme or not. The
option will be put to him, certain investigations will be made in terms ofwork
available, and what sort ofwork the young offender can do for his own and the
community’s beneﬁt. If he is not happy or does not want to participate, then
the magistrate is informed and other options are available.
One of the problems facing the Department and facing workers with
young offenders at the moment is the problem of accommodation. At
Stanmore, 47% of the ﬁrst 400 were able to go back to an intact family, and
of that number roughly half were removed and put in alternative accom-
modation because it was found after a time that that family was not
particularly satisfactory. Of the other 53%, 12.7% of the family had been split
by death, 38.8% separated or divorced, and 1.5% could not be traced. Suitable
accommodation in the St Marys‘ area is proving to be a greater problem. In
the Stanmore area we have a range of both departmental and community
resources available where we can place kids. The crisis centre at Cobham
(St Marys) has been full since its opening and we are ﬁnding great difﬁculty
in accommodating many young people who for some reason cannot go back
to their family or have not got a family to go back to.
In my paper (p 80) I mention that on 23rd February, 1981, there were
790 young people under detention The Australian Institute of Criminology
tables show that New South Wales has the highest detention rate of any
Australian State I conﬁdently predict that that number1s going to fall quite
signiﬁcantly in the next few years as the community programmes are
developed, as the diversionary programmes take effect, and as the Depart-
ment realises that there is a whole range of options available to it provided
by the Department and provided by the community. Those remaining in
residential care will be the more difﬁcult young people for whom a more
intensive programme can then be developed
In my paper I referred brieﬂy to truancy (p. 85). Under the present Act
“without lawful excuse does not attend school regularly“ can be a cause of a
“neglect complaint“ and young people can be committed to a special school
for truants, presently Ormond. The new Bill does not make the truancy
provision “in need of care", but if the care provisions are found approved
and the young person is not attending school an order can be made
requiring the child to reside and attend a prescribed school for up to 10
months. I agree with Richard Chisholm5 comments (p 43) that the causes of
' truancy are quite varied There is a need to examine a whole range of
options and causes. It is a personal view that the order to reside at and
attend a prescribed school up to twelve months may be a bit heavy, and that
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to attend a prescribed school and reside at home may be another option. A
Task Force has been established betWeen our Department and the Depart-
ment of Education to look at the whole question of truancy Some pilot
programmes that recognise the important role of the school in truancy have
development programmes that recognise the individual needs of truants.
Many school and community programme options can be developed well
before the child need to‘be takento court as “in need of care".'
With the new Bill the multi purpose regional centres with regional
data becoming available to assist planning, I look forward tothe future with
a great deal of conﬁdence. I am excited at the very practical grassroots
programmes that are developing for young offenders, the preliminary results
from our Community Youth Centres and the effort currently being put into
planning, co-ordinating and implementing programmes for young of-
fenders. Although the problems seem to be increasing in terms of both
accommodation and employment and although State ﬁnances are not
exactly flush for new programme developmentit is nevertheless an exciting
time and we can look forward to the future with conﬁdence.
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COMMENTARY
R D. Blackmore S.M.,
Senior Special Magistrate,
Children's Court, NSW
Introduction
It may seem questionable to be conducting a seminar on Child
Welfare in New South Wales on the eve of introduction of the Community
Welfare Bill. It could be thought that the Bill would contain all the collective
wisdom of debate over at least the last seven years (commencing with the
Muir Report). After all, the Child Welfare Act (itself a little more than a
revamping of the 1923 Child Welfare ’Act) has been with us for 42 years.
Surely, it may be argued, the Community Welfare Act, insofar as it is
concerned with “juvenile justice”, will serve us well beyond this decade.
It will be realised, however, that in a number of areas relating to Child
Welfare there is polarisation of views, that in some respect the Bill is likely to
represent one View or the other. or compromise between the two. There will
continue to be both satisfaction and dissatisfaction expressed by the wide
spectrum of persons interested in the Bill's provisions; perhaps only the
experience of time will indicate whether it will really prove itself for the 805
and beyond. or whether thre are already factors present which will lead to
further change in the not too distant future. The Juvenile CourtsAct, 1971
(South Australia), hailed at the time as meeting contemporary needs. is
illustrative of the rapidity of possible legislative change, that Act having
been replaced by the Children’s Protection and Young Oﬂenders Act, 1979.
Whilst I personally ﬁnd more in the Bill to praise. than to criticize,
there are nevertheless a number of matters of concern to which this paper
will refer.-
The timing of the introduction of the Community Welfare Bill into
Parliament (asrecently as 14th May, 1981) has caused obvious difficulties in
the convening of this seminar, in that those presenting papers were unable to
refer to the provisions of the Bill with certainty to meet a deadline for
circulation of those papers; I will yet have to comment on their further
addresses made in the light of their more recently attained knowledge of
those provisions.
lack of Australian Uniformity
In recent years there have been fields of legislation in which efforts
have been made to attain levels of uniformity between the States, even where
the Constitution of the Commonwealth imparts no power to the Com-
monwealth Parliament to legislate in the matter. This has not been the case
with laws relating to Child Welfare, although a body such as the Australian
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Institute of Criminology has done much to engender discussion betWeen
V representatives of that disciplinefrom the various States, and the Working
Paper produced for the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the‘Treatment of Offenders (Venezuela, I980) by a group
convened by Dr Seymour pointed to areas where broadly the philosophy of
the States coincides. -
But is Child Welfare parochial? Are our children across the nation and
the social problems concerning families so different that different methods
of treatment are necessary from State to State? Dr Seymour comprehensively
sets out how one basic — the age limits ofjurisdiction —vary so widely. A 17
year old NSW youth sealing a car in Sydney and finding himself
apprehended on the Gold Coast of sunny Queensland, or by the banks of
Melboume‘s Yarra may well express surprise an dismay upon being treated
as an adult and ﬁnding imprisonment the order.of the day for his offence.
Conversely, Tasmaniams may feel a sense of delight in coming to a utopian
NSW where at 17 they will still be treated as “children", and at 9 years of age
not subject at all to the criminal law.
Whilst, historically, criminal laws and protective legislation or ordin-
ances in the ACT, have been based on those in NSW, it is not difﬁcult to see
how the adoption of greatly contrasting child welfare laws between NSW
and the ACT, not only as to jurisdictional age limits but in matters of
procedure and treatment, could cause serious conflict.
Dr Seymour expresses a concern (at pp 12-13) about the use of non-
criminal procedures against a child under the age of criminal responsibility
for an act which otherwise would fall for prosecution by criminal process.
Whilst I have often heard the comment that a young child who commits an
act which has the hallmarks of, an offence, e.g. stealing, might be brought
before a court as being neglected or uncontrollable, it is beyond my
experience that this occurs in any appreciable extent, although it is
occasionally alleged that the type of behaviour is an ingredient in a more
serious overall pattern of behaviour to which such a complaint might be
directed.
I must disagree with the notion that in regard to upper age limits
arbitrary choices must be made. Under the Community Welfare Bill the
children's court is given exclusive jurisdiction in respect of persons aged
under 21 years for alleged offences committed before attaining 18 years of
age, both for the hearing and disposition of matters within the framework of
the Bill and in the hearing of committal proceedings. The present situation
(under 520(2) of the Child Welfare Act is that a children‘s court has a
discretionary extension of jurisdiction in such cases. (See R. v Farrell, (1976) 2
N.S.W.L.R. 498):
There will be certain side-effects of that mandatory exercise of
jurisdiction by the children’s court:
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(a) A“ ustice‘ hearing committal proceedings will not be able to
conduct a joint hearing where an adult and a juvenile are jointly
charged. In a case of serious sexual assault this would expose a
prosecutrix to cross-examinationin at least three proceedings.
(b) The Bill prohibits imprisonment as a sanction at the hands of
the children’s court In respect of a “child" who is 18 to 20 years
at the time of sentencing by a children’s court, the only custodial
sanction will be a “control order”. It is necessary to ask what new
programmes the department is contemplating for this age group.
Rather than creating the many absurdities of 'an arbitrary age limit
(which, when comparing joint offenders' potential sentences where one had
turned 18 a week before the offence and the other turned 18 a week after the
offence, is like comparing the luck of the conscription lottery of yesteryear)
it is possible to draft legislation which merges the effect of that transition
from legal minority to legal adulthood, in either of the following ways, or
both:
(a) by excluding the jurisdiction of the children’s court in respect of
any alleged offender who is over 18 years of age at the date when
the information for the offence is laid; and
(b) by explicitly continuing the jurisdiction children's courts at
present discretionally exercise the deal with fofenders who attain
18 years of age during the carriage of the proceedings according
to adult (Crimes Act) sanctions - including such‘softer” options
as periodic detention.
To deal with a person, who for all other purposes is an adult, as a child
for something he did when a ‘child’ has a logic which I suggest cannot be
sustained. His age at the date of the offence, on the other hand, can properly
be taken into account as a mitigating factor in dealing with him as an adult
Diversion and Panels
The true nature of the Children’s Panel contemplated by the Com-
munity Welfare Bill — in reality a “screening process" — has yet received little
publicity. The provision will probably disappoint many who were expecting
face-to—face panels with some similarity to those in South Australia and
Western Australia.
Nevertheless, I support the concept which will direct many young
offenders away from the court who can be handled in other ways.~ Having
regard to the methods proposed for_C_hildrcn's Panels to achieve this, the
fear expressed by Mr Chisholm (at p.37) that offenders may be directed
towards another system equally as “damaging” or worse, is not one I would
share. I estimate that about 65% of offenders charged could effectively be
diverted away from the court without a rise in recidivism.
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The one concern I have about the Children’s Panel provision is the
question of delay. For a child released on bail the Panel must make a
decision within 28 days — in such a case there may not be much of a
problem, although under existing provisions a child would come before the
court much sooner than that In respect of a child in custody, the Panel must
make a decision “as soon as practicable” (and, incidentally, not necessarily
within 28 days). Remembering that the Panel has power to convene
conferences with persons involved in the child’s welfare, the period spent in
custody has a potential of being protracted. What are the child's choices to
avoid that length of detention? He may, of course, make an application to
the children's court for bail; but there will be many occasions on which the
court may, on proper grounds, nevertheless refuse bail. He may exercise an
option for a court hearing, thereby excluding the Panel's consideration; one
can only hope that where an arresting ofﬁcer has sent his report to the Panel
and the child exercises his option to go to court, that there will be machinery
which will speedily permit the presentation of his case. In the case of
excessive delay, no doubt the Supreme Court upon application on the child's
behalf would intervene, as it has done in respect of a similar “as soon as
practicable" provision under the Mental Health Act.
Police Units
Dr Seymour‘s reference to Juvenile Aid Bureaux is topical in NSW. In
mid-March, 1981, 3 Juvenile Crime Squad was set up in NSW “to combat
vice in Kings Cross paying particular attention to child prostitution".
Members of the squad may claim that their charter is the detention of and
prosecution of “crime" relating to children; and support would readily be
found for the prosecution of adults who exploit children criminally. but such
an activity could be seen as the proper province of a “vice squad". I am
unaware of any juvenile who so far has been charged with any offence as a
result of the new squad‘s activities. It has been claimed that the squad has
been effective in putting juveniles back in contact with their familiesﬂand
various social agencies; a handful of cases by way of “neglect" proceedings
under the Child Welfare Act has come to the children’s court. Whilst the
squad may, therefore. be weeking to detect “juvenile crims", its actual
activities appear to be none of the sort. There has long existed, in my View, a
need in NSW for a Juvenile Aid Bureau of the nature described by Dr
Seymour; a police unit with. an understanding of the distinction between
offences and care proceedings, and with a capability and willingness to
liaise with the Department of Youth and Community Services and other
social agencies, and to act in an advisory capacity to the police force
generally. An intensely better image would have been created by the
adoption of the title “Juvenile Aid Bureau“ than the present “Juvenile Crime
Squad".
There are signs, however, of positive moves within the police to
interdisciplinary involvement in matters concerning children. Earlier this
year a Child Mistreatment Unit was created which involves itself with child
108
abuse and acts in co—opcration with Youth and Community Services' Child
Life Protection Unit.
Procedural justice
Extremism is possibly the greatest challenge faced by those who
control our way of life for years to come. Vocal minorities often achieve
more than their proportionate worth; pursuers of “rights" are often seen to
trample on the rights of others in gaining their objectives, and to create other
dangers by the lack of peripheral vision. In the introduction to this
commentary I mentioned the polarisation of views evident. in those
concerned with children's welfare. In England there is now a reaction
apparent against the strong “social work" approach of the late 1960's; the
United States has been obsessed with “due process”.
A notable feature of the Community Welfare Bill is its statements of
matters of principle — an unusual component in NSW legislation. In respect
of criminal proceedings such a statement includes the following:
cl. 1230 )(b) _
A court, in exercising criminal jurisdiction with respect to
children shall have regard to the following principle(s):
. that children who commit offences should bear responsibility
for their actions but, because of their state of dependency and
immaturity, require guidance and assistance...
Such a statement could be seen as being representative of the current
even-handed philosophy of the childrens court in NSW - recognizing the
need for law enforcement on one hand and the needs of the child on the
other concepts which are not mutually exclusive.
Curiously, the Bill states-that giving effect to the requirement to follow
statements of principle shall be subject to (Le. read down) any other
provision of the Bill. In that regard cl.l94 is apparently to take precedence:
cl.l94:
In determining whether or not to exercise its powers under 3.193
in respect of a child, the Children's Court shall not have regard to
the question of whether the child is in need of care within the
-meaning of Part VII
(5.193 in turn refers to 5.192. Both sections contain the “senten-
cing" powers of the children‘s court.)
On the face of it, 01.194 and cl.123(l)(b), are in direct conflict. The effect
is that offences are to be dealt with without application of the notion “care
for kids". The greater danger is the ultimate public image of the children's
court as a punitive rather than a law enforcing-caring body. Although the
Bill so clearly distinguishes between care proceedings and criminal
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proceedings, it is the most frequently used arm of the court (i.e. its criminal
division) which will receive the most publicity and hence create its image.
That image will then reflect upon what the Bill strives to achieve in respect
of care proceedings, despite its new terminology and procedure.
Clause 194 has gone too far; the obsessionists for “due process” have
triumphed!
Mr Chisholm (p. 33) mentions the U nitcd States argument that “status
Offences” should be abolished. We may be better served if that obnoxious
Americanism itself were abolished. To regard those activities of children
which can result in neglect and uncontrollable complaints — the runaways,
truants, sexually promiscuous, emotionally disturbed - as “offences" is
short-sighted: an investigation of the cause of those activities will usually
reveal the need for care.
In that regard the Child Welfare Act never did say that a child was
“charged” with being neglected or uncontrollable, and it is now 12'years
since the Child Welfare Amendment Act, 1969, rectiﬁed the ambiguity from
which that misconception could have arisen.‘ Yet even in two recent
Supreme Court judgments — and I say so with the proper respect - the
phrase has been perpetuated. Those most critical of the children‘s court
process as being one which "makes the child feel guilty" have usually been
the most frequent users of phrases which improperly infer'that the child in
those cases is “guilty“ of something. . "
Activities of children which can at present result in neglect or
uncontrollable proceedings will continue to ﬁt within the Bill’s deﬁnition of
“need for care" so far as it relates to “harmful behaviour“. If the social
concept of status oﬂence continued to be referred to in this State the objects
of the Bill to divorce care proceedings from criminal proceedings will be
constantly undermined. :-
In relation to those questions of behaviour, however, it would appear
to me that diversion away from the court to an aid panel - not constituted as
the proposed children's panel — could be an effective means of intervention
in many cases. Mr Chisholm‘s concernwith rights (p.49. para. iv) is capable
of proper protection. ' .
I can have no disagreement with Mr Chisholm on his statements
(p. 39) relating to Subs’IiIuIing/br Parents that the greater emphasis for the
eighties is to be the need for family support. Too often in the past has the
greater danger to the child resulted from removal from the family, and in
some cases the removal of a parent from the child.
Children’s Rights
One of Mr Chisholm‘s expressed concerns relates to legal repre-
sentation. Perhaps more than any other feature of the children’s c'ourts
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scene, legal aid and legal representation came under scrutiny during the
Year of the Child (1979), in the course of submissions on the Green Paper
and in connection with the Legal Service Commission’s enquiry. There is no
excuse for any child being unrepresented at any children’s court sitting
throughout the State, no matter how small the centre or how infrequently the
court sits. The scheme devised by the Law Society of NSW has developed.
and with the aid of seminars and other material a good deal of expertise and
quality has come about. There are still critics, but I ask any of them to
consider a comparison between the present level of legal aid and that
existing as recently as 1975. There are further developments ahead and pilot
schemes of the Legal Services Commission to be implemented and
evaluated, but children are immeasurably better served now than when legal
aid for them was non-existent and legal representation provided in a small
minority of cases usually represented the views of the parent rather than the
child.
An intriguing extension of children's “rights” is the provision, enacted
in advance in the Child Welfare (Amendment) Act, 1981, and to be repeated in
the Community Welfare Bill permitting a juvenile to elect committal for trial
in indictable cases. This provision proceeds under the guise that children
should have access to the same procedures that adults have access to. But
will a juvenile ﬁnd that his best interests have been served by being advised
to follow that course? He will find that he will not be tried by a jury of his
“peers" (the raison d’etre for jury trials), but rather by a jury of parental
ﬁgures. He also exposes himself to the possibility of being dealt with by
adult sanctions if found guilty. '
Whilst the pursuit of such a “right" is one I would not wish to deny to a
juvenile, it will be interesting to see to what extent the option is exercised
and with what results. It is a subject which could properly form some early
evaluation by the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research.
The same extension of a “right“ which adults have in certain indictable
cases - the right to summary trial by a' magistrate with “adult" sanctions
under s. 476 of the Crimes Act is denied to children under the Bill. This is a
procedure which has been popularly accepted on behalf ofthe olderjuvenile
in children's courts in recent years as the alternative to the exercise of a
discretion to commit for trial. It follows that it is likely that there will be an
increase in the number of committals for trial (or sentence) where the
children’s court feels that the sanctions of the Community Welfare Bill are
inadequate for the older juvenile.
Child Abuse
Child abuse and neglect represents the greatest new challenge for
children’s courts in the eighties. Children‘s courts are already becoming
familiar with grappling with the effects of physical abuse, particularly since
the 1977 amendments to the Child Welfare Act and the creation of the Child
Life Protection Unit and other similar crisis units. We have yet to learn to
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come to grips with emotional abuse, sexual abuse and the effects of drug
addicted parenting. The Community Welfare Bill’s deﬁnition of “need for
care“ provides not 'only for intervention where harm has occurred but also
where there is a potential for harm. -
Ms Smith (p. 59) speaks of the “adversary" nature of. proceedings
relating to neglected children under the present Act. I feel that the present
situation is not as inflexible as she suggests. Section 19 of the Child Welfare
Act provides that the Justices Act, so far as it is not inconsistent applies to
children‘s court proceedings. Section 79 of the Justices Act provides:
The practice upon the hearing of any information or complaint
shall, in respect of the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses and the right of addressing the Justice or Justices upon
the case in reply or otherwise, be as nearly as possible in
accordance with that of the Supreme Court upon the trial of an
issue of fact in an' action at law.
It may be argued that the impossibility of strictly adhering to adversary
procedure in neglect cases where a number of competing interests and
parties appear (particularly where the quality of guardianship is in question)
is such that the Child Welfare Act can be seen to be inconsistent with ‘
complaint procedures generally governed by the Justices Act, and that scope
exists for procedure more oriented towards an enquiry.
The Community Welfare Bill, however, sets this aspect beyond
question by providing its own procedure, unhampered by formality, legal
technicalities or the rules of evidence, in care proceedings. The Justices Act
has no application to procedure in that‘part of the Bill.
Standard of proof ln‘eare proceedings —— “stricter than strict"
The view generally held in respect of neglect and uncontrollable
proceedings under the Child Welfare Act has been that being non-criminal
the civil standard of proof applies. Dependence was placed by protagonists
for that standard upon Exparte Dorman re Macneadie 76 W.N. 402 & 1959 SR.
271, although that decision did not address itself to the standard of proof,
but held that the age of criminal responsibility had no place for consideration
inan allegation of school default under section 72(0) of the Act, and referred
to the enquiry nature of the proceedings. Yeldham 1,, on the other hand, in
Cratchley v. Power & anor. (N.S.W. Supreme Court 29.3.76, reported in Petty
Sessions Review at p. 1706) held that the standard of proof under s. 72(b) was
“beyond a reasonable doubt".
The Community Welfare Bill provides as follows:
Clause 94(2):
Proceedings under this Division are not criminal proceedings
but any fact which would, in any such proceedings, tend to prove
.9/
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that a child is a child in need of care or that the Children‘s Court
has jurisdiction to make an order with respect to him under
section 80(1) must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The provision has already attracted criticism as being “stricter than
strict". Not only have the ingredients of “need for care” (as defined by 44(4))
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but any fact tendered by the
applicant as tending tov'vards that end, as well. In criminal proceedings
where the onus of “beyond reasonable doubt" applies, each ingredient of the
charge and the ultimate guilt of the defendant must be proved to that level,
but the court would place differing degrees of weight on different facts. In
care proceedings if some facts are found to be established beyond
reasonable doubt but the existence of other facts asserted by the applicant is
not proved to that extent, will the whole application necessarily fail? No
doubt this is a question which will exercise the attention of this seminar — at
least for the few moments necessary'to see how unworkable a test it is.
What then should the standard of proof be? And what has influenced
the inclusion of that standard in the Bill? It is not my understanding that
that was the recommended standard.
In Re Milner (1976) 58 D.L.R. (3d) 593, the following passage from the
text Mendes da Costa, Studies in Canadian Family Law (1972) Vol. 1, at pp 85-
6 was quoted with approval:
In determining the issue of alleged neglect, what is the standard
of proof required? Given that the primary legislative objective is
to protect children and assist parents, it would seem that
application of a criminal standard of proof, beyond a reasonable
doubt, is too great a requirement Despite the fact that the
proceedings may resemble criminal proceedings the ultimate aim
is not to punish but to protect The question has received little
attention from the courts. It is' submitted that the proceedings
. should be regarded as being of a civil nature.
In Re S. V.'S. Infant 43 W.W.R. 374, Harvey C.C.J. said:
If I am wrong in applying the “criminal standard“ I think I
clearly would be right in requiring that “the case must be very
strong indeed" and which needs proof by a high preponderance
of probability. See remarks of Denning, LJ. in Bater v. Baler, 66(2)
TLR 589, (1950) 2 All ER 458, at 459, holding that there may be
degrees of probability within the “civil" standard and that the
degree depends on the subject matter. .
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The High Court in Rejfek v. McElroy 112 CLR 517 at 521 indicated that,
no matter how grave the fact to be found in a civil case, the court requires only
reasonable satisfaction and not that degree of certainty necessary to support a
conviction upon a criminal charge.
Some protagonists for a standard of “beyond reasonable doubt" for
neglect and uncontrollable proceedings under the Child Welfare'Act have
pointed to the potential loss of liberty by committal to a training school (this,
of course, only being a realistic option for the older child arising from his own
behaviour, and not for infants and others “neglected" within the ordinary
sense) as being comparable with the similar sanction available in respect of
offenders. The Community Welfare Bill takes away any weight to be attached
to this argument by not providing committal to training as an option available
to the court in care proceedings.
Separation of children as well as proceedings
The Report of the Royal Commission on Administration of the State
Children Relief Department, 1920, said of the Albion Street Shelter:
In this Shelter are housed temporarily boys awaiting trial before,
or remanded from the Children’s Court, boys awaiting transfer to
institutions. after committal from the court, and occasionally State
wards who have committed no offence but are regarded as too old
to send to Ormond House and who remain here pending suitable
disposal to private or other homes under the control of the State
Children Relief Board. Offenders committed to Mittagong and
Gosford should not be indiscriminately grouped with other boys
awaiting trial in the court, possibly innocent, possibly only
neglected children, and certainly not with wards against whom no
offence whatever has been alleged.
Not much in the way of separation can be seen as having changed in 61
years. It is to be hoped that more than lip-service will be paid to Cl. 101 of the
Bill which requires children in care to be separated from offenders “as far as is
practicable". 1 am satisﬁed, however, that multi-purpose regional centres, as
spoken about by Mr. Cunliffe-Jones, could reasonably achieve that aim
together with the beneﬁts of assisting a child in close proximity to his family
situation rather than in a large “institution” remotely situated from home.
Guardianship has at last been deﬁned with certainty for the purpose ofs.
720) of the Child Welfare Act, in the decision of Youngman v. Lawson, NSW
Court ofAppeal, 14th May, 1981. Whereas that section of the Child WelfareAct
speaks of a child “who in the opinion of the court is under incompetent or
improper guardianship”, the Bill (at cl.44(4)(d)) speaks of a child who “is not
under competent and proper guardianship". One wonders at the basis for
compelling an applicant for a care order to prove both deﬁciencies —
particularly remembering that both aspects are to be proved beyond
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reasonable doubt and that if proof of one fails it would appear the
application must fail.
Representation of child in care proceedings
Ms Smith aptly argues, I feel, the case for separate representation of
the child. The Community Welfare Bill should set at rest arguments
currently raised concerning the representation of infants who are incapable
of giving instructions. It would be timely, however, if the Bill were to provide
that in any court in which the welfare of the child is the major consideration
that child’s interests should be separately represented.
The Assessor
It will be mandatory for a children’s court hearing care proceedings to
sit with an assessor (a person having qualiﬁcations in social work or
experience in community welfare) who may advise the court but not
participate in the adjudication (cl.78 and 79 of the Bill).
The proposal will be a novel one for children’s courts. My concern is
not that courts will have difﬁculty adjusting to the presence of this new
addition to the court scene, but whether a sufﬁciently large panel of
assessors can be assembled to ensure that care proceedings can be heard
without delay (throughout the whole of the State), particularly in cases where
it would be necessary for the child to remain in departmental care pending
the hearing. The provision does not distinguish between contested and
uncontested applications - it may be that it should only be in contested
applications that the assessor's presence be mandatory.
Although the Bill provides forappeal to the District Court in care
proceedings, it does not spell out whether in the necessary re-hearing of the
matter the court must also sit with an assessor. It would be reasonable to
suggest that if a specialist member of the children's court of New South
Wales requires the advice of an assessor to assist him understand the
evidence and social issues put to the court, then non-specialist judges of the
District Court would require that assistance even more. It may be that as
District Court “appeals" are in fact re-hearings, the adoption of the
procedure of the originating court is sufﬁciently implied; to resolve the
matter beyond doubt the Bill should explicitly make provision.
Treatment of Offenders
The provision of new initiatives in relation to offenders as outlined by
Mr Cunliffe-Jones has been received enthusiastically by children’s courts; it
can be frustrating for a children’s court magistrate to have a particular
programme, such as weekend attendance, available at one court and not at
others. The department has a number of capable and imaginative planners,
and a prime requirement for new initiatives is that they be capable of wide
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implementation rather than standing or falling according to the ability of
particular ofﬁcers.
The 83% occupancy rate mentioned by Mr Cunliffe-Jones (p. 80) I
assume to be the rationalised available accommodation at present speciﬁed
for the intake of offenders. Large centres, such as St. Heliers, Ormond and
Yawarra, previously accommodating offenders passing through children’s
courts have been redesignated for other purposes in recent years. It may be
that, on the ﬁgures quoted, there is an occupancy rate of only about 58% of
accommodation which could be available for offenders.
Committal of truants
I query Mr Cunliffe—Jones’ statement (p. 84) that truancy can no longer
form the basis of a “care" application, in view of the power given under cl.
80(l)(c)(v) of the Bill to require a child of school age, who has not been
attending school regularly, to reside at and attend a prescribed school for a
period not exceeding 12 months.
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Having commented liberally on a number of matters covered by the
four speakers, there are number of other matters which I feel are relevant to
“Child Welfare in the 80s".
Appeals to the District Court
During the Year of the Child, 1979, and in response to the proposals of
the Green Paper, a great deal of scrutiny was focussed upon children's court
procedures and associated matters (such as legal representation). None of
that scrutiny appeared to be directed towards the District Court appeals
jurisdiction; the Green Paper made no proposals in respect of it, nor does
the Community Welfare Bill except to provide for the machinery of appeal.
. Appeal to the District Court is a right frequently exercised by children.
I have had the opportunity of speaking - unconnected with their particular
pending cases — with children who have had the experience of both a
children’s court and a District Court appeal hearing. I have been told that
whilst in the relative informality aimed at in children‘s courts they have been
(understandably) nervous, perhaps over-awed, the degree of formality and
non-speciality in the District Court can be terrifying.
In care proceedings in childrenis courts Iuhder'the‘Comrnunity mas"
Bill, the court shall proceed with “as little formality and legal technicality
and form as the circumstances of the case permit". It is logical (at least to
me) that the same provision should apply on appeal to the District Court in
care proceedings. Will there then be a forsaking of the wigs and gowns? Can
the appeal he heard in a place where the child is not looked down upon
from on high, but rather conversed with informally at his own level? In all
116
appeals might there not be judges with a degree of specialisation in
children’s matters?
It will be noted that the children‘s court of South Australia is at present
constituted by two judges (of local and district criminal court status) and by
magistrates and justices. Whilst appeals from that court are heard by the
Supreme Court, it is suggested that a development of the eighties in New
South Wales could be the appointment of senior members of the children's
court of District Court or Family Court status who would have power to hear
appeals from the decisions of ordinary members of the court and magistrates.
Trafﬁc Cases
Driving can be seen as an adult-like responsibility. There is a certain
logic to be seen in exposing those of licensable age (17) to adult-like
consequences for driving offences. The Community Welfare Bill excludes
children's court jurisdiction over traffic offences, whatever the age of the
child, and confers that jurisdiction upon a court of petty sessions. Traffic
offences are not reportable to the Children’s Panel under the Bill, but a court
of petty sessions is given the sentencing powers of a children’s court and
there is provision for restriction of publicity in such cases. The children’s
court will have power to deal with a traffic offence if it is committed in
association with some other offence in respect of which the children‘s court
has jurisdiction, e.g. car stealing.
Leaving aside the young trail-bike riders even, it would have seemed
preferable for trafﬁc offenders under licensable age to have continued to
come before the children’s court. In those cases there is almost necessarily
implied a certain additional illegality; usually the vehicle used would not be
the child's, and whilst the child may have had factual consent to its use, that
use is not an element which can legally be consented to by any person. It is
the experience of the children's court that the commission by children of
those offences frequently leads to the development of “criminal“ behaviour
connected with the use of motor vehicles.
Contempt of Court
The power to deal with contempt of court is one of the hallmarks of a
“court to record”. (Under cl.l75(2) of the Community Welfare Bill, the
children’s court of New South Wales is to be a court of record.) Contempt in
the face of the court is prosecuted sparingly by all courts, and in a
jurisdiction such as the children’s court where there are emotional overtones
almost constantly present, more than usual tolerance is exercised in relation
to incidents which could properly be regarded as contempt. Although rarely
used, the power is nevertheless jealously guarded, and also extends over
witnesses who refuse to answer questions.
The important element of the power to punish contempt in the face of
the court is the ability of the court itself to immediately and summarily deal
with that contempt -
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In Ex pane Bellanto; Re Prior (80 W.N. 616), an extract from Reg. ~v.
Castro: Skipworth’s Case (1873) LR. 9 QB. 219 at p.230 et seq. was quoted by
the Court at p.623: , _
Mos’t things which are done in that way may be‘ liable to
punishment by the criminal law, . .. But then if we are to wait for
that to be done by ordinary criminal process and at an ordinary
trial, there might be great mischief done, because that process is
slow, and before that process could come into train the mischief
would be done by the due administration of justice being
hampered and thwarted. For that reason, from the earliest times
the . . . courts . . . have always had power to deal summarily with
such cases. '
And at p.627, the Court said:
. we would add the observation that as to contempt in facie V
curiae the judge usually himself prefers the charge and is usually
required to act in summary proceedings on the spot so as not to
involve a statement or trial of specially formulated issues.
Clause 306 of the Community Welfare Bill provides:
‘A person shall not during any proceedings before a Children's
Court, commit contempt of the court. Penalty. $200 or imprison-
ment for 10 days.
Clause 305 of the Bill provides:
Subject to this Act, proceedings for an offence under this Act or
the regulations may be taken before a court of petty sessions held
before a stipendiary magistrate sitting alone.
' It will be seen that contempt in the face of the children’s Court is to be
an offence punishable not by the children’s court itself but prosecutedlin
another court. This is a grievous drafting error of the Bill which surely
cannot prevail.
Prosecution of offences under the Act
Under the Child Welfare Act, offences created by the Act-‘were dealt with
exclusively by the children’s court.
Clause 305 of the Community Welfare Bill provides for all offences
created by the Act to be dealt with by Courts of Petty Sessions.
Whilst offenders under the Act typically would be adults and there is a
certain logic in those persons being dealt with by adult courts, it can also be
said that if any court has acquired expertise in dealing with cases associated
with offences against children, that court is the children's court.
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Circumstances may'arise where the Offence alleged against the adult _
also constitutes a child's need for care. There is a need for a consistency of
approach to both cases which 1 suggest can only be achieved by one
specialist jurisdiction having power to deal with.
Compensation ‘
The Community Welfare Bill provides that no order for compensation
shall be made in respect of a child under 16 years of age, nor shall a
condition of probation or of any recognizance applying to such a child
specify payment of compensation. The provision applies whether or not the
child of that age is in an earning capacity. I make no further comment.
beyond referring pai'ticipants at this seminar to this Institute’s previous
seminar on “Victims of Crime". (Syd. Inst. Crim. Free. No. 45, 1980.)
r
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PRESENTATION OF COMMENTARY
R. D. Blackmone
As convenor of this seminar I wish to thank the previous speakers for
their contributions, prepared during the difﬁcult stage when the Community
Welfare Bill is still “in utero”. My commentary has been circulated — I just
wish to emphasise certain points. '
In introducing-the Bill into Parliament, the Minister, Mr Jackson, said:
I point out that this is innovative, and in some areas,
experimental legislation. Though it results from much public
participation and interdepartmental consultation, it is not,>and I
do not claim it to be, the last word on the issues it deals with.
Once it comes into operation, its effect will be closely monitored
and changes will be made to it when the need for change is made
apparent
It is quite likely therefore that we may see further changes during the
coming decade.
I stress the problems (at pp. 105-6) of adopting an arbitrary upper age
limit with mandatory extension to 21 years for children’s courts when it
would be feasible to bring about legislation which merges the effect of that
transition between legal minority and adulthood; and draw attention to my
statement that “to deal with a person, who for all other purposes is an adult,
as a child for something he did when a child. has a logic which I suggest
cannot be sustained”.
I point to the concern over possible delay in the making of a decision
by a Children’s Panel when 'a person is in custody, and‘ now note with
interest Richard Chisholm’s observations concerning the dangers from
conferences convened to assist the panel in effect becoming the real Panel
by indicating submission to undertakings by a child for the purpose of
avoiding a court appearance. The Children’s Panel, however, should always
be in control and be aware of the dangers of a Conference pre-empting its
decision in that way. There is to be a Children's Panel Council which will,
no doubt, formulate guidelines for the operation of panels.
A report of this seminar in this morning's Sydney Morning Herald does
not adequately represent what I was attempting to say concerning the
“Juvenile Crime Squad“. How is the role of that unit perceived By the
“consumers" — the kids of the Cross? Do they see it as a hounding and
prosecuting squad or a helping body? If the real role it is carrying out is a
helping one then it is inappropriately named and would have a better image
with the community and those kids if it were called a “Juvenile Aid Bureau".
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At pp. 108-9 I criticise cl.l94 of the Bill as going too far. It is a fair
proposition to attempt to clearly distinguish care proceedings from criminal
proceedings, but the clause at the least is unnecessary because that Division
of the Bill (relating to criminal proceedings) contains no power to make any
order for the child’s care. On the other hand, even an adult offender has the
right to have his needs taken into consideration when being sentenced. On
this aspect the Minister said:
The court's role in care cases is the protection of the child; its role
in criminal cases is the protection of society. That is not to say
that courts which ﬁnd a child guilty of criminal offences should
be harsh and punitive; on the contrary, they should take into
account the child’s immaturity and any other mitigating factors,
but in doing so they should not forget the offence that has
brought the child before the court in the first place.
It is too simplistic, I feel, to say that the court's only role in criminal
cases is the protection of society, however. In criminal cases children's courts
have frequently made a condition of probation or bonds that an offender
live with some particular person or at some approved place where. for some
reason, it is not possible or appropriate for him to live with his family. The
only real justiﬁcation for imposing that sort of condition is a “need for care“.
Lest it be thought that the Bill is proposing that such a condition should not
be made in criminal cases, c1.200 provides, inter alia that where a person has
been released on probation on condition that he remain in the care of a
person named in the order, that order may be (varied). There is clear
contradiction between those philosophies and provisions of the Bill.
At a seminar on child abuse held in this auditorium yesterday, a
number of speakers referred to the desirability of care proceedings relating
to child abuse being brought before a children's court as early as possible
with the purpose of the court being used therapeutically either as a part or as
the pivot of overall treatment If the overall image of the children’s court is
one to be feared (because its most frequent consumers are offenders in
respect of whom “need for care“ cannot be considered) then the Bill will fail
in its objective of properly separating care proceedings and criminal
proceedings. Let us not forget the theme of the Year of the Child “care for
kids” while at the same time recognising that they have procedural rights
and that the law should be enforced.
It is likely that there will be an increase in committals for trial because
of the lack of adequate sanctions available for many older juveniles. I see
some irony in that, when one considers the objectives of the 1974
amendments to the Crimes Act which gave magistrates consentual juris-
diction to deal with many indictable cases previously the exclusive province
of the higher criminal courts. The District Court is unlikely to regard with
relish either the increased caseload, which already has considerable delays,
or the sentencing problems with which it will be confronted.  
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I am hopeful that the freedom of procedure allowed in care pro-
ceedings will have the effect of courts becoming more adverturesome in their
methods of dealing with these cases - remembering always that principles of
natural justice must prevail. I am hopeful that at least one metropolitan
court can become exclusively a “care court", and that other courts will set
aside particular days or times for the hearing of care cases. It will be
intriguing, however, to see what additional efforts will be made to support
children, particularly adolescents, who are the subject of care proceedings,
when the Bill makes no provision for residential training as a last resort.
What will happen to the persistent runaway, for instance?
I am yet to hear someone speak in support of the standard of proof
that the Bill provides for in care proceedings - if that person is here, let him
speak out! At yesterday’s seminr the standard appeared to be unanimously
rejected by all who spoke as being inappropriate in those cases.
I have reason to hope that the words “competent and proper“ in
relation to guardianship in the deﬁnition of need for care will be looked at
again before the Bill is passed and become “competent or proper“. It may be
possible to show guardianship to be incompetent, but perhaps not both
incompetent and improper.
We are discussing a system of total “juvenile justice’. The District
Court in its appellate jurisdiction cannot remain apart from that total
concept, and you will see that I have addressed some remarks in that area. I
have also mentioned the provisions proposed relating to traffic offenders
and whether they should become the exclusive province of courts of petty
sessions whatever the age of the child may be.
The provision for punishment of contempt might seem to be the least
matter to be concerned about. There are many powers courts have which are
infrequently used but nevertheless important It is completely beyOnd me
that some other courts have power to deal with contempt in the face of the
children‘s court, and I hope that the Government will rectify this provision
during the course of the Bill's transition through Parliament.
A commentary from the Kings Cross Refuge raises the question of the
right of a welfare agency representative to act as a child‘s advocate in court
or to be present with a child at the police station. I would doubt the ability of
such a representative to be a child‘s legal advocate for all purposes in court
proceedings, but such a representative would certainly be permitted to be
present with the child and to put matters to the court concerning the child if
the child requests. Again, at a police station, as an alternative to the presence
of a person having the child’s care, if the child requests the representative
should be permitted to be present Statements made by the child in the
absence of an independent adult are, prima facie, inadmissible in evidence.
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COMMENTARY
Dr W. Gordon Waterlow.
Chairman, Child-at-Risk Committee,
Fairﬁeld District Hospital.
This commentary concerns itself with the provisions of the Com-
munity Welfare Bill as presented to the New South Wales Parliament 14th
May, 1981, and the papers presented to the seminar Child Welfare in the 805.
but only with those sections which .have a bearing on child abuse and
neglect
The short space of time available for writing this commentary brings in
its train the unfortunate consequences of superficiality and disorderliness
for which an apology is proferred at the outset '
Like Blackmore (p.104) I ﬁnd more in the Bill to praise than to
criticise; but likewise find a number of matters of conCem.
The abused child and/or neglected child and his family differ
qualitatively from the rest of the population in several respects. This is well
reported, and widely, in the literature (v., e.g., Smith, S.M., edit The
Maltreatment of Children. M.T.P. Press Ltd UK, 1978. op.cit), and personal
experience supports the proposition‘of qualitative differences. (Waterlow.
W.G., The Recognition of Child Abuse in Hospitals. Interdisciplinary Con-
ference on Child Neglect and Abuse. Sydney, Sept. 1980). 1 am not sure that
the provisions of the Bill which concern, inter alia, Children‘s Welfare'and
especially “Children in Need of Care", are directed speciﬁcally enough to
the amelioration of the special problems of the abused and neglected child.
Indeed some of the provisions may render the protection of children against
all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation (cl.77(d)). in some instances
possible.
Chisholm (p.46) states: . . . what is good policy for older children may
be inappropriate for little children . . . and (p.46) . . . The child is as much at
risk from a mistaken failure to intervene (where there is a danger) as from
unnecessary intervention (where there is not) nd then follows The
important thing is to get it right. .. .
The context here concerns rules of evidence, and whether the criminal
or civil standard of proof ought to apply; these matters will be commented
upon later. at this point I wish to use the statements to air some concern
about cl.77 of the Bill.
The premises (a) through (D in cl.77 of the Bill are admirable, and yet.
there may be a problem. From cl.77 (c) . . . a child of tender years should not
except in exceptional circumstances, be separated. from his parents.
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The most serious consequences of physical abuse — permanent damage
or death: the most serious consequences of psychological abuse (qua cl.4 (i),
abuse) - maternal rejection, failure to thrive, deprivation; are most closely
associated with tender years; certainly the ﬁrst five years of life, perhaps the
ﬁrst three years. These are most cogent reasons for the separation of children
from parents. The child's survival may depend on it I wonder if that is what
is to be meant by “exceptional circumstances". In my fourteen years of close
involvement with some one thousand troubled families containing possible
children-at-risk, the number of cases involving castastrophic consequences
listed above ,are of course only a minority, but for all that the frequency is
disturbing and does not fit the dictionary deﬁnitions of exceptional. Truly
“the important thing is to get it right".
The most catastrophic consequence next to death is perhaps that of the
abused child where the level of intervention by the community has not been
the removal of the child, but where the level of intervention has been that of
a variety of community supports, whilst the destruction Of the child
physically or psychologically has continued. It is unfortunately true that in
the families of the children most at risk the chances of therapeutic success
are the least. Tertiary prevention is of limited value. '
The question of whether the civil standard of proof or thgcﬁn/inal
standard of proof should apply is well addressed by Chisholm (p. 46). My
first comment is that the change from civil standard of proof to criminal
standard of proof plus proof beyond reasonable doubt of any relevant fact
(cl.94(2)) is plainly perverse, when it is in relation to care proceedings and
especially where abuse is involved. cl.44(4)(a), (b), (c), of the Bill makes
mention of probabilities. How is a probability to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt? If the welfare and interests of children in care pro-
ceedings are to be given paramount consideration and children to be
protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation (c1.77(a), (d))
then it is the civil standard which is appropriate. It is the children who are
the losers in the games which the adults play. Itwould be tragic if the work
of the health and social professionals over recent years to delineate the
probability of future catastrophe for children of tender years were to be set at
nought.
Smith (p. 69) on the need for expert evidence to be available readily in
Children's Court, and Chisholm (p. 47) on emotional abuse prompts some
comments. Not only is there the need for expert evidence to be readily
available, and too often it is not, but the experts must work to provide the
evidence in an assimilable manner, and nowhere is this more necessary than
with emotional abuse.
Not only will the assessors be of interest to the lawyers (Chisholm p.
44), the expert witnesses will watch this departure with great interest. Thecalibre and the breadth of experience of the assessors will need to be of the
finest quality. One possible consequence, regrettably, might be a narrowing
of viewpoint, and a lessening of the quality of the judgement.
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PRESENTATION OF COMMENTARY
Dr W. G. WaterIow,
I would like to add another comment to Rod Blackmore‘s, that here is
yet another person who is going to speak against the criminal standard as
being appropriate. '
I just wanted to emphasise that, looking at the Community Welfare
Bill solely from the position of somebody who as a paediatrician is
concerned with child abuse and neglect matters, I am in no doubt
whatsoever that the abused child and grossly neglected child and their
families are qualitatively different from the rest of the population in many
respects. That makes it difficult, if not impossible, to look after their interests
effectively in a Bill whose function is to cover the whole range of child
matters from nought to 18 years of age without there being some special ,,
consideration. Certainly the abused child is very much the loser (and the
biggest loser) and a number ﬁnish up dead or permanently damaged. For
that reason we must get things right. i
From the point of view of one's function as an expert witness, when I
i am calledrto be one as a paediatrician with an abused child, the question is
really what happens next The matters which might have brought us to court,
i.e. the injuries or the damage physical or psychological, are'already water
under the bridge. What is going to happen next? What are the probabilities
of what will happen next? Where will that child be safe? Over the last decade
and a half a lot of us have put in a great deal of work and time to be able to
express that series of reasonable probabilities, but I do not see how we can
possibly succeed in proving those beyond reasonable doubt
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DISCUSSION PAPER
 
Margaret Dwight (Co-ordinator).
David Twyman (President) and
Paul Chetwynd-Jones (Resident Youth Worker),
Kings Cross Youth Refuge Ltd,
Woolloomooloo.
Introduction
The Kings Cross Youth Refuge provides emergency accommodation ‘
for adolescents 12 to 18 years old. The majority of young people we deal with I
are between 15 and 17 years of age, and have been living away from their
natural parents; either in institutions, in foster families, or on the streets for
at least three months.
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Over 90% of the young people we deal with have been before the
children’s court, are or were under supervision of a district ofﬁcer from the
Department of Youth and Community Services, or are either State Wards,
on remand, on probation or paying off ﬁnes. ‘
Very few of the young people have any contact with either their natural
families or with foster families. In most cases their families are incapable of,
or unwilling to offer them any form of support. Where possible we work with
them to re-establish contact with their families and endeavour to assist in
resolving any problems that may have resulted in the young person leaving
home in the ﬁrst instance. In the majority of cases, this is not possible. This
results in the refuge becoming a support base for these young people,
providing assistance with emotional, legal and ﬁnancial problems as
required.
From this experience there are several areas of concern that we would
like to comment upon in relation to the Community Welfare Bill.
Children’s Panel
The Children's Panels will consist of a police ofﬁcer, an ofﬁcer of the
Department of Youth and Community Services and a third independent
person. From the information we have been able to gather it would seem
that community welfare agencies will be called upon to provide that third
person. If so, it poses some very difﬁcult problems for those agencies.
N
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Virtually all community agencies work with the bare minimum of staff
‘ ' necessary to provide their service. It is quite clear that involvement on the
! panel would mean a considerable time involvement for that person if he or
she is to maintain involvement with the agency and be a part-time member
of the Children's Panel Council. For many agencies this will create a
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considerable burden on their staffing structure. In our case, for example,
where residential staff are already working 72 hours per week, a further
involvement such as the panel would be totally unrealistic. What steps will
be taken to ensure that, if an agency is involved in providing people for the
panel, the service of the agency will not suffer? For instance, will money for
relief staff be made available so agencies can release experienced staff to
participate on the panel?
Also of concern is the question of training in legal requirements for
welfare workers involved in the panel. While many workers have a broad
concept of the law, in order to determine whether a case should be referred
to the children's court a much deeper understanding may be required.
In summary, in order for the Children’s Panel to be established and to
- function effectively the problems it poses need to be looked at closely and
the necessary resources must be made available if it is to fulfil its intended
function.
Accommodation
Whilst fully supporting the move away from institutional care, and the
initiatives of the Department of Youth and Community Services as
alternatives to sentencing, the problem of finding suitable accommodation
for young people unable to live at home presents a very real barrier to the
effectiveness of these alternatives.
Refuges receive many referrals from Youth and Community Services
district officers. For the majority of these young people a refuge is the only
accommodation alternative available apart from an institution or establish-
ment. As refuges can accommodate someone for up to three months, it in
effect buys time for the young person so that more suitable accommodation
can be found. "
As an agency involved in assisting young people to ﬁnd permanent
accommodation, we are well acquainted with the extreme shortage of
accommodation that young people can afford, particularly if they are
unemployed. In cases where the person is too young or incapable of living
independently and in need of supportive accommodation, the options are
even more limited. The problems of placing young people after institution-
alisation, when the home environment is not appropriate, is one of concern
to ofﬁcers of the Department’s own institutions and district offices.
Many young people move into accommodation inappropriate to their
needs and consequently time and time again it breaks down and they either
re-appear before the court or return to crisis accommodation. Until a variety
of long-term accommodation is developed, ranging from intensely sup-
portive (e.g. foster care or small family group homes) through a range of less-
supported accommodation (e.g. live-in worker to visiting worker) to totally
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independent living situations, then young people will still have to be in
residential care simply because they are homeless.
Any new welfare bills or initiatives in this field will not achieve their
potential until the basic, ground-level needs are adequately provided for.
The Advocacy Role of Welfare Agencies
The right of a welfare agency to be present at a police station or a court
as an advocate, or in loco parentis for a young person seems to be a confused
area. In providing residential care for a young person, even on a short-term
basis, an agency has all the responsibilities of a guardian yet none of the
rights.
If a young person in our care is arrested and charged with an offence
neither the courts nor the police have any responsibility to contact us. Therehave been situations where our presence has been requested by a young
person and that has been refused. There have also been situations where the
police have refused to allow us to see a young person. In other situations thepolice and courts have been eager to seek our assistance or presence. There
appears to be a real need for clariﬁcation of our roles as advocates with both
the police and courts; and that this should be a standard agreement in all
cases. While cl.128 allows police to request the presence of “a person
responsible for the child", in practice (and, as we understand it, in policestanding orders) it is the parents who are called in, even if, as occurred once,
the young person has not lived with the parents for a period of nine years.The provisionfor the presence ofa district oﬂicer in the case ofa State Ward being
charged could and should be widened to embrace, at all times, the person oragency having the care of the child or young person at the time of the oﬁ'ence or
complaint
Diversion
It is of concern that, despite the provisions of cl.123 (I)(a), i.e. children
have a right to be heard in and participate in the processes that lead todecisions that affect them, the child will not appear before the Children'sPanel. The use of panels provides an excellent opportunity to make
proceedings even more informal than the children’s courts. and moreappropriate to the needs of young offenders. Hopefully such an environmentcould facilitate the real participation of the young person in the judicialprocess and ensure that panel decisions are appropriate to the child's needs.We frequently see cases where a young person breaks the law in order to beable to survive after having run away from home, yet, unless careproceedings are sought, the panel may not hear of such a factor and miss anopportunity to prevent re-offending by seeking more appropriate livingcircumstances for the young person if he/she is likely to abscond from home
again. In such circumstances, for example, the comment of the seniorchildren’s court magistrate is particularly relevant: “Clause 194 has gone tooufar .
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The same magistrate’s appeal for a method of diversion away from
courts in cases of “in need of care” proceedings is one We would endorse.
While the expertise of children's court magistrates is invaluable in such
cases. the procedure and environment of the courts are not the most
appropriate. and do not facilitate the child's participation - most young
people are frightened and taciturn in the courtroom. and too often the child
is left to feel that he/she is the guilty party in the current equivalent of “care“
proceedings. A more informal approach with a panel; differently constituted,
would go a long way in effecting the aims of the new Bill.
Isolated Detention
The new Bill makes a welcome and much needed provision covering
the use of isolated detention (solitary conﬁnement) in training schools
(c1239 and 253 (1)(d)(v) and (2)). Currently isolated detention is used as a
punishment in training schools, and is marked by (l) conﬁnement for
periods of 24 hours or greater; (2) the lack of any useful means of occupying
the offender's time, except for the biting of nails; and, disturbingly, (3) the
repeated allegation that in at least one training school the offender is
expected to be “standing at ease" at the foot of the bed EVERY HOUR of
detention. This latter constitutes psychological abuse which, were it to occur
in the home, would be the subject of “in need of care" proceedings.
Since c1253 (l)(d)(v) contains no provision for a maximum number of
consecutive conﬁnements in any time period, it is possible that a number of
six hour conﬁnements could be given in a 24 hour period, and the purpose
of this clause defeated in its practice. While we have been impressed by the
sincerity and dedication of most ofﬁcers in the training schools we have
visited (and compliment them on the innovations and improvements that
have given a real meaning to the title “training school”), the possibility of
abuse needs to be considered in the framing of new legislation, so that its
practice is not dependent on only the goodwill of those implementing it.
  
129
DISCUSSION
Marrickville Legal Cemre: Questions on notice to Chris Cunliffe-Jones
1. In your discussion paper you have drawn attention to the considerableproblems of dealing with young offenders. We have had the opportunityto read the Community Welfare Bill. It raises serious concern as to theincreased punitive intentions of the Department in future dealings withyoung offenders. We invite your comment‘on the following points ofconcem:-
Clauses 253 and 254 and Schedule 7 of the Bill deﬁne the punishment ofjuveniles within training centres. These read like Sections 23/34 of thePrisons Act for adults. '
The Bill supposedly draws a distinction between adult imprisonmentand juvenile training centres. How does the Department explain theproposed prison-like regime of its training centres?
How are these institutions to be run so that they are distinguishablefrom adult prisons?
Will there be review of these training centres external to the Departmentof Youth and Community Services?
Will projects like the two Community Youth Centres be extended? Whatother preventive/support services for young people are planned? Howmuch financial commitment will be made to such services in com-parison to the expense of running institutions? — Comparative ratios andestimates only are expected.
' ‘
The Bill also prohibits the placing of juveniles in need of care infacilities the same as those for offenders. One presumes this would meanremand centres like Minda would be prohibited. What then are thealternatives envisaged?
At present a number of children on care matters (particularly girls nowon complaints like uncontrollable and exposed to moral danger) are ‘_ institutionalized in the same centres as young offenders. Where willthese children be placed in future?
The Bill describes “Special facilities" for “seriously emotionally dis-turbed " children. What exactly are these “special facilities"? What arethe programmes to be used for these children?
Child Welfare in the 805 in New South Wales is about to undergo majorchanges. The above questions relate to legislation that will introducethose changes. We would welcome this opportunity for a much neededexplanation of its provisions.
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Chris Cunliffe-Jones
The Bill is available at the Government Printer in Ultimo or the
Government Information Centre, Hunter Street
First of all the Bill was the result of a long consultation. A number of
punishments have been excluded from the new Bill and those include
isolated detention for 24 or 48 hours, corporal punishment and physical
exercises. Included is detention in a room for six hours. but if that is
implemented there must be a means of usefully occupying the person in the
room, it must be furnished in the normal manner, and the person in
detention must be able to be seen by and to see and speak to an ofﬁcer at all
times. I do not particularly see this as punitive (although it may be difﬁcult
to administer). I suggest that if people feel the punishment provisions are
punitive, as the Bill is now lying on the table of Parliament, people can refer
comments to the Minister.
In terms of outside supervision of training schools, from my reading of
the Bill there is no outside body to come in and check, but cl.211 of the Bill
does provide that any judge of the Supreme Court or the District Court, any
member of the children’s court and certain stipendiary magistrates may visit
and examine any training centre or remand centre as he thinks fit. As far as
I can see the juvenile institutions that we have been running have been quite
distinguishable from prisons. I believe that recent developments will create
an even bigger difference.
The Community Youth Centres will be expanded. In my paper I refer
to the Minister commenting on Liverpool and Hunter, and there is a
document prepared within theDepartment which examines the co-ordinated
development of regional multi-purpose centres complemented by Com-
munity Centres. On the drawing boards at the moment there are plans for
three centres within the next couple of years at Liverpool, the Hunter Region
and at Wollongong.
What other preventive support services for young people are planned
and how 'much ﬁnancial commitment will be made to such services in
comparison to the expense of running institutions? The Department is aware
of the need to put as many young people as possible back into the
community, and to reserve the training schools for those requiring more
specialised and intensive support and treatment and who cannot be more
effectively dealt with in the community.
The second part of the question refers to the section of the Bill that
prohibits the placing of juveniles “in need of care" in the same facilities as
those for offenders. One presumes this would mean remand centres like
Minda. People “in need of care" will not be sent to remand centres. They will
be going to special centres like Minali, and that is fairly clear in the Act
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At present a number of “children in care“ particularly girls on
complaints like “uncontrollable" "and “exposed to moral danger", are
institutionalised in the same centres as young offenders. In the future these
children will be placed in care facilities. The Bill also describes special
facilities for seriously emotionally disturbed children and units for the
intellectually handicapped people transferred from the Department of
Education. One of the challenges facing the Department is to develop those
facilities and programmes. This is something new that the Bill has given us,
and is something the Department is required to respond to.
Daryl Gunter, Deputy Ombudsman, NSW
Mr Chisholm referred in his paper to the Ombudsman’s investigations
amongst others. What comment do you have on the provision in the Bill that
false statements about ofﬁcers might be subjected to criminal sanction? It
seems to me that that could cause a problem where I or my ofﬁcers visited
an institution, or where a stipendiary magistrate or judge visited an
institution, and had a discussion with a resident. Is that resident likely to feel
that his discussion, if he alleges certain misconduct, might result in his being
punished? It would seem to me that that is likely. or that it could interfere
with the due examination that my ofﬁcers might wish to make of those
inmates. It seems to me also, and I would like to comment on that as a
second matter, that the overall power of the superintendent to take action for
the good order and supervision of the institution sounds very much in terms
of the Prisons Act which under current interpretation appears to give prison
superintendents very wide powers indeed.
The two matters do raise a very serious question of whether the
position of the residents who have been admitted to institutions is going to
be rather different in terms of their practical existence. It does seem that
there is a difference in policy reflected in the terms of the Bill. On the one
hand we have ornate provisions for keeping people out of institutions, but
once they are in the institutions (and there are quite a substantial number of
such people) what is to happen to them within that institution? I do not wish
to suggest that all is black in this area but I think there are questions which
deserve some comment.
Richard Chisholm
In response to the ﬁrst part of the question, my reaction to that section
is that it is terrible and should be got rid oil It seems to me to point exactly in
the wrong direction. No matter how well we staff these institutions, no matter
how much we try to make them different from prisons, it is well known that
there are problems which are inherent in any closed institutions. The
problems do not necessarily stem from the punitive objective of the
institution as a whole. They stem from the nature of the institution itself and
the kind of power structures which exist within it. It seems to me what we
need to do, especially with kids, is provide avenues through which the kids
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can express their concerns and complaints. The existing provision obviously
will have the effect of suppressing complaints. I think that the Bill should
not be merely neutral on this, but it should positively and strenuously try to
establish and encourage avenues through which kids can express their
grievances. The whole experience of prison reform in the last years has been
a sad story of notorious injustices which have gone unremedied because
even adults in prison have not had, _or have not been able to use, avenues of
complaint It seems to me that we have learnt a lot from the difﬁcult time
that we have had with prisons, and we ought to be able to apply those
lessons to kids in institutions, even though we might want to say, perhaps
truthfully, that the objective of the enterprise is different I think that it is
terribly important that we positively encourage avenues of communication
from kids to outside bodies in the way that will not stigmatize and prejudice
them. It is very difﬁcult to do, and the Bill singularly fails to even attempt it.
The second part of the question was about the powers of the
superintendent and I really do not know enough about this area to have
anything to say about that However, while I am sadly not permitted to
disclose to you the Report of the Legislative Advisory Panel, I feel entitled to
tell you that those provisions of the Bill relating to the detailed regulation of
children in custodial care did not emerge from the Legislative Advisory
Panel, and were not a reﬂection of any consensus in the community.
C. B. Conroy, Stipendiary Magistrate
I refer ﬁrst of all to the diversionary programme that is undertaken in
respect of “children at risk” and to the subsequent court intervention. I make
no criticism of the diversionary programmes that'are undertaken by many
social agencies, but I would point out that once there is intervention of any
kind the rights of individuals come in focus, whether they are parents’ rights
or children's rights, and, of course, intervention takes place. That is usually
at the behest of the authorised ofﬁcer under the Child Welfare Act and under
the Community Welfare Bill similar authority is given. I refer ﬁrst of all to
5.158 of the Child Welfare Act that related to the indemnity which was
available to all officers. It provided that no suit or action shall lie against an
ofﬁcer “for or on account of any act, matter or thing done or commanded to
be done by him. and purporting to be done for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions of this Act“ providing that such person acted in good faith
and with reasonable care. A perusal of the Community Welfare Bill does not
appear to have that general provision in relation to the whole Act There is
such provision, it seems, in respect of Intellectually Handicapped Persons
Review Panel and in respect of Community Welfare Tribunals, but not as a
general provision for all ofﬁcers or authorised ofﬁcers involved. I ask the
question that, in the absence of such an indemnity, does the Panel feel that
the lack of that protection would inhibit the involvement of social agencies
when they commenced to interfere with the rights of a particular abuse
situation?  
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Richard Chisholm
I don‘t know why the protection was removed, and I don’t feel able to
speculate on its impact. However, I wonder how serious the problem is. I
have never heard of any such suits.
Anne Banning, Child and Family Psychiatrist
I would like to draw attention to Richard Chisholm’s paper which
mentions the anomaly between children involved in custody disputes being
dealt with by either the Family Court or the Supreme Court. My under-
standing is that the Bill almost does not address itself to the problem of
custody issues even though children outside a legal marriage come within
this jurisdiction. The Family Court has a Family Court counselling service
but there is no such provision within the Supreme Court My understanding
is that all custody disputes are referred to Family Court counsellors who are
able to interview, by force if necessary, parties to the dispute, as well as
ﬁnding out the wishes of the child. Unfortunately there is nothing
comparable in the Supreme Court, and it is so unfortunate that children are
dealt with in these different ways.
A welfare report may be sought by the courts but there is no stipulation
that it needs to be, and there is no stipulation of an independent person
systematically reviewing the situation in a way that exists in the Family
Court. From a more personal practical point of view, I often am referred
cases by a solicitor of one side and I always say “I am acting as an advocate
for the child, I cannot act for either party, and I have to make my report
available to both sides“. When I spell this out, more often than not I do not
get the referral at all.
Chairman
Perhaps I can add something to that. What you have said, Dr Banning,
would be very warmly received by Mr Justice Helsham, the Chief Judge in
Equity, whose division of the Supreme Court is responsible for hearing the
custody of illegitimate children. Incidentally, it is a sad slur upon 'our society
that illegitimate children are segregated from legitimate children in relation
to the court system before which they come, and it is a matter of great
concern to all of us who work within the law. Within the Supreme Court,
where our responsibility is for illegitimate children, the Equity Division
judges are concerned at the absence of a permanent ofﬁcer attached to the
Court to enable that very function to be fulﬁlled. Your comments will be
very warmly seized upon and perhaps used, it is to be hoped, in appropriate
representations.
Bren Collins, Prisoners Action Group
I would like to pose several questions to Mr Cunliffe-Jones who said
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that this new Community Welfare Bill is quite distinguishable from the
Prisons Act.
1. Who actually drafted cl.253 and Schedule 7 of the new Bill?
Because. in fact. it gives less rights to kids inside training centres than it does
' to prisoners inside prisons. I simply refer you to cl.253(l )(d), compared to the
rights of conﬁnement given to a‘ superintendent of a gaol.
2. Has there been any reference at all to the superintendence of
Tamworth Boys’ Home and Kambala as to the conditions inside training
centres? The information that we have received is that there has been none.
3. Has anyone looked at the Nagle Royal Commission Report in
deciding the form of the Schedule 7, specifically the charges that should be
laid inside training centres, and has it been recognised therefore that some
of the charges actually have already been condemned by Mr Justice Nagle?
Chris CunIiffe-Jones
' Training Schools are not prisons. I am not in a position to answer your
question on the drafting of the Act From observation I would believe that a
lot of the current practices (and you have mentioned Kambala and
Endeavour House) are fairly impressive, and that the changes that have
taken place in recent years in the programmes at Kambala and Endeavour
House have been positive and encouraging. That is the result of having seen
kids from Endeavour House and Kambala move directly to a Community
Centre programme at Stanmore and St Marys and out into the’community.
There have always been a few that have not done well, but basically there
have been kids able to move from those programmes into the community. I
have talked to both superintendents about their need for punishments and it
seems to me that they operate in a communicative fashion talking to the
young people. Segregation and that type of punishment is used very
sparingly. Punishment is obviously a very emotive issue, and I am not aware
of who drafted it or why, in fact, they were drafted in that way. From what
Richard Chisholm has said they do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the
committee of review. '
Brett Collins
I am sorry I did not give notice of the question, the Director General,
Mr Langshaw. is present and maybe he can assist the audience.
W. C Langshaw.‘ Director, Department of Youth and
Community Services,'. NSW.
Mr Chairman, I did not take a note of those questions as they were
announced, but I do not think the question of draftmanship is terribly
relevant
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Chairman
I think that the matter raised by the question was the extent to which
the framers of the new legislation took into account existing conditions in
present institutions and were guided both by the critical appraisal of the
present conditions as well as by some of the principles enunciated in the
Nagle Report In other words how deep and how far reaching was ‘the
research which preceded the drafting of these particular provisions?
W C Langshaw
The provisions concerning training centres for juveniles certainly
reﬂect the experience of the Department in relation to our present training
schools and it has already been noted that the proposals in the Bill certainly
water down very considerably the sections in the Child WelfareAct in relation
to punishment ,
The new Bill also provides a whole range of new provisions trans-
ferring intellectually handicapped prisoners from Corrective Service juris-
diction into training centres for intellectually handicapped persons under
this Bill. Those persons are committed to prison in the adult sense and, as I
understand it, the draftsman did transfer some sections from the existing
prison regulations that have not yet been amended because he considered
that the standard should be applicable to adult prisoners wherever they
were. This in fact may be an opportunity for Mr Collins to put submissions
to the Minister, not only about changing those provisions that are in the Bill
while it lies before the House, but may enable him to bring up the other
matter he was raising about conditions in the Corrective Service jurisdiction.
There had to be a degree of consistency and that is the way it has been
drafted.
Margaret Cantor, representing Dorothy Ginn, Director, Child Abuse
Prevention Service.
We help parents who have children at risk of being abused or children
who are actually abused. We try to help them before they get into court,
before they get into trouble, and we are concerned about the mandatory
reporting required from doctors. Apparently that is to be continued in this
new legislation.
Our concern is that it has two effects. The ﬁrst one is that parents do
not go to the doctors because they are frightened of authority. The reason
they come to us is we are'not authoritarian, we have no power. and we do not
do anything. We just help them. That might seem a simple concept but we
are currently helping over 700 families, so obviously it is effective.
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The second effect of this mandatory reporting is that it seems to inhibit
the doctors from recognising child abuse and suspected child abuse cases.
They do not want to know that there is a child abuse case because then they
are forced to report it. Ijust wonder if there is any way out of this dilemma?
Dr W G. Waterlow
It would be interesting to get into this discussion once more but it
might digress too far from the rest of the seminar. This has been a “hot
potato" that has gone round and round for at least a decade. I have been
‘ concerned with the problems of child abuse for a very long time. before
mandatory reporting came in and since mandatory reporting came in. It has
been, and it remains true, that medical practitioners have been the least
likely ever to report child abuse whether there was mandatory reporting or
' not.
My own feeling is that is likely to remain so. Doctors are going to be in
a minority of reporting situations, whether they do so or not for a variety of
reasons. It is much more important, from the point of view of the children,
whether other help and social care professionals, in fact, report the cases
that they see because they are in a far more likely position to see them early
than are the medical practitioners.
Dr c. Enﬁeld, Director of Child and Family Psychiatry, Royal Alexandria
Hospital for Children
I am here in two guises. One for myself and the other in my capacity as
a representative of the Child AbuseGroup at the Children’s Hospital.
In my personal capacity I would like to make some comments. First of
all about mandatory reporting. I think this is a very difficult issue. I think
our experiences increasingly show that putting doctors in a position of
having to breach confidentiality goes against all levels of training that we
have taken in the course of our professional development. My concern is
that in many instances children who are quite obviously abused will
therefore not be recognised nor reported as such, because the doctor feels
that to proceed he may injure his patient further. It seems to me that if we
now proceed into a criminal action type situation, which I understand is part
of the-Bill, then it is going to be even less likely that the doctor will want to
proceed to confrontation in a court in which criminal issues will have to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt
It has been my experience as consultant to the Child Abuse Group at
the Children’s Hospital that when we do appear to have clear cut evidence of
abuse, whether it is emotional, physical, sexual or psychological, it is very
difficult to protect the child within a court situation. It seems to me that we
have already been required to “prove beyond reasonable doubt" in our
submissions‘to courts about the need to protect children who are at risk.
Understandably the law, as we have come to understand it, wants to err on  
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the side of caution. l sympathize with the difﬁcult situation the legal
profession is in having to sit as Solomon in judgment on cases that they do
not quite understand. It seems to me as though there is an inherent dilemma
in the situation. In fact, it is a double dilemma, because taking into protected
care the abused child is a punishment for the child (who is removed from
the only parents he knows). The punishment for the parent is having the
child removed. The parent is unlikely to see that the court taking the child
away from the family is in the child’s best interests. In fact, it is difﬁcult for
the parent to understand that society is protecting the child from the parent,
when the parent suffers what it seems is a punishment, because the
punishment is the removal of the child. The people who are also in need of
help are the parents. There are also other siblings at home who require help.
and are unlikely to get the help that they require. For the child the parent
that is available is the psychological parent, as far as he is concerned. So the
child also suffers punishment when detached from the family. Therefore
long term help for both parties. child and parent, is required, and this is less
likely if this Bill does go through.
The Child Abuse Group asked me to read the following statement:
We wish to express our concern in regard to the change in the
Child Welfare Legislation incorporated in the new Community
Welfare Bill. We understand that under the new Bill when
children will be brought before the Children‘s Court in need of
care and protection the matter will then have to be proved
“beyond reasonable doubt". If the section, Section 94(2) of the
Bill, is passed as proposed it will be extremely difﬁcult to protect
children from all forms of abuse, neglect and emotional depriva-
tion. Even in the way the law is applied at present it often fails to
protect children at risk. The new Bill would be to the’further
detriment of these children.
We propose therefore that prior to the Bill being implemented a
working party be urgently established to study and report on the
implications of this section of the Community Welfare Bill.
Rosemary Smith
I would like to make a short comment because it does touch upon an
area in which I am particularly concerned, and that is the post-graduate
education of doctors and of lawyers in child abuse matters. The comment
was made that mandatory reporting seems to inhibit doctors from reporting.
1 think this is because they do not really understand the court process. They
do not see the court as part of the multi-disciplinary process, but they tend to
see it as a last resort where the child will be removed from the parent and, of
course, that simply is not the case in so many cases.
I agree with the standard of proof comments that have been made (as I
made clear in my paper - this is a personal stance) but we are overlooking
the fact that $.94 does allow for the rules of evidence to be very much relaxed
\
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so that a lot more evidence can be brought before the court in care cases.
Jocelyn McGirr, Solicitor .
I would just like to make two comments, the ﬁrst is, on compulsory
notification issue. Publicity may be more effective than compulsory noti-
ﬁcation. There was a survey and a project carried out in Florida in the
United States in the early 19708. A massive publicity programme was
conducted and they found that, in fact, publicity was more effective in
raising awareness and notiﬁcation of child abuse than any other measure.
Compulsory notiﬁcation is not working and it seems to me that this is
proven by the statements of some of the previous speakers. in that they are
saying that the majority of doctors (who are compelled to notify instances of
child abuse) do not do so and that one of the reasons that doctors do not
report is because of a misunderstanding of the way the system operates. It
seems to me then that also there are many other persons, and, indeed,
neighbours, friends and family of children who are abused, who know that
they are abused long before they get to the doctor. There was the recent case
in Melbourne of the man who had walled a house with searchlights, etc..
and his children were virtual prisoners. You cannot tell me that the
neighbours did not notice that there was something unusual there. The _
situation is that people do know about it, but they do not know what to do.
So it seems to me that there has to be a massive publicity campaign
undertaken by the Department of Youth and Community Services advertis-
ing its aid programmes, such as the one we have heard about tonight, and '
not its punitive programmes. People ought to know that there is help rather
than punishment available, and the publicity should educate the public.
(e.g., schoolteachers would pick up child abuse long before other people.)
The second comment is in the area of the standard of proof in child
abuse cases. I have been to a number of seminars on child abuse and. in fact.
in one conference I sat through ﬁve days of seemingly. endless stories of
most horriﬁc child abuse. It went on and on and on with everybody saying
“isn't this a dreadful thing". Of course it is a shocking thing, and one of the
problems is that the law is an excessively crude implement for dealing with a
wide range of situations from the dubious to the clearly outrageous.
Repeatedly, the discussion, especially amongst welfare personnel. seems to
centre around the welfare of the child, this abused child, which is all 'very
appealing. We. the lawyers, tend to talk about the rights of the parents versus
the rights of the children and then.you get on to this problem about the
standard of proof. The issue is this: if you take the child away from its
parents what is the alternative? Has the State proven, even on the balance of
probabilities, that it can provide for the proper psychological and emotional
development of the child when it is taken away from its parents? That is the
real issue. and that is why higher standard of proof (beyond reasonable
doubt) has to be considered seriously, particularly when you consider
primary psychological emotional bonding with the parent. You have to
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replace that bonding with the parent You have to replace that bonding with
another bonding. For people who think that a good foster parent placement
is not quite stable enough and would make them adoptive parents, there is a
high rate 'of adoptive parent breakdown. This occurs not just in the initial
placement period of twelve months after adoption, but again (no matter
what the length of adoption is) in the teen years when there is a very high
rate of adoptive breakdown. These are the issues that we have to think about.
If, in fact, the State could guarantee to provide for the proper
psychological and emotional development of the child, I would not worry ‘
about the balance of proof at all. I would take children away on mere
suspicion of child abuse.
Jan Shier, Child Protection and Family Crisis Service, Burwood, Department
of Youth and Community Services
I would like to make three brief comments. First, many doctors do
notify; generally they are in hospitals, and our statistics show that» it is
doctors in private practice who do not. I leave you to draw your own
conclusions in relation to that
Second, I would like to agree with the speaker who said that publicity
is essential, because I think ultimately that is how you get people to actually
understand the problem and the need for intervention, and to be prepared to}
accept their responsibility in their relation to children in our community.
I recently attended the Third International Congress on Child Abuse
and Neglect in Amsterdam and the statement was made that we need to
move away from papers in relation to diagnoses and work; towards
treatment, because if a diagnosis of child abuse was missed by a professional
it was missed deliberately.
The third comment I would like to make is in relation to the court
process. I do not believe that the court is synonymous with’the removal of
the child. .
Rosemary Foot, MR, Shadow Minister for Youth and Community Services '
From my preliminary study of the Community Welfare Bill I note that
it may also be mandatory for certain. prescribed persons to report child
abuse.
Would it be possible for the Director of Youth and Community
Services to inform the meeting as to whom those prescribed persons are to'
be in regulations?
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W. C. Langshaw
There is no decision on that at all. There are-no prescribed persons at
this stage.
Richard Chisholm
Under the present law, too, there is provision for other categories of
people to be prescribed and none have been prescribed.
R D. Blackmore
Concerning the question of the standard of proof, it is not only that the
. Bill says that the standard of proof will be “beyond a reasonable doubt" but
it appears to go even further than that In the present situation where we
generally consider that the standard of proof is the civil one of the balance
of probabilities, nevertheless it is not just a matter of tipping the scales to
however slight a degree. The court must be “comfortably satisfied" or have a
“reasonable degree of certainty” and perhaps it is not a giant step from being
“comfortably satisfied” to “beyond reasonable doubt", but s.94 appears to go
further and says that any fact which tends to prove that a situation itself has
to be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt”. That is something again.
Dr J. A. Seymour
I would like to make one comment about what must be established in
care proceedings. Speaking personally, I share the anxiety of the meeting
about the standard of proof being set at the criminal standard but I do not
think we should get too involved in the difference between the civil standard
and the criminal standard. I would like to point out that there is another way
out of the dilemma. That is, by establishing a dual test such that when the
person comes to court with, let us say, a child who has probably been
abused, that person has to establish to the court’s satisfaction that the child
has been abused and that the situation is such as can be met only by way of
a court order. The point of the second test is that the court is forced to ask
what good intervention will do. If I was sitting on the Bench and someone
brought this child before me I would say “Yes, you have established to my
satisfaction that this child is an abused child but why have you brought the
child to me? What good can the court do? Can you explain to me what
avenues have been explored? Why is this a matter which can be dealt with
only by way of a court order?" I personally would like to see a system with
‘ some sort of dual test like that.
Glenn Bartley, Barrister-at-Law
I would like to comment on the welfare of another segment of the
community, namely, the victims of young offenders. The proposed change in
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the name of the legislation from referring to children to referring to the
community seems to be reflected in the objects of the Bill. Two of these
objects are to promote. protect, develop, maintain and improve the well-
bcing of the people of New South Wales to the maximum extent possible.
and to encourage the establishment ol'eommunity welfare and other services
necessary to promote. protect, develop, maintain, and improve the well-
being of persons (c1.5(l)(a) and (d)).
Included in the New South Wales community referred to in those two
objects are of course the victims — the people on the other end of the stick,
the boot. the knife, or whatever. The relevant provisions in this regard
appear to be cl.183, 186 and 202 of the Bill which in effect provide that:
1. Proceedings in respect of most of the indictable offences created
by the Crimes Act 1900 can be heard summarily by the proposed
children‘s court. Among the charges which may be heard
summarily by the children's court are the following —
O maliciously discharging loaded arms with intent to do
grievous bodily harm, (Crimes Act 1900, 5.33A);
0 using an offensive weapon to prevent lawful apprehension
(Crimes Act, 1900, 3.338);
O maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm
(Crimes Act, 3.35);
O causing grievous bodily harm by any unlawful or negligent
act (Crimes Act, $.54) ,
O assault with intent to commit a felony or resist lawful
apprehension (Crimes Act, $.58);
O assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Crimes Act, 5.59).
(“indictable") common assault (Crimes Act, 3.61).
2. A court cannot award any criminal injuries compensation to a
victim assaulted by an offender aged less than 16 years until such
offender reaches his 16th birthday.
3. If a person charged with an offence is dealt with by the
Children's Court, then it is to the Children's Court that the victim
of the offence must make his application for compensation and,
irrespective of how old the offender is at the time of the
application or how serious and permanent are the victim’s
injuries, the maximum compensation that the victim can be
awarded for any summary or'indictable offence committed by
such offender is $1,000 (pursuant to 5.554 (3), Crimes-Act).
The problem is that young offenders can inflict serious injuries‘on
their victims. One client of mine sustained permanent brain damage as a
result of an assault which Parramatta Children's Court described as
“particularly serious and vicious". He will be affected by his partial
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disabilities for the rest of his life and has minimal prospects of further
promotion in his job. At common law I thought his damages would have
been about $30,000 at the time. Yet because of similar provisions in the Child
Welfare Act 1939, the Court was able to and did award the maximum
compensation of only $1,000.
What I would suggest is that c1202 of the Community Welfare Bill.
1981 'be amended by:
1. Substituting “5.437" for “5.554 (subsections (1) and (2) excepted)”
in order that the maximum compensation which can be awarded
by the children’s court be the same as the maximum compen-
sation which can be awarded by other courts (i..e, currently
$1000,0).
2. Providing that compensation orders be made against the Crown
in the first instance.
3. ' Enabling the Crown to join the relevant young offender as a
third party to a victim’s application for compensation.
4. Limiting a young offender‘s liability to reimburse the Crown to
$1,000.00.
The Crown should accept full and direct responsibility for compen-
‘ ~ sating victims of young offenders. Mr Justice‘Hunt in Queen v Babic (1980 2
. NSWLR 743 at 748) has proposed that change in relation to all applications
for compensation. The reality is little different in other courts anyway. At a
previous seminar (Syd. Inst Crim. Proc. No. 45 Victims of Crime) it was
pointed out that only 5% of moneys paid by the Crown pursuant to the
underwriting provisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1967 is
recovered from the offenders, and that percentage will decrease with the
increase in maximum compensation from $4,000 to $10,000.
Nor does the solution .to the problem of compensating victims of
young offenders lie with the ex gratia scheme, the disadvantages of which
were discussed at the last two seminars of this Institute (Syd. Inst. Crim.
Proc. No. 45 Victims of Crime and No. 47 The Old as Offenders and Victims of
Crime).
The Community Welfare Bill again demonstrates how victims of crime
continue to be the forgotten responsibility of the criminal justice system.
They have been overlooked yet again. On the one hand thereis in progress a
review a very slow one, of the New South Wales criminal injuries
compensation schemes. Yet on the other hand, in currently proposed
legislation nothing has been done to improve the rights of victims to just and
adequate compensation. '  
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ll). II. Light/"ooh Hunter Region Child Protection and Family Crisis Centre
An observation on the question of mandatory reporting. not so much
from the point of view of the law but from what the law is all about in the
community. i.e. trying to draw a community together to provide help at an
early enough stage. I want to focus on the suggestion I heard from Mrs
Cantor (see page 135) on behalf of C.A.P.S. that we should dissemble sharply
from the so called authoritarian and so called “monothority” emergencies.
I want to suggest that perhaps this is not the helpful way that we
should go. If we are to try and build through the voluntary and the statutory
sector and the various disciplines a “law approach“ to child abuse we must
clear up the problem of authority. It is simply too pat to say that. in fact, all
forms of authority are prima facie bad and evil.
The problem has been that over many years we in the Department
have been left in a position, partly by our own device, partly by imposition
on us, of becoming a “last resort" authority. The only time that we can go in
is in the “last resort" when much damage has been done, when the only
form of intervention can be seen as fairly heavy, certainly impersonal.
therefore probably irrational. and therefore inevitably isolating, alienating,
and damaging. I think that mandatory reporting legislation. in whatever
form. is really not about early intervention. In fact. the statutory measure of
support that may be needed to help a parent not hurt a child must be
brought to bear at a sufﬁciently early stage such that authority can be
exercised in a caring and in a personal way. That is no more than the kind
of family life that most of us would wish for ourselves and our children -
where authority is carefully, caringly exercised to shape up the situation
around children.
I said in a seminar here some years ago and I would like to repeat it
now. I believe there is no room in the community, in which each one must
share. for an agency which is allowed to become for any reason, by any
means. simply a “last resort" authority agency.
J. M. G. Callaghan. Stipendiary Magistrate
The ﬁrst question is in relation to the diversion panels. There are two
things that appear to me — one is that Johnny comes up before the diversion
panel and on the strength of some promises that he has given to the local
sergeant of police or the child welfare ofﬁcer or whoever, the panel decides
“Oh well, we won't do anything about him. We will put him to one side and
he does not have to go to court". What happens if he does not keep his
promises? What happens if the next time he is caught doing something he
goes to court? Will the court be made aware of all the proceedings under that
particular panel or will it just be shooting in the dark as usual?
The second question is this. It appears to me that the new care
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proposals (and I am going on Mr Chisholm’s papers rather than the actual
reading of the Bill) seem to cut down a great deal on the powers of courts
and the Department with what we might call disciplinary cases - kids who
refuse to go to school, kids who won't stay at home, who won’t obey their
parents, who stay out all night I understand that now you can’t even get
them locked up in the shelters._We have them in open institutions because
they are being charged under care proceedings, and you can only deal with
them either by way of supervision or alternatively in wards’ establishment if
they go that far. I want to know how those establishments are going to
improve to such an extent that they are going to be able to hold them, let
alone keep them on the straight and narrow.
Richard Chisholm
The new Bill is complicated, and it is hazardous making quick answers
to technical questions on it. I think the answer about the panels is this. First
of all children do not technically come before the panels at all. I don’t think
they need necessarily come before the conferences, either, although there is
perhaps some doubt about that. As. I understand the Bill there is no
provision for either the panel or the conference to enforce any undertakings
given by the child or anybody else. In regard to the question “whether any
evidence of what has happened before the panels can come later'before a
court”, I think the answer to that is “No, it cannot”.
In relation to the other question. The Bill in my view does, as Mr
Callaghan says, result in a withdrawal of the use of coercive power over
older troublesome kids. My assessment of the debate on that subject is that
withdrawal of power does reﬂect not a complete consensus but an
overwhelming view, at least in those sectors of the community that made
submissions in this area. It reﬂected, I think, both a worry that such
protective measures were perceived by the kids as punitive and in some
senses really were punitive and secondly, a perception that, particularly with
older children, enforced measures are not accepted by the children and are
unlikely to be workable.
DrIJeﬂ Sutton, Director, Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, NSW
_ The key thing which seems to emerge looking at those statistics of
crime is the absolute necessity to provide more non-custodial alternatives for
the courtto use. When you look at the fact that we have the highest rate of
use of custodial measures in thisState for juveniles, and further, that at
higher court appearances 41% are people with a juvenile conviction and a
vast majority of those have had an institutional experience, then you realise
that one has got the slippery path of sin all over again. However it occurs
and whoever causes it, the fact is there has to be some attempt to reduce that
cycle as much as possible. Although we have talked about diversion, in the
sense of keeping people from courts, it is uncertain in my mind whether
juvenile aid panels will actually result in a reduction of custodial orders in
view of the lack of measures available for the court to use.
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Mr Cunliffe—Jones has referred to a number of recent advances, and
there have, of course, been some developments in the adult area, but if I were
trying to interpret those statistics to people who look at the system from the'
outside then the thing which strikes you immediately is that there has just
got to be an almost emergency attack on providing more opportunity for
magistrates to make non-custodial orders. The massive commitment to
institutionalization has a momentum of its own, and it is a momentum
which I believe must be wound down very rapidly.
Bob Kijurina, Honorary Secretary, Kings Cross Youth Refuge Ltd.
My remarks were to be principally along the lines of the previous
speaker, because the statistics for New South Wales in comparison to all the
other States as to the use of detention alarmed me, but rather than repeat
what has just been said, might I comment that on the basis of the devolution
of the Department of Youth and Community Services across New South
Wales and the examination of the regional statistics, as provided by Mr
Cunliﬂ‘e-Jones, that emphasis be given to making available to all the
magistrates and the local authorities as many of non-detention options for
the young offenders as possible.
Chris Cunlsze-Jones
There is an awareness in the Department that certain country children
have been disadvantaged in the lack of options available to country courts,
or simply for all the young people in those regions. With regionalisation and
the development of Community Service Orders, the leave to attend
Community Youth Centres will follow. Where these services are not able to
be provided, the Department is hoping to develop “fee for service" optibns or
other programmes where local people can supervise or organize pro-
grammes so that local kids in country towns can still partake in such
programmes. It is a direction we are examining so that those options are
available to all children‘right around the State.
Dr W. G. Waterlow
I would like to ask a question which is directed to the panel. It
concerns a circumstance, which does not happen frequently, but does
happen often enough to be very disturbing, and which I am not sure from
reading the Bill is adequately catered for, and I rather suspect that
mechanisms for handling it might be much more cumbersome than they
have been, i.e., regarding the seriously injured child who comes to hospital.
Statistically they tend to arrive after hours, in the evening, or towardsrthe
weekend or on public holidays, and the hospital is faced with the need on
medical grounds to keep that child in a place of safety. On reading the new
Bill, and on looking at the powers that police have, and accepting the fact
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that there are ﬁnancial and resource constraints upon the Department of
Youth and Community Services (which mean that after hours on Friday, on
Weekends and public holidays their assistance may very well be a voice at
the end of a phone) I would like to hear the comments of the panel as to
whether mechanisms for helping in such a circumstance may be much more
cumbersome than they have been in the past.
Rosemary Smith
We have, we think, covered that situation. One solution is that if such a
situation is notiﬁed to Montrose Child Life Protection Unit, that unit will
then notify a member of the Departmental Legal Branch. If an order was
needed in an emergency, or the matter had to be brought before the court in
an emergency, then the legal ofﬁcer would arrange to have the matter
brought before a duty judge of the Supreme Court rostered for that weekend.
W. R. Gilbert, Stipendiary Magistrate
I would like to take Brett Collins’ enquiry a little bit further as regard
to discipline in the Centres. Clause 253 of the Bill provides that the
Superintendent where a child is charged with misconduct by holding an
inquiry for the purpose of disciplining the child the inquiry to be conducted
in accordance with the procedures as may be prescribed. Perhaps Rosemary
Smith‘ could tell me if any procedures have been prescribed at this stage?
Secondly, the rules of evidence do not apply to sub-clause 7 and the
decision of the superintendent becomes ﬁnal, not subject to an appeal to any
court. They appear to be fairly heavy duties cast upon superintendents. But it
goes even further, if a child wishes to defend something before the
superintendent and his defence involves some complaint against an ofﬁcer
and his defence fails, he then becomes a person who has committed a
serious misconduct. The Nagle Commission had some very stem things to
say about the jeopardy in which a person finds himself who puts up a
defence, has the defence rejected and is then charged with, in effect, telling
lies in his defence. That becomes a more serious charge than the offence
with which he is charged. An adult offender in a gaol has the right to elect in
most cases whether the superintendent or a visiting justice will deal with any
matters. There is provision in the Bill for. visiting justices but no election for
children to decide whether they will come before the visiting justices or the
superintendent The superintendent, with the best will in the world, tends to
become part of the institution — you are appealing from Caesar to Caesar.
Should the defence fail, the child is then charged or liable to be charged with
a serious misconduct that misconduct being the allegation which he made in
his defence is not true.
Chairman
To answer the ﬁrst-part, I understand that there have been as yet no
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prescribed procedures. That is contemplated, as I understand it from Miss
Smith, to be dealt with by regulation once the Bill has been through
Parliament but no doubt your observations will be of assistance to those
who are involved in drawing the regulations.
John Dobes, Solicitor
I am one of the duty Solicitors at Albion Street and I have been Duty
Solicitor at the other courts. The conditions for interviewing children down
there are somewhat rude and they are similarly rude at the other courts. I
accept that when the courts were built they were not built with interview
rooms for duty solicitors in mind, but I am sure that better accommodation
could be found. I am just wondering if any thought has been given to
interviewing the children by solicitors once this Act goes through.
R. D. Blackmore
I think Mr Dobes will be pleased when we do move from Albion Street
to Glebe where the building construction is well advanced and does include
interview facilities. I certainly agree about the old facilities, which we do not
like to even think about working there day by day. but some very modern
facilities have been built by the Department, cg the new court at “Cobham”
(St Marys), the new court at “Worimi” (Newcastle), and the one that is being
built at Glebe; and “Keelong”, a modern remand centre at Wollongong.
I would just like to return to what Mr Gilbert was saying. You have to
go on to cl.254 which says that a child under 16 apparently cannot be
charged with serious misconduct and a person who is charged with serious
misconduct shall be taken before a children's court who will then deal with
the matter.
W. R. Gilbert
The offences under Schedule 7 constituting “serious misconduct“ is the
offence of making a complaint against an ofﬁcer knowing it to be false. They
are very similar provisions to those which were very strongly criticised by Mr
Justice Nagle. It has been removed from the Prison Rules because it was
grossly unfair, and it is found here in respect of juveniles.
John Heagney, Department of Youth and Community Services.
I would like to comment about the remarks made by Mr Gilbert. The'
criticism made by Mr Justice Nagle in his Report was not so much that there
should be serious misbehaviour constituted by making a complaint against
a prison ofﬁcer knowing that complaint to be false. What Mr Justice Nagle
was complaining about was the behaviour of a particular visiting justice in
accepting a complaint made by a superintendent in the circumstances that
Mr Gilbert has elaborated. The prisoner defended a disciplinary matter that
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‘ was brought against him by imputing certain matters against a prison officer
and his defence having failed the visitingjustice (whose identity I. would
dearly love to know) entertained a further disciplinary measure against the
.same prisoner for having imputed falsely misbehaviour on the part of the
prison ofﬁcer. That is disgraceful conduct by somebody in the position
either of a superintendent or of a visiting justice. The complaint that may be
made against this or any other of the provisions in Schedule 7 is wrongly
based if it is made on the basis of Mr Justice Nagle’s Report.
Chairman
I invite Mr Chisholm to make some concluding observations on behalf
of the panel.
Richard Chisholm
This is a heavy responsibility, and not having consulted the other
_ members of the panel I think I should perhaps stress that these are my
observations.
It seems to me perhaps I was partly responsible for creating a note of
excitement and optimism about this brand new Bill which does so many
things that some of us have been lobbying for for a long timeWhat I would
like to do now is stress that the appropriate response on looking at the good
things that the Bill does is riot “Whacko! Oh isn’t it wonderful!" but “Its
abOut bloody time!". This discussion has exposed a number of very serious
problems in the Bill, in particular, the provisions relating to children in
institutions which need very careful attention before it is passed. But in
many ways, the Bill introduces reforms which are long overdue.
There was something bizarre about the production of the Bill.
Somebody observed, when everyone was very tired at one of the committees,
that the committees were very well designed to do something other than
review the legislation. They were very well designed to respond to public
pressure and comments about service delivery. In that last Legislative
Advisory Panel we heard documented stories of sad and terrible things that
had happened to kids about people who had exercised their decision
making powers verybadly, about people who were very poorly trained and
incompetent to do their job — often not through their own fault. These things
were very alarming. But it was difﬁcult and usually impossible to translate
this information and criticism into legislative terms. At the end of the day,
even if we got the Act right, the real questions would still be in terms of
resources, funds, wisdom, decision making processes, and so on. I think the
process showed a need to concentrate on flow of information. . '
I was very struck by how very little we knew about how the system
actually operated. In particular we knew almost nothing about how it was
perceived by the children and by their families. We did know quite a lot
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about how the people running the system saw themselves. We got almost no
information from the people whom it was running into, and oveseas studies
have given us some pretty clear messages that the way a system is perceived
is often very different according to which end of the system you are at.
. Overseas studies have also clearly shown that it is possible to reduce the rate
of institutionalization very drastically from what we have in New South
Wales with no signiﬁcant effect on the rate ofjuvenile crime. I do think that,
in this State, in particular, we have failed to learn lessons that we should
have learned long ago, especially about relating servicesto children whose
needs are closely linked to socially based problems (I include in that our
pitiful response to the kids up at Kings Cross). It seems to me that it is
basically a worrying and troublesome scene. From now on our attention
should not be distracted' by a feeling of self congratulatory warmth on
having passed this wonderful new Bill. We should use the Bill’s quite
signiﬁcant avenues for complaint, and its advisory bodies, to subject the
whole system to a high level of monitoring and receiving information from
kids and their. families. That would be a new experience for us, particularly
in this State.
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